December 25, 2010
Vatican Inter-faith relations with Muslims

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09VATICAN134.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 000134

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, S/P, S/GPI, AND S/SRMC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019

TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF SOCI SCUL VT

SUBJECT: AN INVENTORY OF THE VATICAN’S INTERFAITH DIALOGUES

REF: A. 08 VATICAN 87

B. VATICAN 124

C. 08 USUN 1126

D. VATICAN 106

E. VATICAN 122

F. VATICAN 100

G. VATICAN 126

VATICAN 00000134 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b)

1. (SBU) Summary: The Vatican is a leader or partner in many

inter-religious dialogues, primarily with the “Abrahamic”

religions - Islam, Judaism, and of course, other Christians.

Vatican leaders are also beginning to reach out to Asian faiths.

This cable describes the Vatican’s primary, organized

dialogues. Septels: A) analyze why the Vatican pursues

interfaith dialogue, and B) propose USG-Holy See collaboration

in support of such discussions. End Summary.

Dialogues with Muslim Communities and Nations

——————————————————————-

2. (SBU) Formal, modern-day Vatican dialogue with the Muslim

world goes back for over a decade. It intensified following

September 11, 2001, and again after the controversy that erupted

over Pope Benedict XVI’s September 2006 address in Regensberg.

Some of these dialogues have delivered concrete results; others

remain largely symbolic. Following are the formal,

institutionalized Vatican dialogues with Muslims:

— Partnership with the Jordanian Royal Institute of Inter-Faith

Studies. Held its first colloquium on “Religions and Civil

Society” in Rome in 2009. Will meet every two years. The next

meeting will be in 2011 in Amman or Rome. (Note: This

institute is distinct from the Aal al-Bayt institute which is

part of the Catholic Muslim Forum). (See www.riifs.org.)

— “A Common Word”: The Catholic-Muslim Forum: First met in

Rome November 4-6, 2008. Muslim delegates - both Sunni and Shia

- selected by the Amman-based Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic

Thought. Final declaration called for religious freedom,

protection of minorities, respect for religious symbols, and

equal rights. Will meet every two years: 2010 Forum may meet in

Jordan or another Muslim-majority country (ref a). (See

www.acommonword.com.)

— Saudi-sponsored dialogue: Initiated by Saudi King, through

the Mecca-based Muslim World League (a.k.a. the Rabita). King

of Spain hosted the first meeting in Madrid on July 18, 2008.

Second meeting held on margins of 2008 UNGA, attended by

then-President Bush and eighty-plus other senior officials.

Participants criticized terrorists who claimed to act in the

name of religion. Two additional meetings held in Vienna and

Geneva; latest resulting in agreement to create secretariat —

and possibly new center — for interreligious dialogue in

Vienna, Austria (refs B and C). (See www.world-dialogue.org )

— The Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions

First held in 2003. Meets in Astana, Kazakhstan every three

years. The next meeting will be in 2012. (See

www.religions-congress.org.)

— Coordination Committee of the PCID and the World Islamic Call

Society (WICS) of Libya. The focus of this meeting is relations

between Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa, where the

WICS is active. First held in 2002. Meets every two years in

Tripoli or Rome. Next meeting in 2010.

— The Joint Committee for Dialogue between the PCID and the

Permanent Committee of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, for

Dialogue between Monotheistic Religions. First held in 1998.

Meets at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo every year.

— Dialogue with Center for Inter-Religious Dialogue of the

Islamic Culture and Relations Organization in Iran. This

Vatican partnership with Iran’s Islamic Guidance Ministry dates

back to 1995. The subject of a recent meeting was “Human

dignity with special reference to bioethics.” Meets in Tehran

every two years. The next meeting is in 2010. (See

http://en.icro.ir .)

— The Islamic-Catholic Liaison Committee of the International

Forum for Dialogue. First held in 1995. Meets in Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia, every three years. Next meeting in 2012. (See

www.dialogueonline.org.)

VATICAN 00000134 002.2 OF 003

Other Avenues for Catholic-Muslim Encounters

——————————————————————

3. (SBU) The Holy See and the Arab League established diplomatic

relations in 2000. The League has a representative to the Holy

See based in Rome, and the Vatican’s representative to the

League is the nuncio in Cairo. The Holy See and the League

signed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 23, 2009, to

strengthen joint projects to promote peace and dialogue,

especially on the political and cultural levels. The Memorandum

was signed by Archbishop Dominique Mamberti, the Holy See’s

Secretary of Relations with States, and Arab League Secretary

General Amr Moussa. Vatican officials note that the MOU has not

yet led to any concrete initiatives or dialogues.

4. (C) The Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue

signed a “Declaration of Intent” with the Department for

Religious Affairs of the Turkish Prime Minister’s Cabinet on

April 25, 2002. Its aim was to promote inter-religious

dialogue, in particular by facilitating collaboration between

academic institutions. Progress in discussions with the Turks

is not coming quickly. The Vatican is disappointed that the

former Church of Paul of Tarsus is now a Turkish government-run

museum. The Vatican also supports Orthodox demands to reopen

the Halki seminary in Turkey, have the GOT recognize the

Ecumenical Patriarch as an international religious leader, and

grant greater religious freedoms to Orthodox and other

Christians.

5. (SBU) Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, President of the

Inter-Religious Dialogue Council, travelled to Indonesia in

November 2009. It was the first visit of the Vatican’s top

dialogue official to Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority

country in the world — 206 million out of a population of 240

million. (There are 7 million Catholics in the country.)

Vatican and Indonesian officials continue to discuss concrete

initiatives for follow-up to this visit.

The Other Monotheistic Faiths: Jews and other Christians

——————————————————————- —————-

6. (SBU) Unlike relations with Islam, Vatican relations with

Jews are characterized by substantial theological common ground

and historic roots. Discussions between the two religions are

ongoing and broad-based. They are often intersected by

politics, and sometimes hurt by missteps. The Vatican’s

long-standing dialogue initiatives with the Jews prospered in

the years since the Vatican II Council removed obstacles to good

relations. They took a big hit in January 2009, however, when

the Vatican restored communion to a schismatic Catholic group

that included a Holocaust-denying bishop. After considerable

effort by the Vatican and the Pope himself, relations have been

largely mended and were solidified with the Pope’s visit to the

Holy Land in May 2009. Nevertheless, the proposed conferral of

sainthood on WWII-era Pope Pius XII and access by historians to

the archives of his pontificate are recurring irritants in the

relationship (ref D).

7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Vatican officials speak constantly with

followers of other Christian faiths in ecumenical dialogue

intended to overcome divisions between Christians. Indeed, the

Vatican has a separate Pontifical Council for Christian Unity

(which for historical reasons also covers dialogue with Jews).

These discussions have their ups and downs. While the Vatican

move in November 2009 to welcome disaffected Anglicans to the

Catholic Church dealt a blow to ecumenical understanding (ref

E), the rift is healing in part because few Anglicans will

probably take advantage of the Vatican offer. Meanwhile,

relations with the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow — who

commands the allegiance of a large number of Orthodox and is

thus arguably more influential than Ecumenical Patriarch

Bartholomew — have improved. (ref F). This has allowed Moscow

and the Vatican to upgrade their “special character” to “full

diplomatic” relations (ref G).

8. (SBU) Ultimately, the monotheistic nature and shared historic

roots of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — all “people of the

book” - make dialogue between these three religions easier for

the Vatican in some ways than discussions with other religions.

An important interfaith meeting including senior leaders of the

world’s major monotheistic religions, Christians (Catholic and

VATICAN 00000134 003.2 OF 003

Orthodox), Jews and Muslims, took place in Seville, Spain,

December 6-8, 2009. The King of Spain’s “Three Cultures, Three

Faiths” Foundation sponsored the event. (VATICAN 124).

Outreach to Asian Faiths

————————————

9. (C) Despite the difficulty for the Vatican of finding common

ground with polytheistic religions, Holy See officials are

starting to do just that in an effort to support peace,

religious freedom, human rights, and local solutions to local

problems (see septel). Cardinal Tauran travelled to India in

June 2009 for initial dialogue with Hindus. Tauran’s goal was

to go beyond the positive assurances that had characterized

previous meetings with Hindu leaders. Specifically, he sought

to bridge the gap between his Indian interlocutors’ stated

goodwill and the continuing hostility toward Christians in parts

of India like Orissa, especially by some Hindu nationalists.

The Vatican also raised concerns about Indian anti-conversion

laws — although they have not been enforced. Cardinal Tauran

also traveled to Japan in August 2009, to initiate discussions

with Buddhists and other Asian faiths.

10. (SBU) Comment: Tauran acknowledges quietly that the Vatican

has not paid sufficient attention to relations with Asian

religions. He is not an expert on polytheistic religions and is

unlikely to find — or even seek — common theological ground

with their precepts. Instead, as he and his Council increase

their outreach to these communities, they will challenge their

interlocutors to remove obstacles to the enjoyment of religious

freedom for all. End comment.

Comment

———-

11. (C) The number and scope of the Vatican’s inter-religious

dialogues is unparalleled by that of any other church or

organization in the world. The dialogues are already effective

in preventing or smoothing over misunderstandings and tensions.

The big question is how to translate into concrete actions the

high moral principles that the world’s major religions bring to

the dialogue table. Septel includes proposals for USG

engagement with the Vatican in support of interreligious

understanding and action.

DIAZ

4:57pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IizJ1
December 25, 2010
UK Influencing Bangladeshi Madrassa Curriculums, Human Rights Abuses in Bangladesh

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000482 

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09DHAKA482.html

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR H 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019 

TAGS PTER, PGOV, PREL, HYMPSK, MARR, KPAO, UK, BG 

SUBJECT: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON COUNTERRORISM WORKING 

WITH THE UK

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

——— 

SUMMARY

———- 

1. (C) The U.S. and the United Kingdom share common counterterrorism goals in Bangladesh and we have worked together on specific issues in the past. Embassy Dhaka and the British High Commission reviewed our efforts and agreed on several areas of cooperation at an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting. Specifically, we agreed trying to arrange a visit to London and Washington for senior Bangladeshi officials to view both countries’ national security systems. The missions also agreed to work closely on human rights training for the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and on promoting curriculum reform at Bangladesh’s unregulated madrassas. The missions identified several other areas in which coordinated action could promote badly needed security sector reform in Bangladesh.

——————————————————————- - 

COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

——————————————————————- - 

2. (SBU) British High Commissioner Stephen Evans and Ambassador Moriarty led an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting between our two missions on May 13. Although members of the two missions have met individually to discuss counterterrorism issues and work together on specific projects, this forum provided an opoprtunity to discuss broad goals and develop strategies to work collaboratively. Several common areas of interest quickly emerged, most prominently the desire to promote security sector reform in Bangladesh. Evans said this would be the center of discussion at an inaugural Joint Working Group meeting on counterterrorism between Britain and Bangladesh, led by British Security Minister Lord West, in late June, and promised a quick read-out of the results to the Embassy.

3. (SBU) Perhaps the key element of security sector reform is building a healthier civil-military relationship. The dysfunctional relationship dates from the numerous coups in Bangladesh’s early years and was recently exacerbated by the February 25-26 border guard mutiny against army officers. The Ambassador detailed Post’s plans to invite senior Bangladeshi officials to participate in an Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies workshop in November to exchange views on civil-military relations and national security systems. The two missions agreed the workshop would be most effective if a Bangladeshi delegation of military, government and Parliament representatives first visited the U.S. and the United Kingdom to learn about our national security structures. The missions will seek a visit in September; Post will work with SCA to ensure the Washington leg includes visits to Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense, the State Department and the National Security Council.

4. (C) We agreed to jointly engage Bangladesh’s newly formed National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention, a high-level group led by Home Affairs State Minister Tanjim Ahmad Sohel Taj, who has worked closely with the Embassy on security issues. Local media has reported the committee will focus in part on anti-extremism messaging, an area in which both missions already are actively engaged and can work more cooperatively. The U.S. and United Kingdom also agreed to jointly sound out the Government of Bangladesh on its post-mutiny reorganization plans for the Bangladesh Rifles and then work together to help make it a more effective border patrol force.

—————————————————————- 

COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IN RAB

—————————————————————- 

5. (SBU) The U.S. and UK representatives reviewed our ongoing training to make the RAB a more transparent, accountable and human-rights compliant paramilitary force. The British have been training RAB for 18 months in areas such as investigative interviewing techniques and rules of engagement. They said that the training had been widely disseminated within RAB and that they were undertaking an assessment of its effectiveness. The Embassy described plans

DHAKA 00000482 002 OF 002

to imbed two U.S. marshals within RAB for three months to help set up internal affairs, use of force and rules of engagement systems. High Commissioner Evans suggested the marshals stop in London on the way to Bangladesh to meet with British police who have delivered human rights training to RAB. He said the visit would ensure maximum coordination between the U.S. and British programs; the Ambassador enthusiastically supported the proposal.

——————————————————————- ———- 

MARITIME SECURITY, POLICING, AIRPORT SAFETY AND MORE

——————————————————————- ———- 

6. (C) Evans promised to send the Embassy a “lessons learned” document from a just-concluded combined British-Bangladesh maritime security exercise in which U.S. Department of Defense personnel participated. He noted the U.K. did not expect to have any more Royal Navy ships visit Bangladesh before 2011 and asked whether the United States could take the lead in organizing a follow-up exercise. With the U.S. and Britain both ramping up programs to develop community policing, we agreed to create an informal consultative group led by the British that would include other international missions in Dhaka with policing projects. The two missions also agreed to have their two development agencies, USAID and the U.K. Department for International Development, meet to discuss strategies for supporting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s plan to develop standardized curriculum for thousands of unregulated Islamic madrassa schools. (Note: The Embassy has submitted a 1207 proposal for a madrassa curriculum development program. End note). Finally, noting the horrendous safety gaps at Dhaka’s international airport, the Ambassador and High Commissioner agreed to sound out contacts within their respective governments, the international airlines that serve Dhaka, and the Bangladeshi state airline to determine how best to improve security.

———————————- 

CONCLUSION: NOW WE KNOW

———————————- 

7. (C) The inaugural U.S.-British quarterly meeting provided each side with a much better understanding of what the other was doing to counter terrorism and extremism in Bangladesh. Not surprisingly, our counterterrorism strategies and goals are closely aligned, allowing ample room for close coordination and, in some cases, joint programs. Given that Sheikh Hasina’s new government has made security a top priority, the chances of U.S.-British joint efforts bearing fruit are high indeed. MORIARTY

4:42pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IiWDF
December 25, 2010
Iranian Propaganda machine active in India

Friday, 04 May 2007, 11:42

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07NEWDELHI2142.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002142 

SIPDIS 

SIPDIS 

NSC FOR ABRAMS 

EO 12958 DECL: 05/04/2017 

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, IR, IN 

SUBJECT: IRAN MANIPULATING INDIAN ELITE OPINION-MAKERS 

Classified By: Charge Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

1. (C) This cable contains an action request for SCA. Please see paragraph 6.

New Iranian Mischief

——— 

2. (C) Ambassador K.V. Rajan, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and current Chairman of the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), called Charge May 4 for an urgent meeting in which he told Charge that he had been invited by the Iranian Embassy for an all expenses paid trip for “politicians, scholars and commentators.” The list of invitees in a fax from the Iranian Embassy press section included notorious America-critics, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. The visit was scheduled for April 28-May 4, and the Embassy said the guests would meet Iranian officials, scholars and would visit “one or two Iranian nuclear establishment(s).” Reports this week in the “Asian Age” and “The Hindu” indicate the group visited the Arak Heavy Water Complex and met with Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah.

3. (C) Rajan told Charge that this trip was part of an effort on the part of the Iranian government to encourage anti-American, pro-Muslim scholars and think-tankers in India to influence Prime Minister Singh’s supporters to take a more pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. view, and that his presence on the delegation would have handed Iran a PR coup. In light of his suspicions, Rajan canceled at the last minute, citing a sudden family emergency. Following is the invitee list, which Rajan provided to Charge:

— XXXXXXXXXXXX

India Seeks U.S. Help

——— 

4. (C) To counter this new and worrying effort to reach out to Indian opinion makers, Rajan proposed a visit to the United States starting May 14 in his NSAB capacity for five to seven days to talk to officials, think tanks, and the intelligence community to discuss ways to understand better U.S. assessments of Iran. He would expect this to feed into NSAB discussion of Iran policy options.

5. (C) Rajan’s analysis of Iranian intentions to influence PM Singh’s domestic constituencies is deeply worrying and spot-on, and confirms what we have been reporting. Rajan also noted stepped up Iranian funding to sympathetic Shia clerics. The United Progressive Alliance government is deeply interested in appeasing its Muslim and Left Front

NEW DELHI 00002142 002 OF 002

supporters, and is concerned about the outcome of elections in Uttar Pradesh state, where a large number of Muslim constituents reside. We see evidence that Iran has been buying off journalists, clerics and editors in Shia-populated areas of Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir, doling out large sums to stoke anti-Americanism. Now, it seems Iran is focusing squarely on influential elite audiences in Delhi, with a view to shaping the debate of India’s IAEA policy and the nuclear deal.

ACTION REQUEST: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS

——— 

6. (C) To counter this insidious new Iranian effort, we recommend Rajan receive meetings, if possible, with:

— XXXXXXXXXXXX

4:26pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2Ih-DH
December 25, 2010
Prison Life in Morocco

 

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RABAT 000408
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09RABAT408.html
SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR INR - MCCORMACK AND INL/AAE - ALTON/STOLWORTHY
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/MAG AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2029
TAGS: PINR PHUM SOCI EAID SNAR PTER KCRM MO
SUBJECT: OPENING UP AGAIN? MOROCCAN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
AND REFORM (C-NE9-00043)

REF: A. STATE 006210 (C-NE9-00043) (NOTAL)
B. 08 RABAT 0569 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
information and provides a broader general update on
Morocco's prison situation and the now year-old Prison
Administration. Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's
prisons are in a difficult, but changing situation. They
have won increasing international interest, due in part to a
large number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk of
radicalization. The Government of Morocco (GOM) reported
that among the roughly 60,000 prisoners, more than 100
inmates died in 2008, which NGOs blamed on poor conditions.
Morocco's chief warden is Prison Administration
Delegate-General Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former top cop for
the late King Hassan II. Benhachem has been in office a year
following a shakeup after a major breakout by radical
Islamist prisoners. He told us security was his first
priority and rehabilitation next. With King Mohammed VI's
support and a larger budget, Benhachem has improved security,
increased rations, and is embarking on an ambitious building
program, but problems persist. He is beginning to open to
international cooperation. The Justice Ministry is
redrafting the penal code to allow for parole and probation,
the most effective way to ease overcrowding, and has asked us
for help. The USG so far has provided only modest support to
a prison rights NGO. We have sought new funding, including
under a Defense Appropriations Act Section 1207, to aid the
Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration and organizations
involved in post-release re-entry, to reduce the risk that
former prisoners could become suicide bombers. End Summary.

----------
Background
----------

2. (C) Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's prisons are in
a difficult but changing situation. They have been the locus
of increasing international interest, due in part to a large
number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk that the difficult
environment could foster violent tendencies post-release.
With a population of some 60,000, estimates in early 2008
suggested that prison budgets were barely one dollar per
prisoner per day. Prisoners must receive food from family
and friends if they are to eat at a reasonable standard.
Overcrowding can be severe, as shown in some photographs of
prisoners sleeping across the floor of a large cell, packed
like sardines, a condition uncommon, but which may still
exist in some facilities.

3. (C) During the &years of lead,8 the repressive era of
Hassan II, Moroccan prisons were often forbidding places,
isolated in the desert with unspeakable conditions and abuse
common. Later in Hassan II,s reign and under King Mohammed
VI, many of these symbols of repression have been closed;
some turned in to places of remembrance but cutting prison
capacity. Despite growth in the number of prisoners in
recent years, no new prisons have been built for years,
although that is now changing. Outside interest has
increased since a young Moroccan, released on pardon after
being imprisoned for several years for alleged association
with those involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings, blew
himself up in a Casablanca cybercafe in 2007, part of a ring
of seven such suicide bombers. In the years leading up to
2008, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) then responsible for
prisons, instituted some human rights-linked changes funded
by outside donors, including permitting NGOs to work in the
prisons. In response to agitation by Islamist/Salafist
prisoner support groups and families, it also granted
increasing privileges to some Islamist prisoners. The death
penalty has not been carried out in about a decade, although
abolition of capital punishment will not likely soon occur.

RABAT 00000408 002 OF 007


This has contributed to growing numbers of capital prisoners.
The diminution of repression in Moroccan society has
probably also contributed to the rising number of inmates,
with severe physical abuse a lesser form of crime deterrence.
We understand that as many as half the inmate population may
be awaiting trial.

4. (C) In late April 2008, after the escape of nine
Salafists (Islamic radicals) from Kenitra prison, many
convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
King Mohammed VI moved responsibility for prison
administration from the MOJ and gave it to the newly created
Directorate under the Prime Minister's Office. The MOJ had
accommodated the growing organized presence of Salafists in
the prisons by granting increasing privileges, and there was
a sense that it had simply lost control. The escape turned
the prison situation into an embarrassment for the GOM and
the King.

------------------------------------------
Benhachem and the King: The New Old Guard
------------------------------------------

5. (C) The King named Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former
Director General of National Security (DGSN or national
police) under Hassan II, to head the new Prison
Administration, with the quasi-ministerial-rank of Delegate
General, and reporting formally to the Prime Minister but
undoubtedly also directly to the Palace. Retired since 2003,
Benhachem had a reputation for toughness. He did not engage,
as far as we have been able to determine, in any official or
unofficial work or consulting for the GOM during his
retirement, nor did he work in the private sector. Benhachem
brought with him to the Prison Administration several
veterans of the former king's security apparatus, triggering
concerns within the diplomatic and domestic human rights
communities.

6. (C) On the day of Benhachem's appointment, King Mohammed
VI released a statement directing Benhachem and his new
Directorate to improve the reinsertion and reintegration of
former prisoners into society; guarantee security and
discipline within the prison system; ensure respect for law
within the system; bring conditions in prisons into
accordance with international norms; ensure respect for human
rights and dignity within facilities; and improve working
conditions for staff members and guards. The same statement
indicated that such improvements were crucial to combating
radical Islam. This was notable as the GOM had previously
been reluctant to publicly link militant Islam with prison
conditions. The same day, Minister of Justice Radi said that
Benhachem's appointment was part and parcel of a broader
justice sector reform process.

-------------------------
The Prison Administration
-------------------------

7. (C) The Directorate General for Prison Administration and
Reinsertion is an independent entity with its own budget and
central administrative apparatus. It absorbed all
responsibility for correctional administration from the MOJ
and is not affiliated with any other ministry or agency.
Since the removal of the Prison Administration from the
Ministry, there has been little discussion between the two
organizations except through formal channels. While the MOJ
still directs strategic penal policy, such as the possibility
of expanding alternative sentencing or judicial supervision,
it now has no input into security and daily operations of
prison facilities. Nor is there any indication of a
continuing link between Benhachem and the DGSN, or of any
influence from the DGSN/Interior Ministry (MOI). The MOI has
adamantly refused to even discuss with us prisons or related
assistance.


RABAT 00000408 003 OF 007


8. (C) Benhachem's approach to his new job seems well
thought-out and strategic. On assuming his position in April
2008, Benhachem halted discussions with foreign embassies
about cooperation programs, undertook an intensive internal
organizational audit, and formulated a plan and budget. He
fired officials he felt were incompetent or corrupt.
Benhachem proceeded to issue a series of directives ordering
prison guards to begin wearing their uniforms on duty once
again and instructing all staff to apply all rules and
regulations consistently at all facilities. He warned of
dire consequences if his instructions were not followed. He
ended the policy of appeasement of Salafist inmates, who had
gained unprecedented privileges and control under the MOJ
(Ref B). However, with palace support, he also got a larger
budget, and once he reestablished security, funds were then
appropriately next allocated for improved food. In addition,
he expedited existing construction and pushed forward plans
for additional new prisons. The recapture (or death) of all
the Salafist escapees, and others as well, allowed scope for
renewed reform and cooperation with the international
community.

--------------------------------------
Personality, Priorities and Assistance
--------------------------------------

9. (C) EmbOffs met with Benhachem on June 19, 2008 (Ref B),
and again on March 31, 2009, at the Directorate General for
Prison Administration and Reinsertion (DGAP) headquarters.
In both meetings, they found him direct, charming and
practical, but wary of USG intentions. Benhachem underscored
the ministerial status of the Prison Administration.
Benhachem told EmbOffs that he is in charge of prisoners
while incarcerated and responsible for their reintegration
into society when released, although he had earlier confirmed
that his responsibility ended at the prison gate. The DGAP's
2009 budget includes USD 128 million for general operations
and USD 86 million for capital expenses such as new
construction and renovation. Benhachem told EmbOffs that
this represented a 40 percent increase in funding. In
statements reported in the press, Benhachem said that the new
budget allowed him to increase spending per prisoner USD 50
cents to two dollars per day.

10. (C) In a separate meeting with Morocco USAID Mission
Director, he expressed a greater degree of comfort in working
with USAID than the Embassy, and recommended that all
requests for programming and cooperation with the DGAP be
sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via
diplomatic note. He also floated the idea of forming an
inter-ministerial coordination group, helmed by the MFA, to
work on security sector assistance issues with the USG.
(Comment: This suggests his mandate may include increased
controls on and transparency in relations with U.S. entities.
End Comment.)

11. (C) In the March 31 meeting, Benhachem told EmbOffs that
security and rehabilitation were his twin and intertwined
priorities. However, he emphasized that he would not
sacrifice security in the name of reform, saying, "I cannot
make progress if I do not control my buildings." On the
security side, Benhachem had very specific thoughts and
highlighted renovation, new construction, and improved
technological ability to scan inmates and packages for
contraband as immediate areas of focus. He said that
establishing closed-circuit-television networks and
electronic monitoring of facilities and inmates was an
important medium-term goal that would leverage his limited
staff and financial resources to greater effect. Benhachem
also expressed a need for better equipment for his staff and
improved training.

12. (C) On the subject of rehabilitation and post-release
reintegration of inmates, Benhachem appeared open-minded but
less in command of the subject. He expressed a need for

RABAT 00000408 004 OF 007


greater life skills programming but offered no specific
ideas. He reinforced a desire for medical assistance within
prisons and encouraged EmbOffs to coordinate with Deputy
Administrator for Social and Cultural Programs Hilmi.
Benhachem also said that there needed to be greater
coordination with the private sector and local governments to
provide jobs and soft landings for released prisoners.
Benhachem maintained there was no serious overcrowding in the
women's section and was less interested in specific women's
programming. (Note: Women are a small minority of prisoners
-- perhaps only three percent. End Note.)

13. (C) Despite public statements of support from Minister
of Justice Radi, who told then-Ambassador Riley in November
2007 that he sought the creation of an independent prison
authority, relations between Justice and the DGAP remain
tense. M'Hammed Abdenabaoui, the number three at the MOJ,
still holds the pre-sentencing and post-release portfolio for
his Ministry. He told PolOff in a February meeting that the
MOJ was interested in collaborating with the USG in designing
reentry programs. Abdenabaoui said that communication with
the DGAP was still tense but improving. He thought Benhachem
seemed to have little respect for the MOJ's former prison
managers.

----------------
The Two Deputies
----------------

14. (C) Two deputies assist Benhachem. Mustapha Hilmi, a
former prosecutor who also served at the upper echelons of
the MOJ's Central Prison Authority, was given the title of
Director of Social, Cultural and Reintegration Activities.
Soufiane Ouamrou, formerly of the police (DGSN) became the
Director of Inmate and Physical Security. Hilmi is known to
EmbOffs and is respected within the legal community. He
assisted the American Bar Association in Rabat in efforts to
reform the Moroccan Bar Association. Under the MOJ, he was
known as a moderate voice on prison issues. At the March 31
meeting, Benhachem appeared to have a collaborative,
respectful and easy relationship with Hilmi, who also
attended. Benhachem appeared to trust his insights and
delegated tasks to him easily. Mission staff have not met
with Ouamrou and little is known about him.

------------------
Current Conditions
------------------

15. (C) Overcrowding remains the largest single challenge to
the Moroccan prison system. Its 59 prisons, many of which
are outdated and poorly maintained, hold 60,000 inmates, 40
percent more than they were designed to house. Almost half
of those detained are in pre-trial or preventive detention.
Since Moroccan law allows for up to a year of pre-trial
detention, and Morocco has no jails in which individuals
awaiting trial can be held separately from convicts, this
class of inmate contributes significantly to the overcrowding
problem.

16. (C) According to the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OMP),
an independent, non-profit watchdog group, inmate complaints
of abuse or substandard conditions increased by 22.48 percent
in 2008 compared to 19 percent in 2007. OMP received 520
letters from prisoners or their relatives related to
mistreatment, poor conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical
treatment, sexual assault and violence. The OMP's report
linked 18 deaths directly to substandard conditions and
inmate violence as a result of overcrowding, and reported
greater than 100 inmate deaths overall. The OMP also
strongly criticized poor working conditions for the system's
5,228 guards, most of whom only make USD 240 per month. In
press statements, Abderrahim Jamai, a member of the OMP
board, said that the organization's attempts to raise issues
of concern with Benhachem were rebuffed and their letters to

RABAT 00000408 005 OF 007


the DGAP remain unanswered.

17. (C) The DGAP's Hilmi, in a public statement, countered
that cases of violence were down 12 percent in 2008 compared
to the period between 2003 and 2007. In a separate
statement, Benhachem said that 2008's inmate mortality rate,
while high, was less than the previous year's rate of 125
deaths, and well within norms for a system of this size. He
added that 32 percent of mortality cases were due to chronic
diseases, and that 66 percent of deaths among the prisoners
were registered in hospitals. Benhachem said that there was
one suicide every two months in 2008.

----------------------------
Status of Islamist Prisoners
----------------------------

18. (C) The majority of Salafist or terror-related inmates
are held in prisons in Tetouan, Sale and Ain Sebaa outside
Casablanca. Although they no longer enjoy the broad
privileges they once did they, like most inmates in the
system, they have easy access to mobile phones and contraband
smuggled in when family members bring food. On January 29,
Embassy received a letter from Reda Ben Othman, an "Islamic
detainee at the local prison of Ain Sebaa." He alleged that
he and his fellow religious prisoners still suffer "assault
and torture" at the hands of authorities for their beliefs.
There is a formally recognized NGO, "Anassir" (victory),
which advocates for the prisoners as individuals or as a
group. In 2007, a photograph of a police officer beating the
wife of a Salafist prisoner at an Anassir demonstration was
carried by al Qaeda websites, accompanied by threats against
perfidious Moroccan authorities. Benhachem has apparently
dispersed some Salafist prisioners, but most remain
concentrated in a few higher-security prisons.

--------------
Plan of Action
--------------

19. (C) In a speech at a national workshop on implementing
the International Convention against Torture (ICAT) in
Morocco, Benhachem said that harmonizing Moroccan legislation
with the ICAT was in the interests of society and that
protection of human rights was a central aspect of his
mandate. He said that he had issued directives on respect
for rights to all staff members and would not hesitate to
punish violators. He also encouraged all security sector
staff to meet both the spirit and the letter of laws and
agreements. Since his appointment, Benhachem has suspended
or fired five prison directors and more than 20 guards and
officials for dereliction of duty or malfeasance.

20. (C) At the ICAT workshop, Benhachem said that a special
240 million dirham (USD 30 million) allocation is being used
to complete six new prisons in the first half of 2009. He
added that renovations at the "priority prisons" of Oukacha
in Casablanca and Kenitra are well underway. The end result
of this investment, he explained, would be to increase inmate
living space from the current level of 1.6 meters per person
to three meters. (Note: International norms call for nine
meters. End Note.) The new facilities will include areas
for enhanced inmate training and counseling. Benhachem
indicated that the DGAP will begin to recruit an additional
6,000 guards in 2012.

21. (C) In terms of health services, Benhachem said that the
DGAP directly employs 107 general practitioners and has a
large number of medical specialists under contract to provide
inmates with additional care as needed. According to
Benhachem, the DGAP has also increased per person medical
expenditures from less than USD .01 to USD .50 per day.

--------------------------------------------- ------
Pretrial Diversion, Parole and the Justice Ministry

RABAT 00000408 006 OF 007


--------------------------------------------- ------

22. (C) As part of a longer-term strategy to decrease
overcrowding and provide incentive-based rehabilitation
programs, the GOM with the MOJ in the lead is revising the
penal code to allow for parole and probationary release of
convicts. There is no such provision under current law; so
inmates must either serve their entire sentence or hope to
benefit from a royal pardon. Some prisoners convicted of
terrorism won early release in pardons, in some cases due to
an admittedly wide dragnet after the 2003 Casablanca
bombings. Both Benhachem and the MOJ's Abdenabaoui
separately told EmbOffs that the creation of a parole and
probation system is a crucial aspect of correctional reform
in Morocco. Abdenabaoui, who would have MOJ authority over
any conditional release structure, informally requested USG
help in setting up such a system in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Abdelaziz Nouyaidi, President of NGO Adala (Justice), told
EmbOffs in April that the GOM had not yet invited civil
society comment on the draft penal code and was playing its
cards close to the chest.

-------------------------
Partners and Other Actors
-------------------------

23. (C) The largest actor working on rehabilitation and
correctional issues outside of the DGAP is the Mohammed VI
Foundation for Reinsertion. Founded in 2002 with strong
royal patronage, the GOM-funded private foundation aims to
lead the effort to improve vocational and educational reform
in prisons. Overseen by a board made up of human rights
activists and private sector leaders, the Foundation has laid
out a plan to provide vocational training to 26,570 inmates
(11 percent female) between 2008 and 2012. The Foundation
has established Post-Release Coaching Centers designed to
ease the transition to freedom.

24. (C) Other potential partners include:

-- The Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (mentioned earlier).
OMP was the recipient of the first USG funded prison
assistance in Morocco, initially in 2006 through a grant from
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for technical
assistance to this human rights civil society organization
and, in 2008 in a modest USD 80,000 grant of Counterterrorism
(S/CT) funds administered by Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI);

-- Relais Prison, a social work organization run by Fatna
Elbouih, a prominent former political prisoner, who works
with inmates on vocational, health and counseling issues;

-- Association Annasir (or Al Nasir), an Islamist prisoner
support and advocacy organization;

-- Other small NGOs, including one in Western Sahara, support
prisoner welfare and education;

-- The Belgian Embassy, which works with released prisoners;

-- The British Embassy, which is funding a mediation training
program in prisons through U.S.-based NGO Search for Common
Ground and has funded curriculum development programs in the
past at the DGAP's training Academy in Ifrane;

-- The Danish Embassy, which is funding an agricultural
vocational skills program at a minimum-security prison in
central Morocco; and

-- The European Union, which has expressed an interest in
working on penal issues in Morocco.

-------
Comment

RABAT 00000408 007 OF 007


-------

25. (C) Comment: Although still steering a firm,
security-focused course, Benhachem appears to have somewhat
assuaged those who feared he would focus only on walls and
guards and not rehabilitation or reform. Once he established
control, he seems ready to begin engaging with donors. Given
his apparent lack of trust over USG motives in wanting to
fund prison programs, it would be advisable to proceed slowly
and closely engage only if identifiable funds are already
available for a program that could be implemented with input
from the DGAP. Conversely, assistance to the MOJ, with which
our relations are good and growing, in revising the penal
code and setting up conditional release programs might be
easier and less controversial first steps towards building
broader trust and programming. The Mission has also
requested Washington funding for a longer-term, more
comprehensive approach, including under Section 1207 and/or
MEPI, that would also focus on pre-intake, prison conditions
and vital support for the re-entry into society of those
whose term is finished. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

4:06pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IhLsw
December 25, 2010
Ethnic divisions in Spanish Islam

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09BARCELONA154.html

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BARCELONA 000154

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE MCKNIGHT AND ZERDECKI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR SMIG SOCI SP MO
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARLIAMENTARIAN DISCUSSES ISLAM IN SPAIN

1. (U) SUMMARY: Spain's first Muslim Parliamentarian
discussed with POLOFF Muslim relations in Spain and stressed the
importance of grassroots activism to integrate Muslims into
Spanish society. Noting the vast increase of Muslim immigrants
into Spain in recent years, Mohammed Chaib cautioned against
radical and fundamentalist trends in the country. In addition
to xenophobic political attitudes, Chaib faulted the lack of
unity within the Muslim community as a barrier to developing a
more positive role for Muslims in Spain. He also criticized the
divided Muslim leadership for not collaborating to build an
official mosque in Catalonia, which has more Muslims than any
other region in Spain. On a positive note, he said that the
Arab world has high hopes for President Obama. END SUMMARY



2. (U) POLOFF met on October 29 with Mohammed Chaib, a
socialist party deputy elected to the Catalan Parliament in 2003
and, more notably, the first Muslim Parliamentarian in Spain. A
Moroccan born immigrant whose family moved to Barcelona when he
was a small child, Chaib shared his views on the state of Islam
in Spain, and stressed the importance of immigrants integrating
into Spanish society. He said that the high rate of Muslim
immigration into Spain has greatly changed the Islamic community
over the past 15 years, and noted that more Muslims live in
Catalonia than in any other region of Spain. Approximately 1.3
to 1.5 million Muslims live in Spain, roughly half of whom are
from Morocco. The number of Muslims in Spain has nearly tripled
since 2003, when the population was estimated at only 525,000.
Less than 30 percent are Spanish citizens, including descendents
of immigrants and Spanish converts to Islam.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY



3. (U) The Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE), created in
1992, is the official entity representing Muslims in Spain. The
CIE has outlined cooperative agreements on education, prayer in
the workplace, imams and other policies to help manage Muslim
relations with Spanish society. According to Chaib, however,
these agreements were never fully developed and have been poorly
implemented. He said that competing interpretations of Islam,
coupled with cultural differences between Arab, Pakistani,
sub-Saharan and Spanish Muslim converts create further
divisions. He added that much of the discordance within the
Muslim community stems from the competing interests of the two
administrative bodies that comprise CIE - the Federation of
Islamic Religious Entities of Spain (FEERI) and the Islamic
Community Union of Spain (UCIDE). Chaib explained that FEERI
was originally created to serve Spanish Muslim converts, while
UCIDE was oriented toward Arab immigrants. He said that the two
federations need to unite under one secretary general with a
common mandate to integrate Muslims into Spanish society.
Chaib, who participated in a State Department International
Visitors Leadership Program on immigration in 2002, noted,
"Islam is the same. However, the administration of Islam is
very different."



4. (U) Chaib faulted the Islamic institutions for not
adapting to the changes and rapid growth of the Muslim
community. He warned of the "dangers of many different
religious movements from all over the world" competing for the
attention of Muslims in Spain, explaining that a unified,
moderate religious leadership is necessary to fight radical
views. Chaib is a staunch proponent of Muslim integration, and
he said that his primary struggle is "against those Muslims who
want to stay un-integrated." He explained that two types of
radicalism exist in Spain-political radicalism, which is an
anti-modernization, fundamentalist movement led by the
Moroccan-based Justice and Charity group, and religious
radicalism, which is characterized by Salafists who advocate a
separatist, strict interpretation of Islam. Promoting his
modern, moderate views, he declared, "we are living in the 21st
century, not in the era of Muhammad."



5. (U) Having grown up in Barcelona, Chaib's first
languages are Catalan and Spanish, and he said he did not learn
to speak Arabic until he returned to Morocco to attend high
school. He maintains strong ties with Morocco and recently
traveled there with the mayor of Barcelona on an official visit
to discuss the Moroccan community in Catalonia. Adding that
Moroccans comprise half of the Muslim population in Spain, he
stressed the importance of Spanish-Moroccan relations to combat
radicalism and cautioned that Morocco needs to stay vigilant
against extremism to prevent "what happened in Algeria."

BARCELONA 00000154 002 OF 002



NO MOSQUE IN CATALONIA



6. (U) Although Catalonia has more Muslims than any other
part of Spain, no proper mosque exists in the region. Muslims
in Catalonia congregate in approximately 170 neighborhood prayer
rooms and oratories, many of which are informal operations run
out of garages or commercial spaces. In 2006 a proposed mosque
in the beachfront Badalona neighborhood of Barcelona was
defeated by a campaign directed by Partido Popular activists who
gathered 4,000 voters' signatures against the mosque. (Note:
Another ongoing proposal to build a mosque in the city of Lleida
has faced similar opposition for the past eight years. End
Note.) Chaib also cited the anti-immigration Platform for
Catalonia party as "racist and anti-Muslim". Much of the
blame, he added, stems from the lack of unity within the Muslim
community as the different factions cannot agree on the
characteristics of an official mosque. While Chaib did say that
relations between Moroccans and Pakistanis in Catalonia are
good, he believes that the Pakistani community resists
integrating and being more open to Spanish society. Chaib said
that his goal is to have a "Muslim community that lives in peace
within Spanish society, and has a true mosque."



7. (U) Chaib said that until several years ago many of the
imams in the informal prayer centers did not have residency
permits, and obtaining religious-based visas was difficult. He
credited the Spanish government in recent years for recognizing
the importance of legalizing the immigration status of religious
leaders, and said that most of the roughly 170 imams in
Catalonia are now legal residents. Chaib said that as the
number of Muslim immigrants increased, traditional fathers
increasingly voiced their concerns with their daughters
receiving a westernized education. As a result, the Spanish
government recognized the importance of promoting moderate
religious leaders to explain the role of Islam in a western
society.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS



8. (U) Chaib also stressed the importance of educating
Muslim youth and Spanish born children of immigrants to be
politically active and participate in society. The founder of
the Ibn Batuta Socio-Cultural Association, a secular
organization that aims to improve relations between Muslims and
Spanish society, Chaib is active at both the political and
grassroots level. The Ibn Batuta center - named after the famed
14th century Moroccan explorer - organizes cultural activities,
neighborhood dialogues, workshops on Islam, and job assistance
programs. Chaib said that because of the high number of
immigrants that typically work in Catalonia's now struggling
construction industry, the economic crisis has hurt Muslims
particularly hard. He added that economic woes and unemployment
create more tensions than do religious and cultural differences.
Noting that Latin American immigrants in Spain can vote in
municipal elections - unlike most Muslim immigrants- Chaib
mentioned the importance of the Spanish government signing
bilateral accords with Morocco, Pakistan and other countries to
allow non-citizen immigrants to participate in the political
process.


9. (U) Chaib, who excused himself three times during the
hour and a half long meeting to vote on different resolutions in
the Catalan Parliament, spoke highly of his 2002 visit to the
U.S. and like many interlocutors these days was hopeful that
President Obama would visit Barcelona next year. Before
concluding the meeting with a tour of the Parliament building
and introductions to several other socialist deputies, Chaib
said that Arabs have both high hopes and high expectations for
President Obama, noting "the doors of hope are opening, and it's
easier to work in that environment.
CROUCHG

3:48pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IgnRh
December 25, 2010
Iran getting Uranium from Tanzania? 

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/09/06DARESSALAAM1593.html


C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 001593 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTRICK ALSO VCI FOR HHEINTZELMAN AND KWALKIN EO 12958 DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS PTER, PINR, IAEA, PGOV, CG, TZ SUBJECT: URANIUM IN DAR COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO SHIPPING COMPANIES, PER SWISS DIPLOMAT REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 01376 B. UNVIE VIENNA 00601 C. KINSHASA 01309 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires D. Purnell Delly for reasons 1.4(b),(d) and (e). 1. (C) According to a senior Swiss diplomat, the shipment of uranium through Dar es Salaam is common knowledge to two Swiss shipping companies. Hans Peter Schoni, Counsellor at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tanzania, referred to the allegations of uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) passing through Zambia and Tanzania en route to Iran, but did not attribute to the shipping companies any opinion of the source or destination of the alleged uranium. Poloff pointed out that the reports were unsubstantiated, but Schoni repeated that transport of uranium is common knowledge to the two companies, though no one at either company would admit it in writing. XXXXXXXXXXXX are both based in Geneva and conduct verification and inspection work in Tanzania. 2. (C) Mission has shared this information with all relevant agencies at post which were unable to substantiate this or any other such reports of uranium shipments. Nevertheless, given the potential significance of such allegations we believe it is important to report nonetheless. DELLY

3:38pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IgThC
(Notes: 1)
  
December 25, 2010
Radioactive Terrorists in Yemen?

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10SANAA19.html

S E C R E T SANAA 000019 

SIPDIS 

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND ISN/NESS MHUMPHREY 

EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2020 

TAGS ENRG, ECON, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PGOV, IN, YM 

SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SOUNDS ALARM OVER 

UNPROTECTED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

REF: A. 07 SANAA 1905  B. 07 SANAA 2029

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S) The lone security guard standing watch at Yemen’s main radioactive materials storage facility was removed from his post on December 30, 2009, according toXXXXXXXXXXXX.  XXXXXXXXXXXX. The only closed-circuit television security camera monitoring the facility broke six months ago and was never fixed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. The facility XXXXXXXXXXXX holds various radioactive materials, small amounts of which are used by local universities for agricultural research, by a Sana’a hospital, and by international oilfield services companies for well-logging equipment spread out across the country. “Very little now stands between the bad guys and Yemen’s nuclear material,” a worried XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff.

2. (S) Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told the Ambassador on January 7 that no radioactive material was currently stored in Sana’a and that all “radioactive waste” was shipped to Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX

3. (S) The NAEC nuclear material storage facility normally contains IAEA Category I and II amounts of iridium and cobalt-60, including a lead-encased package of 13,500 curies (Ci) of cobalt-60 that was allegedly shipped to Yemen from India six months ago. XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that XXXXXXXXXXXX the cobalt-60 was moved late on January 7 from the largely unsecured NAEC facility XXXXXXXXXXXX implored the U.S. to help convince the ROYG to remove all materials from the country until they can be better secured, or immediately improve security measures at the NAEC facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX

COMMENT

———- 

4. (S) Post will continue to push senior ROYG officials to increase security at all National Atomic Energy Commission facilities and provide us with a detailed accounting of all radioactive materials in the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX  XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX’s concern over the safety and security of Yemen’s modest nuclear material inventory, however, appears genuine. XXXXXXXXXXXX. . Post POC is EconOff Roland McKay, mckayrd@state.sgov.gov. SECHE

3:36pm  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2IgOfg
December 16, 2010
UK Muslim Demographics

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09LONDON27.html

S E C R E T LONDON 000027


DEPARTMENT FOR INR/I AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PINR KISL KPLS UK
SUBJECT: UK MUSLIM DEMOGRAPHICS (C-RE8-02527)

REF: A. 08 STATE 128186
B. LONDON DAILY REPORT 7-28-08

Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary. Per reftel, this cable provides
information on the demographics of the Muslim community in
the UK. The last official UK census was in 2001 and much of
what is provided below is a combination of census figures and
subsequent estimates and surveys. Post notes that the
information is incomplete and in many cases several years
old. This is, however, the most current and accurate
information available. Among the findings are that the UK
Muslim population has jumped in seven years from 1.6 million
to 2 million. At that rate of increase, HMG estimates that
the Muslim population of the UK at the next census in 2011
will be over 2.2 million. End Summary.

Overall Muslim Population Growing But Rate Slowing
--------------------------------------------- -----

2. (C) The 2001 UK census showed a population of 1.6 million
Muslims. In April 2008, the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith
announced that HMG estimated the Muslim population at 2
million or 3.3% of the UK population. This represented an
increase of 400,000 in seven years. The 1951 census showed a
population of Muslims of less than 22,000. Therefore between
1951 and 2001 (50 years) there had been an annualized
increase of 31,500 Muslims in the UK, but in the seven year
period between 2001 and 2008 there was an actual annualized
increase of 57,000. The rate of increase as measured by
decades has slowed, however. In 1961, the population of
Muslims in the UK was 2.5 times what it had been in 1951.
Between 1961 and 1971 the Muslim population multiplied an
astonishing 5 times its previous population. Thereafter the
Muslim population's rate of growth began to slow. In 1981 it
was only 2.4 times the 1971 population (this was attributed
to the ending of unlimited Commonwealth immigration in the
early 1970's). In 1991 it was only 1.7 times what it had been
in 1981; and between 1991 and 2001 it only grew by 1.6 times
the previous population. Based on a projected 2011
population of 2.2 million, the rate of increase between 2001
and 2011 is estimated to be 1.4 times the 2001 figure. In
overall numbers, the UK Muslim population is rapidly
increasing, but its rate of growth is slowly decreasing.
Changes to UK visa rules announced in 2008 may slow this rate
even more.

Immigration Or Birthrate?
-------------------------

3. (C) HMG does not categorize either births or immigration
by religion. A rough estimate, however, based on immigration
statistics by country of origin indicates 50-55,000 "self
declared" Muslims were granted settlement (permanent
residence) in the UK in 2007. Based on the aforementioned
57,000 annualized growth in the Muslim population, it is
clear that a significant portion of the population growth
among Muslims in the UK is based on immigration. 34% of
Muslims in 2001 were below the age of 16, however, and 63% of
Muslim households had at least one child and 25% contained 3
or more children. Based on these statistics a report by the
NGO Migration Watch UK (MWUK), which favors restrictions on
immigration, estimated in 2008 that the real number of
Muslims in the UK was closer to 3 million which would be 5%
of the UK population.

Raw Data: Office of National Statistics
---------------------------------------

4. (SBU) The following are excerpts from the UK's Office of
National Statistics (ONS), all data is from the 2001 UK
census unless otherwise noted.

-- The 2001 Census showed that out of the total UK population
of 58.8 million, 1.6 million identify as Muslims. At 3
percent, this is the largest non-Christian religious
population. They are a young, tightly clustered, but often
disadvantaged community, according to UK social and economic
statistics.

-- People with Muslim backgrounds are most concentrated in
London (38% of the total UK Muslim population) and other
large urban areas, including the West Midlands (14% of the
Muslim population), the North West (13%), and Yorkshire and
the Humber (12%). Within these areas, Muslims are highly
concentrated spatially. Muslims make up 8% of the population
of London overall, but 36% of the Tower Hamlets area and 24%
of the Newham area population.

-- 70% of Muslims gave their national identity as British,
English, Scottish, or Welsh; 91% of UK-born Muslims gave a
British national identity.

-- More than half of Muslim adults living in England and
Wales in 2001 said their religion was important to their
self-identity.

-- Muslims are the second least-likely of all religious
groups to have been born in the UK, with the majority being
born outside the UK; 46% were born in the UK, 39% were born
in Asia (Pakistan - 18%; Bangladesh - 9%; India - 3%), 9%
were born in Africa (Somalia - 2%; Kenya - 1%), and 4% were
born in Europe outside the UK (Turkey - 3%, former
Yugoslavian countries - 1%).

-- Muslims were more likely than all other groups of UK 16 to
24-year-olds to be living with a partner, either as a married
or cohabiting couple (19% each).

-- Among 45 to 54-year-olds, 17% described their marital
status as divorced, separated or re-married.

-- Muslims households were the least likely to be homeowners
(52%) and are the most likely among all religious groups to
be living in accommodation rented from the council or housing
association (28%); 4% live rent-free.

-- 32% of Muslim households live in overcrowded
accommodation. Average family size for a Muslim family is
3.8, which can contribute to overcrowding. 34% of Muslim
households contained more than five people. 63% contained at
least one dependent child, and 25% contained three or more
dependent children.

-- Unemployment rates were higher for Muslims than any other
religion, for both men and women. Muslim male unemployment
rate was 13% in 2004, and for women it was 18%.

-- Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 had the highest
unemployment rates at 28%; 11% of Muslims over the age of 25
were unemployed.

-- Muslims were most likely to be unavailable or not actively
seeking work due to reasons such as disability, being a
student, or looking after the family and home. 31% of
working-age men were economically inactive, as were 69% of
working-age women.

-- With 34% of Muslims under the age of 16 in 2001, Muslims
have the youngest age profile of all the religious groups in
Great Britain. Less than one in ten were aged 65 or older.

-- Muslim men outnumber women 52% to 48%.

-- 74% of Muslims are from an Asian ethnic background
(Pakistani - 43%, Bangladeshi - 16%, Indian - 8%, Other Asian
- 6%), Almost 1.2 million Asian Muslims were living in Great
Britain in 2001. Another 11% were from a White ethnic
background, including 4% of White British origin and 7% from
another White background (including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab
and Eastern European). 6% of Muslims were of Black African
origin, mainly from North and West Africa.

-- Muslims, both male and female, had the highest rates of
reported ill health in 2000. Age-standardized rates of "not
good" health were 13% for Muslim males and 16% for Muslim
females.

-- Muslims had the highest rates of disability, with 24% of
females and 21% of males claiming a disability.

-- Lone parent households are less common within Muslim
communities, with around 50% of Muslim households headed by
an individual who is part of a married couple.

-- Muslim households were also more likely to contain more
than one family, with 19% of all multiple family households
Muslim.

-- 33% of working-age Muslims in Great Britain had no
qualifications in 2004, which is the highest rate of any
religious group. At 12%, they were also the least likely to
have degrees or equivalent qualifications.

-- Muslims who were born in the UK are more likely than
Muslims born elsewhere to have a degree or equivalent
qualification at any age. UK-born Muslims under the age of
30 were almost twice as likely to have degrees as those born
elsewhere in 2004.

-- 371,000 school-aged (5 to 16 years old) Muslim children
were in England in 2001, and by 2008 there were seven
state-maintained Islamic schools catering to around 2,100
Muslim children.

-- One-fifth of Muslims were self-employed n 2004.

-- 37% of Muslim men and over a quarter of Muslim women were
working in the distribution, hotel and restaurant industry.

-- One in seven Muslim men work in the transport and
communication industry.

-- Less than a third of Muslim men work in managerial or
professional occupations, and almost one in ten worked as a
taxi driver, cab driver or chauffeur in 2004.

-- Between 16 and 20% of Muslim women work in sales and
customer service jobs.

Raw Data: Post's 2008 Religious Freedom Report and NGOs
--------------------------------------------- ----------

5. (SBU) The following are excerpted from Post's
International Religious Freedom Report (IRFR) and reports or
studies from various Muslim and migration/immigration NGO's.
Citations are from the IRFR unless otherwise noted.

-- The Government estimates the number of mosques in the UK
to be around 1,000.

-- A May 8, 2008, Religious Trends report states that more
than 50% of Muslims regularly worship at mosques. (Embassy
Comment: Religious Trends is a UK think tank that monitors a
wide array of religious issues. Among other things, the 2008
report noted that while 43 million UK residents claimed to be
Christians, less than 3 million (7%) regularly worship in
churches. End Comment).

-- The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reported a decrease in
prosecutions over the previous reporting period for
religiously-motivated incidents, with only 29 cases
classified as religiously-aggravated offenses. Of the 23
cases in which the victim's religious affiliation is known,
17 were Muslim.

-- In 2006, controversy arose after 100 Islamic private
schools turned out to be "little more than places where the
Koran is recited," the schools promised to upgrade their
instruction and they are due for review in 2010.

-- According to a poll of 600 Muslim and 800 non-Muslim
students at thirty universities throughout the UK conducted
by the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC), as reported ref B,
32 percent of Muslims on UK campuses believe killing in the
name of religion is justified, 54 percent wanted a Muslim
Party to represent their world view in Parliament, and 40
percent want Muslims in the UK to be under Sharia law. Only
2 percent of non-Muslims felt killing in the name of religion
could be justified and none believed it was acceptable for
Muslims in the UK to have a religious-based party, or to be
under Sharia law. 73 percent of Muslim students are at least
occasional participants in Friday services while only 2
percent of non-Muslim students attend any religious service.
The poll results also found that 73 percent of Muslim
students believe it is possible to be both Muslim and British
and a similar number believe their parents are "much more or
somewhat more" strict Muslims than they are. In addition
only six percent believed that people who leave Islam for
another religion should be "punished according to Sharia law"
(killed).

-- According to MWUK, arranged marriages in the Muslim
community are creating unusually large population growth in
areas where Muslims predominate, since first-generation
families tend to have larger numbers of children (based on
published research and a comparison of the 1991 and 2001
census). For example, in the eighties the Bradford (city)
Council estimated that the Muslim population would reach
130,000 by 2030 and then level off. Now the projection is
for 130,000 by 2020 and rising. Bradford is a West Yorkshire
industrial city whose 2001 population of 294,000 included an
estimated 75,000 Muslims (25%), predominantly of Pakistani
origin. Bradford has the largest Muslim population in the UK
outside of London, and no single London borough
(neighborhood) has as large a Muslim population.

-- Also according to MWUK, the number of marriageble-age
Muslims in the South Asian community had jumped from 155,000
in 1991 to 236,000 in 2001. MWUK claims the majority of
members of these communities seek spouses from overseas in
arranged marriages. MWUK claims these figures point to a much
larger Muslim population than HMG is reporting and is
projecting. HMG says arranged marriages with South Asian
partners, "are a normal facet of settlement figures."


Visit London's Classified Website:
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TUTTLE

1:20am  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2B6pCi
(Notes: 2)
  
December 16, 2010
UK Muslim Counter-Radicalization strategies

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10LONDON268.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000268


NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/PGI, EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: KPAO PGOV PREL UK
SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE UK

REF: (A) STATE 127215 (B) STATE 1183

Classified By: LDAVIS

1. (C) Summary: Although people of Muslim faith make up only
3-4 percent of the UK's population, outreach to this key
audience is vital to U.S. foreign policy interests in the UK
and beyond. Embassy London Muslim engagement activities
comprise a counter-radicalization strategic plan, public
diplomacy programming, and Ambassadorial outreach to address
diverse audiences of varied national origin. This is a top
Mission priority. End summary.

Countering Radicalization
--------------------------

2. (C) The Embassy,s counter-radicalization multi-agency
working group, established in 2007 to improve our
understanding of Muslim communities, the radicalization
process, and HMG counter-radicalization efforts, developed a
strategic action plan in 2009. This plan, regularly updated,
outlines counter-radicalization goals and concrete steps the
Embassy will take to encourage Muslim communities to reject
violent ideologies and recruitment by extremists. The plan
is consistent with overall USG plans to counter violent
extremism, but considers the particular context of
radicalization in the UK.

3. (C) The Embassy plan integrates efforts and resources
across sections and agencies to ensure a coherent strategy.
It outlines key objectives necessary to the Administration,s
vision of community engagement to prevent violent extremism.
Programs are shaped to fit particular neighborhood needs and
dynamics, recognizing that the diversity of Muslim
communities precludes a monolithic set of responses. Focus
is on the most at-risk Muslim populations and youths,
targeting engagement and community capacity-building to
counter violent extremism. Mission efforts incorporate a
close working relationship with UK agencies working on the
same set of issues.

4) (C) Our objectives:
A) Empowering Muslim communities to mobilize against
extremism. Although communities frequently reject violent
extremism, they lack the institutional infrastructure to
actively mobilize against radicalizing influences.
B) Empowering Muslim communities to build community
resilience. Civil society and grassroots organizations can
help channel grievances, providing institutions for
community-based solutions and for engaging government and
other communities.
C) Encouraging community cohesion, respect for pluralism, and
integration across ethnic and religious groups. Insular
communities tend to be more vulnerable to radicalization, as
demonstrated by statistical analysis of survey research and
comparative studies of Muslim communities.
D) Increasing Muslim communities, understanding of U.S.
foreign policy in Muslim countries and counter-terrorism
objectives; countering the view that the West is at war with
Islam.
E) Encouraging Muslim communities, positive and effective
relations with the Embassy, fundamental to the success of our
engagement programs.

5)(C) We are currently building a network of Muslim civic
activists to enhance the collective skills of individuals and
groups involved in counter-radicalization and to encourage
collaborative initiatives. The network will include
different kinds of activists * youth workers, civil rights
organizations, business entrepreneurs, interfaith workers,
and former extremists, and others * who share an interest in
counter-radicalization but frequently operate in different
spheres of activity, limiting opportunities to learn from one
another, share expertise and resources, and collaborate.

Public Diplomacy
----------------

6)(C) The Counter-radicalization Strategic Plan complements
and in most cases includes PD programs, outreach, and broad
base of Muslim contacts. We use the full range of PD tools
at our disposal to influence UK Muslim perceptions of the
U.S., to counter violence and ideological extremism, and to
empower credible Muslim voices. Our programs focus on Muslim
youth and women and potential multipliers such as youth
leaders, youth program directors, mosques, and schools.
Through interfaith dialogue, the arts, exchanges, and Muslim
media, we have a broad base of Muslim contacts who view the
Embassy as a reliable and supportive partner. Outreach
beyond London is a priority. Areas of emphasis include
interfaith dialogue the arts, and exchanges and outreach.

7)(C) Interfaith dialogue: Our joint programs with the
Chicago-based Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC) focus on high
school and university level youth with the goal of reducing
the risk of radicalization and promoting understanding among
faiths. Activities have included training and exchanges of
UK youth workers, and small grants to seed projects on
interfaith volunteerism, neighborhood-based relationship
building, new media promotion of interfaith dialogue, and
interfaith dialogue around environmental issues, among
others. We also support the London-based Three Faiths
Forum,s high-school level outreach program, through which
they talk to young people about different faiths and dispel
myths and misconceptions.

8)(C) The arts: We use elements of new media, culture, and
the arts to connect with a younger audience and rising Muslim
artists, using the arts as a platform to demonstrate the rich
diversity of Muslim life in America. The arts are also an
important way to reach potentially hostile audiences.
Programs include film screenings (Islam in America,
DeenTight, New Muslim Cool), support for the annual Ramadan
Festival of arts, and programs with American Muslim writers,
artists, and musicians.

9)(C) Exchanges and outreach: People-to-people interactions
and seeing America first-hand have consistently been an
effective way of dispelling stereotypes and prejudices about
the U.S. Our programs include: the Citizen Dialogues
Program, International Visitors Leadership Program, and
Voluntary Visitor exchanges with Muslim women community
leaders. Our schools outreach program to secondary schools
and universities has included over 20 predominantly Muslim
institutions in nine localities over the past year. These
school visits were in many cases the first by an American
officer. We have built on the First Lady,s hugely
successful 2009 visit to a minority school (reftel B) with an
exchange program in 2010 that will include some of the
students meeting her at the White House. Four UK
businesspeople will attend the President,s Entrepreneurship
Summit in April, 2010.

The Ambassador,s Outreach
-------------------------

10) (C) The Ambassador engages with UK Muslim communities
regularly. Beginning with an iftar in 2009 shortly after his
arrival, he has spoken to Muslim groups in Wales and
Scotland, visited the London Central Mosque, and hosted an
interfaith breakfast at his residence, among other
activities. Having the U.S. Ambassador visit and listen
respectfully to Muslim points of view has an enormous impact
on groups that often feel marginalized and ignored.

Visit London's Classified Website:
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SUSMAN

1:15am  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2B6emo
December 16, 2010
Canadian CSIS on Terrorism

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/07/08OTTAWA918.html

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000918 

C O R R E C T E D COPY//SUBJECT LINE////////////////////////////////// 

NOFORN 
SIPDIS 

EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2018 
TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IR, PK, AF, CA 

SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS, 
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
REF: A. OTTAWA 360  B. OTTAWA 808  C. OTTAWA 850  D. OTTAWA 878
OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies.  He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr’s interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada, which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared Dr. Cohen’s negative assessment of current political, economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.  Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran’s intelligence service which Judd has not yet “figured out.” (Septel will cover Dr. Cohen’s discussions regarding Pakistan and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.

2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is Canada’s lead agency for national security intelligence.) Director Judd ascribed an “Alice in Wonderland” worldview to Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS “in knots,” making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he commented, left government security agencies on the defensive and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada and its allies.

Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect
---------------------------------- 

3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX

4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada’s courts that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit that Canadian authorities cannot use information that “may have been” derived from torture, and that any Canadian public official who conveys such information may be subject to criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to “prove” the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed wrongdoing.

5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s minority Conservative government for “taking it on the chin and pressing ahead” with common sense measures despite court challenges and political knocks from the opposition and interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal procedures that make intelligence available to “vetted defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees.”
OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003

Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures
--------------------------------------------- ------ 

6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three (Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger “knee-jerk anti-Americanism” and “paroxysms of moral outrage, a Canadian specialty,” as well as lead to a new round of heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr’s return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper’s government would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure. 

7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since June 23 in the first major test of Canada’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada’s ability to protect intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D); the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and, the prosecution of  XXXXXXXXXXXX.

8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his “ilk” as outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada’s ethnic Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for themselves and their children in North America, he observed, so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the recruitment of a small number of Canadian “wannabes” of Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan
------------------------ 

9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at the degrading economic, political, and security situation there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen’s sober assessment tracked with CSIS’ own view of Pakistan, and that “it is hard to see a good outcome there” due to that country’s political, economic, and security failures, on top of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel). Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.
10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being “high-five mode” on Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being “high-five mode” on Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai’s weak leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, but could not get a handle on the timing.

Iranian Outreach
---------------- 

11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are “very, very worried” about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada, he said. The Iranians agreed to “help” on Afghan issues, including sharing information regarding potential attacks. However, “we have not figured out what they are up to,” Judd confided, since it is clear that the “Iranians want ISAF to bleed...slowly.”
OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003

12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS

12:44am  |   URL: http://tmblr.co/ZQo8zx2B5f2L
(Notes: 1)