Ummah Leaks

Vatican Inter-faith relations with Muslims

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:57:17 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/12/09VATICAN134.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 VATICAN 000134

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR G, S/P, S/GPI, AND S/SRMC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2019

TAGS: PREL PHUM KIRF SOCI SCUL VT

SUBJECT: AN INVENTORY OF THE VATICAN’S INTERFAITH DIALOGUES

REF: A. 08 VATICAN 87

¶B. VATICAN 124

¶C. 08 USUN 1126

¶D. VATICAN 106

¶E. VATICAN 122

¶F. VATICAN 100

¶G. VATICAN 126

VATICAN 00000134 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Julieta Valls Noyes, DCM, EXEC, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Vatican is a leader or partner in many

inter-religious dialogues, primarily with the “Abrahamic”

religions - Islam, Judaism, and of course, other Christians.

Vatican leaders are also beginning to reach out to Asian faiths.

This cable describes the Vatican’s primary, organized

dialogues. Septels: A) analyze why the Vatican pursues

interfaith dialogue, and B) propose USG-Holy See collaboration

in support of such discussions. End Summary.

Dialogues with Muslim Communities and Nations

——————————————————————-

¶2. (SBU) Formal, modern-day Vatican dialogue with the Muslim

world goes back for over a decade. It intensified following

September 11, 2001, and again after the controversy that erupted

over Pope Benedict XVI’s September 2006 address in Regensberg.

Some of these dialogues have delivered concrete results; others

remain largely symbolic. Following are the formal,

institutionalized Vatican dialogues with Muslims:

— Partnership with the Jordanian Royal Institute of Inter-Faith

Studies. Held its first colloquium on “Religions and Civil

Society” in Rome in 2009. Will meet every two years. The next

meeting will be in 2011 in Amman or Rome. (Note: This

institute is distinct from the Aal al-Bayt institute which is

part of the Catholic Muslim Forum). (See www.riifs.org.)

— “A Common Word”: The Catholic-Muslim Forum: First met in

Rome November 4-6, 2008. Muslim delegates - both Sunni and Shia

- selected by the Amman-based Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic

Thought. Final declaration called for religious freedom,

protection of minorities, respect for religious symbols, and

equal rights. Will meet every two years: 2010 Forum may meet in

Jordan or another Muslim-majority country (ref a). (See

www.acommonword.com.)

— Saudi-sponsored dialogue: Initiated by Saudi King, through

the Mecca-based Muslim World League (a.k.a. the Rabita). King

of Spain hosted the first meeting in Madrid on July 18, 2008.

Second meeting held on margins of 2008 UNGA, attended by

then-President Bush and eighty-plus other senior officials.

Participants criticized terrorists who claimed to act in the

name of religion. Two additional meetings held in Vienna and

Geneva; latest resulting in agreement to create secretariat —

and possibly new center — for interreligious dialogue in

Vienna, Austria (refs B and C). (See www.world-dialogue.org )

— The Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions

First held in 2003. Meets in Astana, Kazakhstan every three

years. The next meeting will be in 2012. (See

www.religions-congress.org.)

— Coordination Committee of the PCID and the World Islamic Call

Society (WICS) of Libya. The focus of this meeting is relations

between Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa, where the

WICS is active. First held in 2002. Meets every two years in

Tripoli or Rome. Next meeting in 2010.

— The Joint Committee for Dialogue between the PCID and the

Permanent Committee of Al-Azhar University in Cairo, for

Dialogue between Monotheistic Religions. First held in 1998.

Meets at the Al-Azhar University in Cairo every year.

— Dialogue with Center for Inter-Religious Dialogue of the

Islamic Culture and Relations Organization in Iran. This

Vatican partnership with Iran’s Islamic Guidance Ministry dates

back to 1995. The subject of a recent meeting was “Human

dignity with special reference to bioethics.” Meets in Tehran

every two years. The next meeting is in 2010. (See

http://en.icro.ir .)

— The Islamic-Catholic Liaison Committee of the International

Forum for Dialogue. First held in 1995. Meets in Jeddah, Saudi

Arabia, every three years. Next meeting in 2012. (See

www.dialogueonline.org.)

VATICAN 00000134 002.2 OF 003

Other Avenues for Catholic-Muslim Encounters

——————————————————————

¶3. (SBU) The Holy See and the Arab League established diplomatic

relations in 2000. The League has a representative to the Holy

See based in Rome, and the Vatican’s representative to the

League is the nuncio in Cairo. The Holy See and the League

signed a Memorandum of Understanding on April 23, 2009, to

strengthen joint projects to promote peace and dialogue,

especially on the political and cultural levels. The Memorandum

was signed by Archbishop Dominique Mamberti, the Holy See’s

Secretary of Relations with States, and Arab League Secretary

General Amr Moussa. Vatican officials note that the MOU has not

yet led to any concrete initiatives or dialogues.

¶4. (C) The Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue

signed a “Declaration of Intent” with the Department for

Religious Affairs of the Turkish Prime Minister’s Cabinet on

April 25, 2002. Its aim was to promote inter-religious

dialogue, in particular by facilitating collaboration between

academic institutions. Progress in discussions with the Turks

is not coming quickly. The Vatican is disappointed that the

former Church of Paul of Tarsus is now a Turkish government-run

museum. The Vatican also supports Orthodox demands to reopen

the Halki seminary in Turkey, have the GOT recognize the

Ecumenical Patriarch as an international religious leader, and

grant greater religious freedoms to Orthodox and other

Christians.

¶5. (SBU) Cardinal Jean-Louis Tauran, President of the

Inter-Religious Dialogue Council, travelled to Indonesia in

November 2009. It was the first visit of the Vatican’s top

dialogue official to Indonesia, the largest Muslim-majority

country in the world — 206 million out of a population of 240

million. (There are 7 million Catholics in the country.)

Vatican and Indonesian officials continue to discuss concrete

initiatives for follow-up to this visit.

The Other Monotheistic Faiths: Jews and other Christians

——————————————————————- —————-

¶6. (SBU) Unlike relations with Islam, Vatican relations with

Jews are characterized by substantial theological common ground

and historic roots. Discussions between the two religions are

ongoing and broad-based. They are often intersected by

politics, and sometimes hurt by missteps. The Vatican’s

long-standing dialogue initiatives with the Jews prospered in

the years since the Vatican II Council removed obstacles to good

relations. They took a big hit in January 2009, however, when

the Vatican restored communion to a schismatic Catholic group

that included a Holocaust-denying bishop. After considerable

effort by the Vatican and the Pope himself, relations have been

largely mended and were solidified with the Pope’s visit to the

Holy Land in May 2009. Nevertheless, the proposed conferral of

sainthood on WWII-era Pope Pius XII and access by historians to

the archives of his pontificate are recurring irritants in the

relationship (ref D).

¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, Vatican officials speak constantly with

followers of other Christian faiths in ecumenical dialogue

intended to overcome divisions between Christians. Indeed, the

Vatican has a separate Pontifical Council for Christian Unity

(which for historical reasons also covers dialogue with Jews).

These discussions have their ups and downs. While the Vatican

move in November 2009 to welcome disaffected Anglicans to the

Catholic Church dealt a blow to ecumenical understanding (ref

E), the rift is healing in part because few Anglicans will

probably take advantage of the Vatican offer. Meanwhile,

relations with the Russian Orthodox Patriarch of Moscow — who

commands the allegiance of a large number of Orthodox and is

thus arguably more influential than Ecumenical Patriarch

Bartholomew — have improved. (ref F). This has allowed Moscow

and the Vatican to upgrade their “special character” to “full

diplomatic” relations (ref G).

¶8. (SBU) Ultimately, the monotheistic nature and shared historic

roots of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam — all “people of the

book” - make dialogue between these three religions easier for

the Vatican in some ways than discussions with other religions.

An important interfaith meeting including senior leaders of the

world’s major monotheistic religions, Christians (Catholic and

VATICAN 00000134 003.2 OF 003

Orthodox), Jews and Muslims, took place in Seville, Spain,

December 6-8, 2009. The King of Spain’s “Three Cultures, Three

Faiths” Foundation sponsored the event. (VATICAN 124).

Outreach to Asian Faiths

————————————

¶9. (C) Despite the difficulty for the Vatican of finding common

ground with polytheistic religions, Holy See officials are

starting to do just that in an effort to support peace,

religious freedom, human rights, and local solutions to local

problems (see septel). Cardinal Tauran travelled to India in

June 2009 for initial dialogue with Hindus. Tauran’s goal was

to go beyond the positive assurances that had characterized

previous meetings with Hindu leaders. Specifically, he sought

to bridge the gap between his Indian interlocutors’ stated

goodwill and the continuing hostility toward Christians in parts

of India like Orissa, especially by some Hindu nationalists.

The Vatican also raised concerns about Indian anti-conversion

laws — although they have not been enforced. Cardinal Tauran

also traveled to Japan in August 2009, to initiate discussions

with Buddhists and other Asian faiths.

¶10. (SBU) Comment: Tauran acknowledges quietly that the Vatican

has not paid sufficient attention to relations with Asian

religions. He is not an expert on polytheistic religions and is

unlikely to find — or even seek — common theological ground

with their precepts. Instead, as he and his Council increase

their outreach to these communities, they will challenge their

interlocutors to remove obstacles to the enjoyment of religious

freedom for all. End comment.

Comment

———-

¶11. (C) The number and scope of the Vatican’s inter-religious

dialogues is unparalleled by that of any other church or

organization in the world. The dialogues are already effective

in preventing or smoothing over misunderstandings and tensions.

The big question is how to translate into concrete actions the

high moral principles that the world’s major religions bring to

the dialogue table. Septel includes proposals for USG

engagement with the Vatican in support of interreligious

understanding and action.

DIAZ

UK Influencing Bangladeshi Madrassa Curriculums, Human Rights Abuses in Bangladesh

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:42:58 -0500

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DHAKA 000482

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09DHAKA482.html

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR H

EO 12958 DECL: 05/13/2019

TAGS PTER, PGOV, PREL, HYMPSK, MARR, KPAO, UK, BG

SUBJECT: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON COUNTERRORISM WORKING

WITH THE UK

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Moriarty. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

———

SUMMARY

———-

¶1. (C) The U.S. and the United Kingdom share common counterterrorism goals in Bangladesh and we have worked together on specific issues in the past. Embassy Dhaka and the British High Commission reviewed our efforts and agreed on several areas of cooperation at an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting. Specifically, we agreed trying to arrange a visit to London and Washington for senior Bangladeshi officials to view both countries’ national security systems. The missions also agreed to work closely on human rights training for the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and on promoting curriculum reform at Bangladesh’s unregulated madrassas. The missions identified several other areas in which coordinated action could promote badly needed security sector reform in Bangladesh.

——————————————————————- -

COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

——————————————————————- -

¶2. (SBU) British High Commissioner Stephen Evans and Ambassador Moriarty led an inaugural counterterrorism quarterly meeting between our two missions on May 13. Although members of the two missions have met individually to discuss counterterrorism issues and work together on specific projects, this forum provided an opoprtunity to discuss broad goals and develop strategies to work collaboratively. Several common areas of interest quickly emerged, most prominently the desire to promote security sector reform in Bangladesh. Evans said this would be the center of discussion at an inaugural Joint Working Group meeting on counterterrorism between Britain and Bangladesh, led by British Security Minister Lord West, in late June, and promised a quick read-out of the results to the Embassy.

¶3. (SBU) Perhaps the key element of security sector reform is building a healthier civil-military relationship. The dysfunctional relationship dates from the numerous coups in Bangladesh’s early years and was recently exacerbated by the February 25-26 border guard mutiny against army officers. The Ambassador detailed Post’s plans to invite senior Bangladeshi officials to participate in an Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies workshop in November to exchange views on civil-military relations and national security systems. The two missions agreed the workshop would be most effective if a Bangladeshi delegation of military, government and Parliament representatives first visited the U.S. and the United Kingdom to learn about our national security structures. The missions will seek a visit in September; Post will work with SCA to ensure the Washington leg includes visits to Capitol Hill, the Department of Defense, the State Department and the National Security Council.

¶4. (C) We agreed to jointly engage Bangladesh’s newly formed National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention, a high-level group led by Home Affairs State Minister Tanjim Ahmad Sohel Taj, who has worked closely with the Embassy on security issues. Local media has reported the committee will focus in part on anti-extremism messaging, an area in which both missions already are actively engaged and can work more cooperatively. The U.S. and United Kingdom also agreed to jointly sound out the Government of Bangladesh on its post-mutiny reorganization plans for the Bangladesh Rifles and then work together to help make it a more effective border patrol force.

—————————————————————-

COMMON CT GOAL: PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS IN RAB

—————————————————————-

¶5. (SBU) The U.S. and UK representatives reviewed our ongoing training to make the RAB a more transparent, accountable and human-rights compliant paramilitary force. The British have been training RAB for 18 months in areas such as investigative interviewing techniques and rules of engagement. They said that the training had been widely disseminated within RAB and that they were undertaking an assessment of its effectiveness. The Embassy described plans

DHAKA 00000482 002 OF 002

to imbed two U.S. marshals within RAB for three months to help set up internal affairs, use of force and rules of engagement systems. High Commissioner Evans suggested the marshals stop in London on the way to Bangladesh to meet with British police who have delivered human rights training to RAB. He said the visit would ensure maximum coordination between the U.S. and British programs; the Ambassador enthusiastically supported the proposal.

——————————————————————- ———-

MARITIME SECURITY, POLICING, AIRPORT SAFETY AND MORE

——————————————————————- ———-

¶6. (C) Evans promised to send the Embassy a “lessons learned” document from a just-concluded combined British-Bangladesh maritime security exercise in which U.S. Department of Defense personnel participated. He noted the U.K. did not expect to have any more Royal Navy ships visit Bangladesh before 2011 and asked whether the United States could take the lead in organizing a follow-up exercise. With the U.S. and Britain both ramping up programs to develop community policing, we agreed to create an informal consultative group led by the British that would include other international missions in Dhaka with policing projects. The two missions also agreed to have their two development agencies, USAID and the U.K. Department for International Development, meet to discuss strategies for supporting Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s plan to develop standardized curriculum for thousands of unregulated Islamic madrassa schools. (Note: The Embassy has submitted a 1207 proposal for a madrassa curriculum development program. End note). Finally, noting the horrendous safety gaps at Dhaka’s international airport, the Ambassador and High Commissioner agreed to sound out contacts within their respective governments, the international airlines that serve Dhaka, and the Bangladeshi state airline to determine how best to improve security.

———————————-

CONCLUSION: NOW WE KNOW

———————————-

¶7. (C) The inaugural U.S.-British quarterly meeting provided each side with a much better understanding of what the other was doing to counter terrorism and extremism in Bangladesh. Not surprisingly, our counterterrorism strategies and goals are closely aligned, allowing ample room for close coordination and, in some cases, joint programs. Given that Sheikh Hasina’s new government has made security a top priority, the chances of U.S.-British joint efforts bearing fruit are high indeed. MORIARTY

Iranian Propaganda machine active in India

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:26:00 -0500

Friday, 04 May 2007, 11:42

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/05/07NEWDELHI2142.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002142

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS

EO 12958 DECL: 05/04/2017

TAGS PREL, PGOV, PINR, IR, IN

SUBJECT: IRAN MANIPULATING INDIAN ELITE OPINION-MAKERS

Classified By: Charge Geoffrey Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B,D)

¶1. (C) This cable contains an action request for SCA. Please see paragraph 6.

New Iranian Mischief

———

¶2. (C) Ambassador K.V. Rajan, former Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs and current Chairman of the Prime Minister’s National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), called Charge May 4 for an urgent meeting in which he told Charge that he had been invited by the Iranian Embassy for an all expenses paid trip for “politicians, scholars and commentators.” The list of invitees in a fax from the Iranian Embassy press section included notorious America-critics, such as XXXXXXXXXXXX. The visit was scheduled for April 28-May 4, and the Embassy said the guests would meet Iranian officials, scholars and would visit “one or two Iranian nuclear establishment(s).” Reports this week in the “Asian Age” and “The Hindu” indicate the group visited the Arak Heavy Water Complex and met with Minister of Energy Parviz Fatah.

¶3. (C) Rajan told Charge that this trip was part of an effort on the part of the Iranian government to encourage anti-American, pro-Muslim scholars and think-tankers in India to influence Prime Minister Singh’s supporters to take a more pro-Iranian, anti-U.S. view, and that his presence on the delegation would have handed Iran a PR coup. In light of his suspicions, Rajan canceled at the last minute, citing a sudden family emergency. Following is the invitee list, which Rajan provided to Charge:

— XXXXXXXXXXXX

India Seeks U.S. Help

———

¶4. (C) To counter this new and worrying effort to reach out to Indian opinion makers, Rajan proposed a visit to the United States starting May 14 in his NSAB capacity for five to seven days to talk to officials, think tanks, and the intelligence community to discuss ways to understand better U.S. assessments of Iran. He would expect this to feed into NSAB discussion of Iran policy options.

¶5. (C) Rajan’s analysis of Iranian intentions to influence PM Singh’s domestic constituencies is deeply worrying and spot-on, and confirms what we have been reporting. Rajan also noted stepped up Iranian funding to sympathetic Shia clerics. The United Progressive Alliance government is deeply interested in appeasing its Muslim and Left Front

NEW DELHI 00002142 002 OF 002

supporters, and is concerned about the outcome of elections in Uttar Pradesh state, where a large number of Muslim constituents reside. We see evidence that Iran has been buying off journalists, clerics and editors in Shia-populated areas of Uttar Pradesh and Kashmir, doling out large sums to stoke anti-Americanism. Now, it seems Iran is focusing squarely on influential elite audiences in Delhi, with a view to shaping the debate of India’s IAEA policy and the nuclear deal.

ACTION REQUEST: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS

———

¶6. (C) To counter this insidious new Iranian effort, we recommend Rajan receive meetings, if possible, with:

— XXXXXXXXXXXX

Prison Life in Morocco

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:06:28 -0500

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RABAT 000408
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09RABAT408.html
SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR INR - MCCORMACK AND INL/AAE - ALTON/STOLWORTHY
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/MAG AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2029
TAGS: PINR PHUM SOCI EAID SNAR PTER KCRM MO
SUBJECT: OPENING UP AGAIN? MOROCCAN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
AND REFORM (C-NE9-00043)

REF: A. STATE 006210 (C-NE9-00043) (NOTAL)
¶B. 08 RABAT 0569 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
information and provides a broader general update on
Morocco's prison situation and the now year-old Prison
Administration. Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's
prisons are in a difficult, but changing situation. They
have won increasing international interest, due in part to a
large number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk of
radicalization. The Government of Morocco (GOM) reported
that among the roughly 60,000 prisoners, more than 100
inmates died in 2008, which NGOs blamed on poor conditions.
Morocco's chief warden is Prison Administration
Delegate-General Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former top cop for
the late King Hassan II. Benhachem has been in office a year
following a shakeup after a major breakout by radical
Islamist prisoners. He told us security was his first
priority and rehabilitation next. With King Mohammed VI's
support and a larger budget, Benhachem has improved security,
increased rations, and is embarking on an ambitious building
program, but problems persist. He is beginning to open to
international cooperation. The Justice Ministry is
redrafting the penal code to allow for parole and probation,
the most effective way to ease overcrowding, and has asked us
for help. The USG so far has provided only modest support to
a prison rights NGO. We have sought new funding, including
under a Defense Appropriations Act Section 1207, to aid the
Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration and organizations
involved in post-release re-entry, to reduce the risk that
former prisoners could become suicide bombers. End Summary.

----------
Background
----------

¶2. (C) Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's prisons are in
a difficult but changing situation. They have been the locus
of increasing international interest, due in part to a large
number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk that the difficult
environment could foster violent tendencies post-release.
With a population of some 60,000, estimates in early 2008
suggested that prison budgets were barely one dollar per
prisoner per day. Prisoners must receive food from family
and friends if they are to eat at a reasonable standard.
Overcrowding can be severe, as shown in some photographs of
prisoners sleeping across the floor of a large cell, packed
like sardines, a condition uncommon, but which may still
exist in some facilities.

¶3. (C) During the &years of lead,8 the repressive era of
Hassan II, Moroccan prisons were often forbidding places,
isolated in the desert with unspeakable conditions and abuse
common. Later in Hassan II,s reign and under King Mohammed
VI, many of these symbols of repression have been closed;
some turned in to places of remembrance but cutting prison
capacity. Despite growth in the number of prisoners in
recent years, no new prisons have been built for years,
although that is now changing. Outside interest has
increased since a young Moroccan, released on pardon after
being imprisoned for several years for alleged association
with those involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings, blew
himself up in a Casablanca cybercafe in 2007, part of a ring
of seven such suicide bombers. In the years leading up to
2008, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) then responsible for
prisons, instituted some human rights-linked changes funded
by outside donors, including permitting NGOs to work in the
prisons. In response to agitation by Islamist/Salafist
prisoner support groups and families, it also granted
increasing privileges to some Islamist prisoners. The death
penalty has not been carried out in about a decade, although
abolition of capital punishment will not likely soon occur.

RABAT 00000408 002 OF 007


This has contributed to growing numbers of capital prisoners.
The diminution of repression in Moroccan society has
probably also contributed to the rising number of inmates,
with severe physical abuse a lesser form of crime deterrence.
We understand that as many as half the inmate population may
be awaiting trial.

¶4. (C) In late April 2008, after the escape of nine
Salafists (Islamic radicals) from Kenitra prison, many
convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
King Mohammed VI moved responsibility for prison
administration from the MOJ and gave it to the newly created
Directorate under the Prime Minister's Office. The MOJ had
accommodated the growing organized presence of Salafists in
the prisons by granting increasing privileges, and there was
a sense that it had simply lost control. The escape turned
the prison situation into an embarrassment for the GOM and
the King.

------------------------------------------
Benhachem and the King: The New Old Guard
------------------------------------------

¶5. (C) The King named Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former
Director General of National Security (DGSN or national
police) under Hassan II, to head the new Prison
Administration, with the quasi-ministerial-rank of Delegate
General, and reporting formally to the Prime Minister but
undoubtedly also directly to the Palace. Retired since 2003,
Benhachem had a reputation for toughness. He did not engage,
as far as we have been able to determine, in any official or
unofficial work or consulting for the GOM during his
retirement, nor did he work in the private sector. Benhachem
brought with him to the Prison Administration several
veterans of the former king's security apparatus, triggering
concerns within the diplomatic and domestic human rights
communities.

¶6. (C) On the day of Benhachem's appointment, King Mohammed
VI released a statement directing Benhachem and his new
Directorate to improve the reinsertion and reintegration of
former prisoners into society; guarantee security and
discipline within the prison system; ensure respect for law
within the system; bring conditions in prisons into
accordance with international norms; ensure respect for human
rights and dignity within facilities; and improve working
conditions for staff members and guards. The same statement
indicated that such improvements were crucial to combating
radical Islam. This was notable as the GOM had previously
been reluctant to publicly link militant Islam with prison
conditions. The same day, Minister of Justice Radi said that
Benhachem's appointment was part and parcel of a broader
justice sector reform process.

-------------------------
The Prison Administration
-------------------------

¶7. (C) The Directorate General for Prison Administration and
Reinsertion is an independent entity with its own budget and
central administrative apparatus. It absorbed all
responsibility for correctional administration from the MOJ
and is not affiliated with any other ministry or agency.
Since the removal of the Prison Administration from the
Ministry, there has been little discussion between the two
organizations except through formal channels. While the MOJ
still directs strategic penal policy, such as the possibility
of expanding alternative sentencing or judicial supervision,
it now has no input into security and daily operations of
prison facilities. Nor is there any indication of a
continuing link between Benhachem and the DGSN, or of any
influence from the DGSN/Interior Ministry (MOI). The MOI has
adamantly refused to even discuss with us prisons or related
assistance.


RABAT 00000408 003 OF 007


¶8. (C) Benhachem's approach to his new job seems well
thought-out and strategic. On assuming his position in April
2008, Benhachem halted discussions with foreign embassies
about cooperation programs, undertook an intensive internal
organizational audit, and formulated a plan and budget. He
fired officials he felt were incompetent or corrupt.
Benhachem proceeded to issue a series of directives ordering
prison guards to begin wearing their uniforms on duty once
again and instructing all staff to apply all rules and
regulations consistently at all facilities. He warned of
dire consequences if his instructions were not followed. He
ended the policy of appeasement of Salafist inmates, who had
gained unprecedented privileges and control under the MOJ
(Ref B). However, with palace support, he also got a larger
budget, and once he reestablished security, funds were then
appropriately next allocated for improved food. In addition,
he expedited existing construction and pushed forward plans
for additional new prisons. The recapture (or death) of all
the Salafist escapees, and others as well, allowed scope for
renewed reform and cooperation with the international
community.

--------------------------------------
Personality, Priorities and Assistance
--------------------------------------

¶9. (C) EmbOffs met with Benhachem on June 19, 2008 (Ref B),
and again on March 31, 2009, at the Directorate General for
Prison Administration and Reinsertion (DGAP) headquarters.
In both meetings, they found him direct, charming and
practical, but wary of USG intentions. Benhachem underscored
the ministerial status of the Prison Administration.
Benhachem told EmbOffs that he is in charge of prisoners
while incarcerated and responsible for their reintegration
into society when released, although he had earlier confirmed
that his responsibility ended at the prison gate. The DGAP's
2009 budget includes USD 128 million for general operations
and USD 86 million for capital expenses such as new
construction and renovation. Benhachem told EmbOffs that
this represented a 40 percent increase in funding. In
statements reported in the press, Benhachem said that the new
budget allowed him to increase spending per prisoner USD 50
cents to two dollars per day.

¶10. (C) In a separate meeting with Morocco USAID Mission
Director, he expressed a greater degree of comfort in working
with USAID than the Embassy, and recommended that all
requests for programming and cooperation with the DGAP be
sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via
diplomatic note. He also floated the idea of forming an
inter-ministerial coordination group, helmed by the MFA, to
work on security sector assistance issues with the USG.
(Comment: This suggests his mandate may include increased
controls on and transparency in relations with U.S. entities.
End Comment.)

¶11. (C) In the March 31 meeting, Benhachem told EmbOffs that
security and rehabilitation were his twin and intertwined
priorities. However, he emphasized that he would not
sacrifice security in the name of reform, saying, "I cannot
make progress if I do not control my buildings." On the
security side, Benhachem had very specific thoughts and
highlighted renovation, new construction, and improved
technological ability to scan inmates and packages for
contraband as immediate areas of focus. He said that
establishing closed-circuit-television networks and
electronic monitoring of facilities and inmates was an
important medium-term goal that would leverage his limited
staff and financial resources to greater effect. Benhachem
also expressed a need for better equipment for his staff and
improved training.

¶12. (C) On the subject of rehabilitation and post-release
reintegration of inmates, Benhachem appeared open-minded but
less in command of the subject. He expressed a need for

RABAT 00000408 004 OF 007


greater life skills programming but offered no specific
ideas. He reinforced a desire for medical assistance within
prisons and encouraged EmbOffs to coordinate with Deputy
Administrator for Social and Cultural Programs Hilmi.
Benhachem also said that there needed to be greater
coordination with the private sector and local governments to
provide jobs and soft landings for released prisoners.
Benhachem maintained there was no serious overcrowding in the
women's section and was less interested in specific women's
programming. (Note: Women are a small minority of prisoners
-- perhaps only three percent. End Note.)

¶13. (C) Despite public statements of support from Minister
of Justice Radi, who told then-Ambassador Riley in November
2007 that he sought the creation of an independent prison
authority, relations between Justice and the DGAP remain
tense. M'Hammed Abdenabaoui, the number three at the MOJ,
still holds the pre-sentencing and post-release portfolio for
his Ministry. He told PolOff in a February meeting that the
MOJ was interested in collaborating with the USG in designing
reentry programs. Abdenabaoui said that communication with
the DGAP was still tense but improving. He thought Benhachem
seemed to have little respect for the MOJ's former prison
managers.

----------------
The Two Deputies
----------------

¶14. (C) Two deputies assist Benhachem. Mustapha Hilmi, a
former prosecutor who also served at the upper echelons of
the MOJ's Central Prison Authority, was given the title of
Director of Social, Cultural and Reintegration Activities.
Soufiane Ouamrou, formerly of the police (DGSN) became the
Director of Inmate and Physical Security. Hilmi is known to
EmbOffs and is respected within the legal community. He
assisted the American Bar Association in Rabat in efforts to
reform the Moroccan Bar Association. Under the MOJ, he was
known as a moderate voice on prison issues. At the March 31
meeting, Benhachem appeared to have a collaborative,
respectful and easy relationship with Hilmi, who also
attended. Benhachem appeared to trust his insights and
delegated tasks to him easily. Mission staff have not met
with Ouamrou and little is known about him.

------------------
Current Conditions
------------------

¶15. (C) Overcrowding remains the largest single challenge to
the Moroccan prison system. Its 59 prisons, many of which
are outdated and poorly maintained, hold 60,000 inmates, 40
percent more than they were designed to house. Almost half
of those detained are in pre-trial or preventive detention.
Since Moroccan law allows for up to a year of pre-trial
detention, and Morocco has no jails in which individuals
awaiting trial can be held separately from convicts, this
class of inmate contributes significantly to the overcrowding
problem.

¶16. (C) According to the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OMP),
an independent, non-profit watchdog group, inmate complaints
of abuse or substandard conditions increased by 22.48 percent
in 2008 compared to 19 percent in 2007. OMP received 520
letters from prisoners or their relatives related to
mistreatment, poor conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical
treatment, sexual assault and violence. The OMP's report
linked 18 deaths directly to substandard conditions and
inmate violence as a result of overcrowding, and reported
greater than 100 inmate deaths overall. The OMP also
strongly criticized poor working conditions for the system's
5,228 guards, most of whom only make USD 240 per month. In
press statements, Abderrahim Jamai, a member of the OMP
board, said that the organization's attempts to raise issues
of concern with Benhachem were rebuffed and their letters to

RABAT 00000408 005 OF 007


the DGAP remain unanswered.

¶17. (C) The DGAP's Hilmi, in a public statement, countered
that cases of violence were down 12 percent in 2008 compared
to the period between 2003 and 2007. In a separate
statement, Benhachem said that 2008's inmate mortality rate,
while high, was less than the previous year's rate of 125
deaths, and well within norms for a system of this size. He
added that 32 percent of mortality cases were due to chronic
diseases, and that 66 percent of deaths among the prisoners
were registered in hospitals. Benhachem said that there was
one suicide every two months in 2008.

----------------------------
Status of Islamist Prisoners
----------------------------

¶18. (C) The majority of Salafist or terror-related inmates
are held in prisons in Tetouan, Sale and Ain Sebaa outside
Casablanca. Although they no longer enjoy the broad
privileges they once did they, like most inmates in the
system, they have easy access to mobile phones and contraband
smuggled in when family members bring food. On January 29,
Embassy received a letter from Reda Ben Othman, an "Islamic
detainee at the local prison of Ain Sebaa." He alleged that
he and his fellow religious prisoners still suffer "assault
and torture" at the hands of authorities for their beliefs.
There is a formally recognized NGO, "Anassir" (victory),
which advocates for the prisoners as individuals or as a
group. In 2007, a photograph of a police officer beating the
wife of a Salafist prisoner at an Anassir demonstration was
carried by al Qaeda websites, accompanied by threats against
perfidious Moroccan authorities. Benhachem has apparently
dispersed some Salafist prisioners, but most remain
concentrated in a few higher-security prisons.

--------------
Plan of Action
--------------

¶19. (C) In a speech at a national workshop on implementing
the International Convention against Torture (ICAT) in
Morocco, Benhachem said that harmonizing Moroccan legislation
with the ICAT was in the interests of society and that
protection of human rights was a central aspect of his
mandate. He said that he had issued directives on respect
for rights to all staff members and would not hesitate to
punish violators. He also encouraged all security sector
staff to meet both the spirit and the letter of laws and
agreements. Since his appointment, Benhachem has suspended
or fired five prison directors and more than 20 guards and
officials for dereliction of duty or malfeasance.

¶20. (C) At the ICAT workshop, Benhachem said that a special
240 million dirham (USD 30 million) allocation is being used
to complete six new prisons in the first half of 2009. He
added that renovations at the "priority prisons" of Oukacha
in Casablanca and Kenitra are well underway. The end result
of this investment, he explained, would be to increase inmate
living space from the current level of 1.6 meters per person
to three meters. (Note: International norms call for nine
meters. End Note.) The new facilities will include areas
for enhanced inmate training and counseling. Benhachem
indicated that the DGAP will begin to recruit an additional
6,000 guards in 2012.

¶21. (C) In terms of health services, Benhachem said that the
DGAP directly employs 107 general practitioners and has a
large number of medical specialists under contract to provide
inmates with additional care as needed. According to
Benhachem, the DGAP has also increased per person medical
expenditures from less than USD .01 to USD .50 per day.

--------------------------------------------- ------
Pretrial Diversion, Parole and the Justice Ministry

RABAT 00000408 006 OF 007


--------------------------------------------- ------

¶22. (C) As part of a longer-term strategy to decrease
overcrowding and provide incentive-based rehabilitation
programs, the GOM with the MOJ in the lead is revising the
penal code to allow for parole and probationary release of
convicts. There is no such provision under current law; so
inmates must either serve their entire sentence or hope to
benefit from a royal pardon. Some prisoners convicted of
terrorism won early release in pardons, in some cases due to
an admittedly wide dragnet after the 2003 Casablanca
bombings. Both Benhachem and the MOJ's Abdenabaoui
separately told EmbOffs that the creation of a parole and
probation system is a crucial aspect of correctional reform
in Morocco. Abdenabaoui, who would have MOJ authority over
any conditional release structure, informally requested USG
help in setting up such a system in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Abdelaziz Nouyaidi, President of NGO Adala (Justice), told
EmbOffs in April that the GOM had not yet invited civil
society comment on the draft penal code and was playing its
cards close to the chest.

-------------------------
Partners and Other Actors
-------------------------

¶23. (C) The largest actor working on rehabilitation and
correctional issues outside of the DGAP is the Mohammed VI
Foundation for Reinsertion. Founded in 2002 with strong
royal patronage, the GOM-funded private foundation aims to
lead the effort to improve vocational and educational reform
in prisons. Overseen by a board made up of human rights
activists and private sector leaders, the Foundation has laid
out a plan to provide vocational training to 26,570 inmates
(11 percent female) between 2008 and 2012. The Foundation
has established Post-Release Coaching Centers designed to
ease the transition to freedom.

¶24. (C) Other potential partners include:

-- The Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (mentioned earlier).
OMP was the recipient of the first USG funded prison
assistance in Morocco, initially in 2006 through a grant from
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for technical
assistance to this human rights civil society organization
and, in 2008 in a modest USD 80,000 grant of Counterterrorism
(S/CT) funds administered by Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI);

-- Relais Prison, a social work organization run by Fatna
Elbouih, a prominent former political prisoner, who works
with inmates on vocational, health and counseling issues;

-- Association Annasir (or Al Nasir), an Islamist prisoner
support and advocacy organization;

-- Other small NGOs, including one in Western Sahara, support
prisoner welfare and education;

-- The Belgian Embassy, which works with released prisoners;

-- The British Embassy, which is funding a mediation training
program in prisons through U.S.-based NGO Search for Common
Ground and has funded curriculum development programs in the
past at the DGAP's training Academy in Ifrane;

-- The Danish Embassy, which is funding an agricultural
vocational skills program at a minimum-security prison in
central Morocco; and

-- The European Union, which has expressed an interest in
working on penal issues in Morocco.

-------
Comment

RABAT 00000408 007 OF 007


-------

¶25. (C) Comment: Although still steering a firm,
security-focused course, Benhachem appears to have somewhat
assuaged those who feared he would focus only on walls and
guards and not rehabilitation or reform. Once he established
control, he seems ready to begin engaging with donors. Given
his apparent lack of trust over USG motives in wanting to
fund prison programs, it would be advisable to proceed slowly
and closely engage only if identifiable funds are already
available for a program that could be implemented with input
from the DGAP. Conversely, assistance to the MOJ, with which
our relations are good and growing, in revising the penal
code and setting up conditional release programs might be
easier and less controversial first steps towards building
broader trust and programming. The Mission has also
requested Washington funding for a longer-term, more
comprehensive approach, including under Section 1207 and/or
MEPI, that would also focus on pre-intake, prison conditions
and vital support for the re-entry into society of those
whose term is finished. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Ethnic divisions in Spanish Islam

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 15:48:30 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09BARCELONA154.html

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BARCELONA 000154

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/WE MCKNIGHT AND ZERDECKI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PINR SMIG SOCI SP MO
SUBJECT: MUSLIM PARLIAMENTARIAN DISCUSSES ISLAM IN SPAIN

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Spain's first Muslim Parliamentarian
discussed with POLOFF Muslim relations in Spain and stressed the
importance of grassroots activism to integrate Muslims into
Spanish society. Noting the vast increase of Muslim immigrants
into Spain in recent years, Mohammed Chaib cautioned against
radical and fundamentalist trends in the country. In addition
to xenophobic political attitudes, Chaib faulted the lack of
unity within the Muslim community as a barrier to developing a
more positive role for Muslims in Spain. He also criticized the
divided Muslim leadership for not collaborating to build an
official mosque in Catalonia, which has more Muslims than any
other region in Spain. On a positive note, he said that the
Arab world has high hopes for President Obama. END SUMMARY



¶2. (U) POLOFF met on October 29 with Mohammed Chaib, a
socialist party deputy elected to the Catalan Parliament in 2003
and, more notably, the first Muslim Parliamentarian in Spain. A
Moroccan born immigrant whose family moved to Barcelona when he
was a small child, Chaib shared his views on the state of Islam
in Spain, and stressed the importance of immigrants integrating
into Spanish society. He said that the high rate of Muslim
immigration into Spain has greatly changed the Islamic community
over the past 15 years, and noted that more Muslims live in
Catalonia than in any other region of Spain. Approximately 1.3
to 1.5 million Muslims live in Spain, roughly half of whom are
from Morocco. The number of Muslims in Spain has nearly tripled
since 2003, when the population was estimated at only 525,000.
Less than 30 percent are Spanish citizens, including descendents
of immigrants and Spanish converts to Islam.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY



¶3. (U) The Islamic Commission of Spain (CIE), created in
1992, is the official entity representing Muslims in Spain. The
CIE has outlined cooperative agreements on education, prayer in
the workplace, imams and other policies to help manage Muslim
relations with Spanish society. According to Chaib, however,
these agreements were never fully developed and have been poorly
implemented. He said that competing interpretations of Islam,
coupled with cultural differences between Arab, Pakistani,
sub-Saharan and Spanish Muslim converts create further
divisions. He added that much of the discordance within the
Muslim community stems from the competing interests of the two
administrative bodies that comprise CIE - the Federation of
Islamic Religious Entities of Spain (FEERI) and the Islamic
Community Union of Spain (UCIDE). Chaib explained that FEERI
was originally created to serve Spanish Muslim converts, while
UCIDE was oriented toward Arab immigrants. He said that the two
federations need to unite under one secretary general with a
common mandate to integrate Muslims into Spanish society.
Chaib, who participated in a State Department International
Visitors Leadership Program on immigration in 2002, noted,
"Islam is the same. However, the administration of Islam is
very different."



¶4. (U) Chaib faulted the Islamic institutions for not
adapting to the changes and rapid growth of the Muslim
community. He warned of the "dangers of many different
religious movements from all over the world" competing for the
attention of Muslims in Spain, explaining that a unified,
moderate religious leadership is necessary to fight radical
views. Chaib is a staunch proponent of Muslim integration, and
he said that his primary struggle is "against those Muslims who
want to stay un-integrated." He explained that two types of
radicalism exist in Spain-political radicalism, which is an
anti-modernization, fundamentalist movement led by the
Moroccan-based Justice and Charity group, and religious
radicalism, which is characterized by Salafists who advocate a
separatist, strict interpretation of Islam. Promoting his
modern, moderate views, he declared, "we are living in the 21st
century, not in the era of Muhammad."



¶5. (U) Having grown up in Barcelona, Chaib's first
languages are Catalan and Spanish, and he said he did not learn
to speak Arabic until he returned to Morocco to attend high
school. He maintains strong ties with Morocco and recently
traveled there with the mayor of Barcelona on an official visit
to discuss the Moroccan community in Catalonia. Adding that
Moroccans comprise half of the Muslim population in Spain, he
stressed the importance of Spanish-Moroccan relations to combat
radicalism and cautioned that Morocco needs to stay vigilant
against extremism to prevent "what happened in Algeria."

BARCELONA 00000154 002 OF 002



NO MOSQUE IN CATALONIA



¶6. (U) Although Catalonia has more Muslims than any other
part of Spain, no proper mosque exists in the region. Muslims
in Catalonia congregate in approximately 170 neighborhood prayer
rooms and oratories, many of which are informal operations run
out of garages or commercial spaces. In 2006 a proposed mosque
in the beachfront Badalona neighborhood of Barcelona was
defeated by a campaign directed by Partido Popular activists who
gathered 4,000 voters' signatures against the mosque. (Note:
Another ongoing proposal to build a mosque in the city of Lleida
has faced similar opposition for the past eight years. End
Note.) Chaib also cited the anti-immigration Platform for
Catalonia party as "racist and anti-Muslim". Much of the
blame, he added, stems from the lack of unity within the Muslim
community as the different factions cannot agree on the
characteristics of an official mosque. While Chaib did say that
relations between Moroccans and Pakistanis in Catalonia are
good, he believes that the Pakistani community resists
integrating and being more open to Spanish society. Chaib said
that his goal is to have a "Muslim community that lives in peace
within Spanish society, and has a true mosque."



¶7. (U) Chaib said that until several years ago many of the
imams in the informal prayer centers did not have residency
permits, and obtaining religious-based visas was difficult. He
credited the Spanish government in recent years for recognizing
the importance of legalizing the immigration status of religious
leaders, and said that most of the roughly 170 imams in
Catalonia are now legal residents. Chaib said that as the
number of Muslim immigrants increased, traditional fathers
increasingly voiced their concerns with their daughters
receiving a westernized education. As a result, the Spanish
government recognized the importance of promoting moderate
religious leaders to explain the role of Islam in a western
society.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS



¶8. (U) Chaib also stressed the importance of educating
Muslim youth and Spanish born children of immigrants to be
politically active and participate in society. The founder of
the Ibn Batuta Socio-Cultural Association, a secular
organization that aims to improve relations between Muslims and
Spanish society, Chaib is active at both the political and
grassroots level. The Ibn Batuta center - named after the famed
14th century Moroccan explorer - organizes cultural activities,
neighborhood dialogues, workshops on Islam, and job assistance
programs. Chaib said that because of the high number of
immigrants that typically work in Catalonia's now struggling
construction industry, the economic crisis has hurt Muslims
particularly hard. He added that economic woes and unemployment
create more tensions than do religious and cultural differences.
Noting that Latin American immigrants in Spain can vote in
municipal elections - unlike most Muslim immigrants- Chaib
mentioned the importance of the Spanish government signing
bilateral accords with Morocco, Pakistan and other countries to
allow non-citizen immigrants to participate in the political
process.


¶9. (U) Chaib, who excused himself three times during the
hour and a half long meeting to vote on different resolutions in
the Catalan Parliament, spoke highly of his 2002 visit to the
U.S. and like many interlocutors these days was hopeful that
President Obama would visit Barcelona next year. Before
concluding the meeting with a tour of the Parliament building
and introductions to several other socialist deputies, Chaib
said that Arabs have both high hopes and high expectations for
President Obama, noting "the doors of hope are opening, and it's
easier to work in that environment.
CROUCHG

Iran getting Uranium from Tanzania?

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 15:38:00 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/09/06DARESSALAAM1593.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L DAR ES SALAAM 001593 SIPDIS SIPDIS AF/E FOR BYODER, AF/RSA FOR MBITTRICK ALSO VCI FOR HHEINTZELMAN AND KWALKIN EO 12958 DECL: 09/27/2016 TAGS PTER, PINR, IAEA, PGOV, CG, TZ SUBJECT: URANIUM IN DAR COMMON KNOWLEDGE TO SHIPPING COMPANIES, PER SWISS DIPLOMAT REF: A. DAR ES SALAAM 01376 B. UNVIE VIENNA 00601 C. KINSHASA 01309 Classified By: Charge d’Affaires D. Purnell Delly for reasons 1.4(b),(d) and (e). ¶1. (C) According to a senior Swiss diplomat, the shipment of uranium through Dar es Salaam is common knowledge to two Swiss shipping companies. Hans Peter Schoni, Counsellor at the Embassy of Switzerland in Tanzania, referred to the allegations of uranium from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) passing through Zambia and Tanzania en route to Iran, but did not attribute to the shipping companies any opinion of the source or destination of the alleged uranium. Poloff pointed out that the reports were unsubstantiated, but Schoni repeated that transport of uranium is common knowledge to the two companies, though no one at either company would admit it in writing. XXXXXXXXXXXX are both based in Geneva and conduct verification and inspection work in Tanzania. ¶2. (C) Mission has shared this information with all relevant agencies at post which were unable to substantiate this or any other such reports of uranium shipments. Nevertheless, given the potential significance of such allegations we believe it is important to report nonetheless. DELLY

Radioactive Terrorists in Yemen?

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 15:36:00 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10SANAA19.html

S E C R E T SANAA 000019

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP AMACDONALD AND ISN/NESS MHUMPHREY

EO 12958 DECL: 01/08/2020

TAGS ENRG, ECON, MNUC, PARM, PREL, PGOV, IN, YM

SUBJECT: XXXXXXXXXXXX SOUNDS ALARM OVER

UNPROTECTED RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

REF: A. 07 SANAA 1905 B. 07 SANAA 2029

Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (S) The lone security guard standing watch at Yemen’s main radioactive materials storage facility was removed from his post on December 30, 2009, according toXXXXXXXXXXXX. XXXXXXXXXXXX. The only closed-circuit television security camera monitoring the facility broke six months ago and was never fixed, according to XXXXXXXXXXXX. The facility XXXXXXXXXXXX holds various radioactive materials, small amounts of which are used by local universities for agricultural research, by a Sana’a hospital, and by international oilfield services companies for well-logging equipment spread out across the country. “Very little now stands between the bad guys and Yemen’s nuclear material,” a worried XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff.

¶2. (S) Foreign Minister Abu Bakr al-Qirbi told the Ambassador on January 7 that no radioactive material was currently stored in Sana’a and that all “radioactive waste” was shipped to Syria. XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶3. (S) The NAEC nuclear material storage facility normally contains IAEA Category I and II amounts of iridium and cobalt-60, including a lead-encased package of 13,500 curies (Ci) of cobalt-60 that was allegedly shipped to Yemen from India six months ago. XXXXXXXXXXXX told EconOff that XXXXXXXXXXXX the cobalt-60 was moved late on January 7 from the largely unsecured NAEC facility XXXXXXXXXXXX implored the U.S. to help convince the ROYG to remove all materials from the country until they can be better secured, or immediately improve security measures at the NAEC facility. XXXXXXXXXXXX

COMMENT

———-

¶4. (S) Post will continue to push senior ROYG officials to increase security at all National Atomic Energy Commission facilities and provide us with a detailed accounting of all radioactive materials in the country. XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX.XXXXXXXXXXXX’s concern over the safety and security of Yemen’s modest nuclear material inventory, however, appears genuine. XXXXXXXXXXXX. . Post POC is EconOff Roland McKay, mckayrd@state.sgov.gov. SECHE

UK Muslim Demographics

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 01:20:32 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/01/09LONDON27.html

S E C R E T LONDON 000027


DEPARTMENT FOR INR/I AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PINR KISL KPLS UK
SUBJECT: UK MUSLIM DEMOGRAPHICS (C-RE8-02527)

REF: A. 08 STATE 128186
¶B. LONDON DAILY REPORT 7-28-08

Classified By: Political Counselor Rick Mills, Jr. for reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Per reftel, this cable provides
information on the demographics of the Muslim community in
the UK. The last official UK census was in 2001 and much of
what is provided below is a combination of census figures and
subsequent estimates and surveys. Post notes that the
information is incomplete and in many cases several years
old. This is, however, the most current and accurate
information available. Among the findings are that the UK
Muslim population has jumped in seven years from 1.6 million
to 2 million. At that rate of increase, HMG estimates that
the Muslim population of the UK at the next census in 2011
will be over 2.2 million. End Summary.

Overall Muslim Population Growing But Rate Slowing
--------------------------------------------- -----

¶2. (C) The 2001 UK census showed a population of 1.6 million
Muslims. In April 2008, the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith
announced that HMG estimated the Muslim population at 2
million or 3.3% of the UK population. This represented an
increase of 400,000 in seven years. The 1951 census showed a
population of Muslims of less than 22,000. Therefore between
1951 and 2001 (50 years) there had been an annualized
increase of 31,500 Muslims in the UK, but in the seven year
period between 2001 and 2008 there was an actual annualized
increase of 57,000. The rate of increase as measured by
decades has slowed, however. In 1961, the population of
Muslims in the UK was 2.5 times what it had been in 1951.
Between 1961 and 1971 the Muslim population multiplied an
astonishing 5 times its previous population. Thereafter the
Muslim population's rate of growth began to slow. In 1981 it
was only 2.4 times the 1971 population (this was attributed
to the ending of unlimited Commonwealth immigration in the
early 1970's). In 1991 it was only 1.7 times what it had been
in 1981; and between 1991 and 2001 it only grew by 1.6 times
the previous population. Based on a projected 2011
population of 2.2 million, the rate of increase between 2001
and 2011 is estimated to be 1.4 times the 2001 figure. In
overall numbers, the UK Muslim population is rapidly
increasing, but its rate of growth is slowly decreasing.
Changes to UK visa rules announced in 2008 may slow this rate
even more.

Immigration Or Birthrate?
-------------------------

¶3. (C) HMG does not categorize either births or immigration
by religion. A rough estimate, however, based on immigration
statistics by country of origin indicates 50-55,000 "self
declared" Muslims were granted settlement (permanent
residence) in the UK in 2007. Based on the aforementioned
57,000 annualized growth in the Muslim population, it is
clear that a significant portion of the population growth
among Muslims in the UK is based on immigration. 34% of
Muslims in 2001 were below the age of 16, however, and 63% of
Muslim households had at least one child and 25% contained 3
or more children. Based on these statistics a report by the
NGO Migration Watch UK (MWUK), which favors restrictions on
immigration, estimated in 2008 that the real number of
Muslims in the UK was closer to 3 million which would be 5%
of the UK population.

Raw Data: Office of National Statistics
---------------------------------------

¶4. (SBU) The following are excerpts from the UK's Office of
National Statistics (ONS), all data is from the 2001 UK
census unless otherwise noted.

-- The 2001 Census showed that out of the total UK population
of 58.8 million, 1.6 million identify as Muslims. At 3
percent, this is the largest non-Christian religious
population. They are a young, tightly clustered, but often
disadvantaged community, according to UK social and economic
statistics.

-- People with Muslim backgrounds are most concentrated in
London (38% of the total UK Muslim population) and other
large urban areas, including the West Midlands (14% of the
Muslim population), the North West (13%), and Yorkshire and
the Humber (12%). Within these areas, Muslims are highly
concentrated spatially. Muslims make up 8% of the population
of London overall, but 36% of the Tower Hamlets area and 24%
of the Newham area population.

-- 70% of Muslims gave their national identity as British,
English, Scottish, or Welsh; 91% of UK-born Muslims gave a
British national identity.

-- More than half of Muslim adults living in England and
Wales in 2001 said their religion was important to their
self-identity.

-- Muslims are the second least-likely of all religious
groups to have been born in the UK, with the majority being
born outside the UK; 46% were born in the UK, 39% were born
in Asia (Pakistan - 18%; Bangladesh - 9%; India - 3%), 9%
were born in Africa (Somalia - 2%; Kenya - 1%), and 4% were
born in Europe outside the UK (Turkey - 3%, former
Yugoslavian countries - 1%).

-- Muslims were more likely than all other groups of UK 16 to
24-year-olds to be living with a partner, either as a married
or cohabiting couple (19% each).

-- Among 45 to 54-year-olds, 17% described their marital
status as divorced, separated or re-married.

-- Muslims households were the least likely to be homeowners
(52%) and are the most likely among all religious groups to
be living in accommodation rented from the council or housing
association (28%); 4% live rent-free.

-- 32% of Muslim households live in overcrowded
accommodation. Average family size for a Muslim family is
3.8, which can contribute to overcrowding. 34% of Muslim
households contained more than five people. 63% contained at
least one dependent child, and 25% contained three or more
dependent children.

-- Unemployment rates were higher for Muslims than any other
religion, for both men and women. Muslim male unemployment
rate was 13% in 2004, and for women it was 18%.

-- Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 had the highest
unemployment rates at 28%; 11% of Muslims over the age of 25
were unemployed.

-- Muslims were most likely to be unavailable or not actively
seeking work due to reasons such as disability, being a
student, or looking after the family and home. 31% of
working-age men were economically inactive, as were 69% of
working-age women.

-- With 34% of Muslims under the age of 16 in 2001, Muslims
have the youngest age profile of all the religious groups in
Great Britain. Less than one in ten were aged 65 or older.

-- Muslim men outnumber women 52% to 48%.

-- 74% of Muslims are from an Asian ethnic background
(Pakistani - 43%, Bangladeshi - 16%, Indian - 8%, Other Asian
- 6%), Almost 1.2 million Asian Muslims were living in Great
Britain in 2001. Another 11% were from a White ethnic
background, including 4% of White British origin and 7% from
another White background (including Turkish, Cypriot, Arab
and Eastern European). 6% of Muslims were of Black African
origin, mainly from North and West Africa.

-- Muslims, both male and female, had the highest rates of
reported ill health in 2000. Age-standardized rates of "not
good" health were 13% for Muslim males and 16% for Muslim
females.

-- Muslims had the highest rates of disability, with 24% of
females and 21% of males claiming a disability.

-- Lone parent households are less common within Muslim
communities, with around 50% of Muslim households headed by
an individual who is part of a married couple.

-- Muslim households were also more likely to contain more
than one family, with 19% of all multiple family households
Muslim.

-- 33% of working-age Muslims in Great Britain had no
qualifications in 2004, which is the highest rate of any
religious group. At 12%, they were also the least likely to
have degrees or equivalent qualifications.

-- Muslims who were born in the UK are more likely than
Muslims born elsewhere to have a degree or equivalent
qualification at any age. UK-born Muslims under the age of
30 were almost twice as likely to have degrees as those born
elsewhere in 2004.

-- 371,000 school-aged (5 to 16 years old) Muslim children
were in England in 2001, and by 2008 there were seven
state-maintained Islamic schools catering to around 2,100
Muslim children.

-- One-fifth of Muslims were self-employed n 2004.

-- 37% of Muslim men and over a quarter of Muslim women were
working in the distribution, hotel and restaurant industry.

-- One in seven Muslim men work in the transport and
communication industry.

-- Less than a third of Muslim men work in managerial or
professional occupations, and almost one in ten worked as a
taxi driver, cab driver or chauffeur in 2004.

-- Between 16 and 20% of Muslim women work in sales and
customer service jobs.

Raw Data: Post's 2008 Religious Freedom Report and NGOs
--------------------------------------------- ----------

¶5. (SBU) The following are excerpted from Post's
International Religious Freedom Report (IRFR) and reports or
studies from various Muslim and migration/immigration NGO's.
Citations are from the IRFR unless otherwise noted.

-- The Government estimates the number of mosques in the UK
to be around 1,000.

-- A May 8, 2008, Religious Trends report states that more
than 50% of Muslims regularly worship at mosques. (Embassy
Comment: Religious Trends is a UK think tank that monitors a
wide array of religious issues. Among other things, the 2008
report noted that while 43 million UK residents claimed to be
Christians, less than 3 million (7%) regularly worship in
churches. End Comment).

-- The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reported a decrease in
prosecutions over the previous reporting period for
religiously-motivated incidents, with only 29 cases
classified as religiously-aggravated offenses. Of the 23
cases in which the victim's religious affiliation is known,
17 were Muslim.

-- In 2006, controversy arose after 100 Islamic private
schools turned out to be "little more than places where the
Koran is recited," the schools promised to upgrade their
instruction and they are due for review in 2010.

-- According to a poll of 600 Muslim and 800 non-Muslim
students at thirty universities throughout the UK conducted
by the Centre for Social Cohesion (CSC), as reported ref B,
32 percent of Muslims on UK campuses believe killing in the
name of religion is justified, 54 percent wanted a Muslim
Party to represent their world view in Parliament, and 40
percent want Muslims in the UK to be under Sharia law. Only
2 percent of non-Muslims felt killing in the name of religion
could be justified and none believed it was acceptable for
Muslims in the UK to have a religious-based party, or to be
under Sharia law. 73 percent of Muslim students are at least
occasional participants in Friday services while only 2
percent of non-Muslim students attend any religious service.
The poll results also found that 73 percent of Muslim
students believe it is possible to be both Muslim and British
and a similar number believe their parents are "much more or
somewhat more" strict Muslims than they are. In addition
only six percent believed that people who leave Islam for
another religion should be "punished according to Sharia law"
(killed).

-- According to MWUK, arranged marriages in the Muslim
community are creating unusually large population growth in
areas where Muslims predominate, since first-generation
families tend to have larger numbers of children (based on
published research and a comparison of the 1991 and 2001
census). For example, in the eighties the Bradford (city)
Council estimated that the Muslim population would reach
130,000 by 2030 and then level off. Now the projection is
for 130,000 by 2020 and rising. Bradford is a West Yorkshire
industrial city whose 2001 population of 294,000 included an
estimated 75,000 Muslims (25%), predominantly of Pakistani
origin. Bradford has the largest Muslim population in the UK
outside of London, and no single London borough
(neighborhood) has as large a Muslim population.

-- Also according to MWUK, the number of marriageble-age
Muslims in the South Asian community had jumped from 155,000
in 1991 to 236,000 in 2001. MWUK claims the majority of
members of these communities seek spouses from overseas in
arranged marriages. MWUK claims these figures point to a much
larger Muslim population than HMG is reporting and is
projecting. HMG says arranged marriages with South Asian
partners, "are a normal facet of settlement figures."


Visit London's Classified Website:
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TUTTLE

UK Muslim Counter-Radicalization strategies

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 01:15:06 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10LONDON268.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 000268


NOFORN

STATE FOR EUR/PGI, EUR/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: KPAO PGOV PREL UK
SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT WITH MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE UK

REF: (A) STATE 127215 (B) STATE 1183

Classified By: LDAVIS

¶1. (C) Summary: Although people of Muslim faith make up only
3-4 percent of the UK's population, outreach to this key
audience is vital to U.S. foreign policy interests in the UK
and beyond. Embassy London Muslim engagement activities
comprise a counter-radicalization strategic plan, public
diplomacy programming, and Ambassadorial outreach to address
diverse audiences of varied national origin. This is a top
Mission priority. End summary.

Countering Radicalization
--------------------------

¶2. (C) The Embassy,s counter-radicalization multi-agency
working group, established in 2007 to improve our
understanding of Muslim communities, the radicalization
process, and HMG counter-radicalization efforts, developed a
strategic action plan in 2009. This plan, regularly updated,
outlines counter-radicalization goals and concrete steps the
Embassy will take to encourage Muslim communities to reject
violent ideologies and recruitment by extremists. The plan
is consistent with overall USG plans to counter violent
extremism, but considers the particular context of
radicalization in the UK.

¶3. (C) The Embassy plan integrates efforts and resources
across sections and agencies to ensure a coherent strategy.
It outlines key objectives necessary to the Administration,s
vision of community engagement to prevent violent extremism.
Programs are shaped to fit particular neighborhood needs and
dynamics, recognizing that the diversity of Muslim
communities precludes a monolithic set of responses. Focus
is on the most at-risk Muslim populations and youths,
targeting engagement and community capacity-building to
counter violent extremism. Mission efforts incorporate a
close working relationship with UK agencies working on the
same set of issues.

4) (C) Our objectives:
A) Empowering Muslim communities to mobilize against
extremism. Although communities frequently reject violent
extremism, they lack the institutional infrastructure to
actively mobilize against radicalizing influences.
B) Empowering Muslim communities to build community
resilience. Civil society and grassroots organizations can
help channel grievances, providing institutions for
community-based solutions and for engaging government and
other communities.
C) Encouraging community cohesion, respect for pluralism, and
integration across ethnic and religious groups. Insular
communities tend to be more vulnerable to radicalization, as
demonstrated by statistical analysis of survey research and
comparative studies of Muslim communities.
D) Increasing Muslim communities, understanding of U.S.
foreign policy in Muslim countries and counter-terrorism
objectives; countering the view that the West is at war with
Islam.
E) Encouraging Muslim communities, positive and effective
relations with the Embassy, fundamental to the success of our
engagement programs.

5)(C) We are currently building a network of Muslim civic
activists to enhance the collective skills of individuals and
groups involved in counter-radicalization and to encourage
collaborative initiatives. The network will include
different kinds of activists * youth workers, civil rights
organizations, business entrepreneurs, interfaith workers,
and former extremists, and others * who share an interest in
counter-radicalization but frequently operate in different
spheres of activity, limiting opportunities to learn from one
another, share expertise and resources, and collaborate.

Public Diplomacy
----------------

6)(C) The Counter-radicalization Strategic Plan complements
and in most cases includes PD programs, outreach, and broad
base of Muslim contacts. We use the full range of PD tools
at our disposal to influence UK Muslim perceptions of the
U.S., to counter violence and ideological extremism, and to
empower credible Muslim voices. Our programs focus on Muslim
youth and women and potential multipliers such as youth
leaders, youth program directors, mosques, and schools.
Through interfaith dialogue, the arts, exchanges, and Muslim
media, we have a broad base of Muslim contacts who view the
Embassy as a reliable and supportive partner. Outreach
beyond London is a priority. Areas of emphasis include
interfaith dialogue the arts, and exchanges and outreach.

7)(C) Interfaith dialogue: Our joint programs with the
Chicago-based Interfaith Youth Core (IFYC) focus on high
school and university level youth with the goal of reducing
the risk of radicalization and promoting understanding among
faiths. Activities have included training and exchanges of
UK youth workers, and small grants to seed projects on
interfaith volunteerism, neighborhood-based relationship
building, new media promotion of interfaith dialogue, and
interfaith dialogue around environmental issues, among
others. We also support the London-based Three Faiths
Forum,s high-school level outreach program, through which
they talk to young people about different faiths and dispel
myths and misconceptions.

8)(C) The arts: We use elements of new media, culture, and
the arts to connect with a younger audience and rising Muslim
artists, using the arts as a platform to demonstrate the rich
diversity of Muslim life in America. The arts are also an
important way to reach potentially hostile audiences.
Programs include film screenings (Islam in America,
DeenTight, New Muslim Cool), support for the annual Ramadan
Festival of arts, and programs with American Muslim writers,
artists, and musicians.

9)(C) Exchanges and outreach: People-to-people interactions
and seeing America first-hand have consistently been an
effective way of dispelling stereotypes and prejudices about
the U.S. Our programs include: the Citizen Dialogues
Program, International Visitors Leadership Program, and
Voluntary Visitor exchanges with Muslim women community
leaders. Our schools outreach program to secondary schools
and universities has included over 20 predominantly Muslim
institutions in nine localities over the past year. These
school visits were in many cases the first by an American
officer. We have built on the First Lady,s hugely
successful 2009 visit to a minority school (reftel B) with an
exchange program in 2010 that will include some of the
students meeting her at the White House. Four UK
businesspeople will attend the President,s Entrepreneurship
Summit in April, 2010.

The Ambassador,s Outreach
-------------------------

10) (C) The Ambassador engages with UK Muslim communities
regularly. Beginning with an iftar in 2009 shortly after his
arrival, he has spoken to Muslim groups in Wales and
Scotland, visited the London Central Mosque, and hosted an
interfaith breakfast at his residence, among other
activities. Having the U.S. Ambassador visit and listen
respectfully to Muslim points of view has an enormous impact
on groups that often feel marginalized and ignored.

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

SUSMAN

Canadian CSIS on Terrorism

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 00:44:26 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/07/08OTTAWA918.html

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 000918

C O R R E C T E D COPY//SUBJECT LINE//////////////////////////////////

NOFORN
SIPDIS

EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2018
TAGS PREL, PTER, MOPS, IR, PK, AF, CA

SUBJECT: COUNSELOR, CSIS DIRECTOR DISCUSS CT THREATS,
PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
REF: A. OTTAWA 360 B. OTTAWA 808 C. OTTAWA 850 D. OTTAWA 878
OTTAWA 00000918 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons, 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Director Judd discussed domestic and foreign terror threats with Counselor of the State Department Cohen in Ottawa on July 2. Judd admitted that CSIS was increasingly distracted from its mission by legal challenges that could endanger foreign intelligence-sharing with Canadian agencies. He predicted that the upcoming release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr’s interrogation by Canadian officials would lead to heightened pressure on the government to press for his return to Canada, which the government would continue to resist. Judd shared Dr. Cohen’s negative assessment of current political, economic, and security trends in Pakistan, and was worried about what it would mean for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Canada has begun formulating an inter-agency Pakistan strategy, and CSIS had agreed to open a channel to Iran’s intelligence service which Judd has not yet “figured out.” (Septel will cover Dr. Cohen’s discussions regarding Pakistan and the OEF and ISAF missions in Afghanistan.) End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Counselor of the Department of State Eliot Cohen and CSIS Director Jim Judd in Ottawa on July 2 discussed threats posed by violent Islamist groups in Canada, and recent developments in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (CSIS is Canada’s lead agency for national security intelligence.) Director Judd ascribed an “Alice in Wonderland” worldview to Canadians and their courts, whose judges have tied CSIS “in knots,” making it ever more difficult to detect and prevent terror attacks in Canada and abroad. The situation, he commented, left government security agencies on the defensive and losing public support for their effort to protect Canada and its allies.

Legal Wrangling Risks Chill Effect
----------------------------------

¶3. (S/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶4. (S/NF) Judd derided recent judgments in Canada’s courts that threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- Qthat threaten to undermine foreign government intelligence- and information-sharing with Canada. These judgments posit that Canadian authorities cannot use information that “may have been” derived from torture, and that any Canadian public official who conveys such information may be subject to criminal prosecution. This, he commented, put the government in a reverse-onus situation whereby it would have to “prove” the innocence of partner nations in the face of assumed wrongdoing.

¶5. (S/NF) Judd credited Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s minority Conservative government for “taking it on the chin and pressing ahead” with common sense measures despite court challenges and political knocks from the opposition and interest groups. When asked to look to the future, Judd predicted that Canada would soon implement UK-like legal procedures that make intelligence available to “vetted defense lawyers who see everything the judge sees.”
OTTAWA 00000918 002.2 OF 003

Terror Cases and Communities Present Mixed Pictures
--------------------------------------------- ------

¶6. (C/NF) Judd commented that cherry-picked sections of the court-ordered release of a DVD of Guantanamo detainee and Canadian citizen Omar Khadr (ref D) would likely show three (Canadian) adults interrogating a kid who breaks down in tears. He observed that the images would no doubt trigger “knee-jerk anti-Americanism” and “paroxysms of moral outrage, a Canadian specialty,” as well as lead to a new round of heightened pressure on the government to press for Khadr’s return to Canada. He predicted that PM Harper’s government would nonetheless continue to resist this pressure.

¶7. (C) The Director mentioned other major cases that also presented CSIS with major legal headaches due to the use of intelligence products in their development: Momin Khawaja has been on trial for his role in an Al Qaeda UK bomb plot since June 23 in the first major test of Canada’s 2001 Anti-Terrorism Act, and Canada’s ability to protect intelligence supplied by foreign government sources (ref D); the trial of the first of the home-grown Toronto 11 (down from 18) terror plotters, which is also now underway; and, the prosecution of XXXXXXXXXXXX.

¶8. (C) Judd said he viewed Khawaja and his “ilk” as outliers, due in part to the fact that Canada’s ethnic Pakistani community is unlike its ghettoized and poorly educated UK counterpart. It is largely made up of traders, lawyers, doctors, engineers, and others who see promise for themselves and their children in North America, he observed, so its members are unlikely to engage in domestic terror plots. He said that therefore CSIS main domestic focus is instead on fundraising and procurement, as well as the recruitment of a small number of Canadian “wannabes” of Pakistani origin for mostly overseas operations.

Pakistan and Afghanistan
------------------------

¶9. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Counselor Cohen briefed his recent trip to Islamabad and Peshawar, noting his alarm at the degrading economic, political, and security situation there, and its implications for Pakistan, Afghan, and regional stability. Judd responded that Dr. Cohen’s sober assessment tracked with CSIS’ own view of Pakistan, and that “it is hard to see a good outcome there” due to that country’s political, economic, and security failures, on top of fast-rising oil and food prices. Canada does not have an explicit strategy for Pakistan, Judd said, but Privy Council Deputy Secretary David Mulroney (who leads the interagency on Afghanistan) now has the lead on developing one (septel). Dr. Cohen remarked, and Judd agreed, that it would be necessary to avoid approaching Pakistan as simply an adjunct to the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan.
¶10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being “high-five mode” on Q10. (S/NF) CSIS is far from being “high-five mode” on Afghanistan, Judd asserted, due in part to Karzai’s weak leadership, widespread corruption, the lack of will to press ahead on counter-narcotics, limited Afghan security force capability (particularly the police) and, most recently, the Sarpoza prison break. He commented that CSIS had seen Sarpoza coming, and its link to the Quetta Shura in Pakistan, but could not get a handle on the timing.

Iranian Outreach
----------------

¶11. (S/NF) Judd added that he and his colleagues are “very, very worried” about Iran. CSIS recently talked to Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) after that agency requested its own channel of communication to Canada, he said. The Iranians agreed to “help” on Afghan issues, including sharing information regarding potential attacks. However, “we have not figured out what they are up to,” Judd confided, since it is clear that the “Iranians want ISAF to bleed...slowly.”
OTTAWA 00000918 003.2 OF 003

¶12. (U) Dr. Cohen has cleared this message.
Visit Canada,s Economy and Environment Forum at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/can ada
WILKINS

Discussing ME with Netanyahu

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 00:22:07 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/02/09TELAVIV457.html
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000457 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV KPAL IS IR SY
SUBJECT: CODEL CARDIN DISCUSSES IRAN, SYRIA, PALESTINIANS, 
AND ISRAEL ELECTION WITH BENJAMIN NETANYAHU 
 
Classified By: DCM Luis G. Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1.  (C)  SUMMARY  During their trip to Israel, CODEL Cardin 
discussed Iran, Syria, Israel-Palestinian negotiations, and 
the Israeli elections with Likud Party leader and candidate 
for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.  Netanyahu described a 
nuclear Iran as the greatest threat facing Israel, and urged 
strong economic sanctions backed by a viable military option 
to confront a problem that he said threatened the region and 
could prove a "tipping point" in world history.  Describing 
his approach to "economic peace" with the Palestinians, 
Netanyahu suggested he would cut through bureaucratic 
obstacles to Palestinian economic development to build a 
"pyramid" from the "bottom up" that would strengthen the 
Palestinian Authority, and offer the Palestinians  a viable 
alternative to radicalism.  Netanyahu expressed support for 
the concept of land swaps, and emphasized that he did not 
want to govern the West Bank and Gaza but rather to stop 
attacks from being launched from there.  Netanyahu suggested 
Syrian interest in peace negotiations with Israel were really 
overtures to the United States, and described the Syrians as 
firmly in the Iranian camp.  Netanyahu expressed confidence 
that President Peres would offer him rather than Kadima Party 
leader Livni the opportunity of forming a coalition because 
the bloc of center-right/right wing parties in the new 
Knesset amounted to 65 seats.  Netanyahu said his desire 
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would 
not agree to a rotating prime ministership.  END SUMMARY 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  As part of their February 14-17 visit to Israel, 
CODEL Cardin met with Likud Party leader and candidate for 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on February 16 in 
Jerusalem.  Netanyahu was at the center of intense political 
speculation about the formation of a governing coalition 
following the extremely close Israeli national election of 
February 10, which did not produce a clear winner.  The CODEL 
met with Netanyahu following meetings the previous day with 
President Peres, and prior to meetings later in the day with 
Prime Minister Olmert and Palestinian Authority Prime 
Minister Fayyad. 
 
---- 
IRAN 
---- 
 
¶3.  (C)  Netanyahu quickly launched into his oft-stated 
position that Iran is the greatest threat facing Israel. 
Noting that "Persia" already had two bases on the 
Mediterranean (referring to Hizballah and Hamas), Netanyahu 
complained that Iran's "tentacles" were choking Israel, and 
that a new one grew back whenever one was cut off.  Netanyahu 
charged that Iran was developing nuclear weapons with the 
express purpose of wiping out Israel, and described 
preventing Iran from developing a nuclear capability as 
Israel's  highest policy priority.  Netanyahu described five 
threats that he saw emanating from Iranian nuclear 
development: a direct threat to Israel; a direct threat to 
other regional states; increased terrorist power under an 
Iranian nuclear umbrella; a Middle East nuclear arms race; 
and a destabilized Middle East, with  Arab regimes 
"terrified" of Iran in his view.  Netanyahu, commenting that 
he normally avoided political jargon, pointed to one phrase 
that he said applied to this issue - "a tipping point." 
According to Netanyahu, if Iran develops a nuclear weapon 
capability it will "topple the peace process" and "change the 
history of the world." 
 
¶4.  (C)  When asked what advice he offered to the United 
States, Netanyahu reported that he had spoken to 
then-candidate Obama and said the method was less important 
than the goal, and asked rhetorically whether the President 
would allow Iran to "cross the nuclear threshold ... on his 
watch."  Netanyahu suggested there were many ways to pressure 
Iran, which he saw as economically weak at the moment due to 
plunging oil prices at the same time that the U.S. President 
had strong international backing, a situation Netanyahu 
described as the opposite of the past few years.  He said he 
would look forward (as Prime Minister) to discussing  with 
President Obama concrete measures to be taken against Iran. 
Netanyahu said these would not be a substitute for 
Palestinian negotiations, but that any result from such 
negotiations would be "washed away" by Iran's attaining a 
nuclear bomb. 
 
¶5.  (C)  When asked how Iran could be isolated, Netanyahu 
suggested a blockade as one possibility.  The nuclear program 
could be stopped if the U.S. led the international community 
to "ratchet up" economic sanctions, but that these sanctions 
would only work if Iran knew that the U.S. military option 
remained viable.  Netanyahu said he did not object to a U.S. 
dialogue with Iran provided the talks were close ended, 
perhaps two months, with fixed results, otherwise Iran would 
 
TEL AVIV 00000457  002 OF 003 
 
 
"take you to the cleaners."  He said he agreed with the 
Europeans' urging the U.S. to postpone any talks until past 
the Iranian elections in June.  Netanyahu said he did not 
know for certain how close Iran was to developing a nuclear 
weapons capability, but that "our experts" say Iran was 
probably only one or two years away and that was why they 
wanted open ended negotiations.  He again urged "tough 
negotiations" if military means were not used  (and added 
that Special Envoy Mitchell was both nice and tough.) 
Netanyahu described the Iranian regime as crazy, retrograde, 
and fanatical, with a Messianic desire to speed up a violent 
"end of days."  That was not the whole country, however, in 
his view, as he said that "75 percent of the Iranian people" 
oppose the regime, but that it governed with terror and would 
be hard to overthrow.  There was no single view from 
Iranians, therefore, but there was from the powers that 
dominate.  He reiterated that strong economic action could 
stop their nuclear development or possibly even bring down 
the regime - as could "the U.S. military process." 
 
----------------- 
PALESTINIAN TRACK 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C)  Turning to peace with the Palestinians, Netanyahu 
said the reason  the process had not worked so far was that 
while 70 percent of Israelis were willing to make 
concessions, the same number were convinced that there was no 
real Palestinian partner.  Netanyahu warned that when Israel 
left Lebanon is created a first Iranian base, that when it 
left Gaza it created a second Iranian base, and if Israel 
"promised" a third retreat from the West Bank it would see 
the same results.  There were three options, according to 
Netanyahu - withdrawing to the 1967 borders (that would "get 
terror, not peace"); doing nothing ("just as bad"); or 
"rapidly building a pyramid from the ground up."  Netanyahu 
suggested a rapid move to develop the West Bank economically, 
including "unclogging" bureaucratic "bottlenecks."  He 
promised to "take charge personally" (as Prime Minister) to 
facilitate this bureaucratic reform, which would occur in 
tandem with political negotiations and cooperation with 
Jordan to build up Palestinian Authority security capacity. 
Netanyahu noted that there  were larger demonstrations 
against the  Gaza operation in Madrid and London than in the 
West Bank.  He said this was because the West Bankers 
recognized that Hamas represents  the prospect of "violent, 
crazy" people in charge of their society; they  should be 
offered real alternatives in order to have the strength to 
resist the radicals. 
 
¶7.  (C)  Netanyahu said his "new approach"  would also 
include not continuing to fund a  "bloated" Palestinian 
bureaucracy.  It would be aimed at direct development. 
Netanyahu, noting that he had previously "turned around" the 
Israeli economy (as Finance Minister), gave one example of a 
problem he would fix as an electric powerline in the West 
Bank that was held up by conflicting and competing agencies. 
He said this powerline was needed and would create jobs, but 
was held up not because the Palestinians were targeted, but 
because that was how the Israeli bureaucracy worked for 
everyone, including Israelis.  When asked whether these 
reforms could include room to modify security arrangements, 
Netanyahu agreed that some of what the GOI calls security is 
in fact bureaucracy.  Pointing to what he described as strong 
but unpublicized trade between Haifa port and Iraq via 
Jordan, he suggested assembly points could be set up in the 
West Bank for some goods, which would create thousands of 
jobs.  This would not be a substitute for a political 
settlement, according to Netanyahu, but economic prosperity 
would make peace possible, as occurred in Northern Ireland. 
 
----- 
SYRIA 
----- 
 
¶8.  (C)  Netanyahu said he was actually more optimistic about 
dealing with the Palestinians than with Syria, because he was 
confident that the Palestinian Authority wants Iran and its 
proxies out.  He said he was less sanguine about Syria, which 
he complained straddles the fence all the time.  The Syrians 
might "talk about" a new (U.S.) relationship, but he did not 
see them disconnecting from Iran.  Netanyahu suggested that 
Israel "giving up" the Golan would just result in assurances 
that Syria would later "tear up."  Describing King Hussein as 
heroic, and noting that the King came from his "death bed" in 
1998 to get then-Prime Minister Netanyahu and 
then-Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat to reach an 
agreement at the Wye River talks, Netanyahu said that when 
Saddam Hussein took Kuwait, even King Hussein "snuggled up" 
to the Iraqi leader out of necessity.  Such is the reality in 
the Middle East. 
 
 
TEL AVIV 00000457  003 OF 003 
 
 
------------------- 
COALITION FORMATION 
------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Despite finishing one Knesset seat behind Kadima and 
its candidate Tzipi Livni in the February 10 Israeli national 
elections, Netanyahu expressed complete confidence that 
President Peres would offer him the opportunity to form a 
government because the bloc of center-right/right wing 
parties in the new Knesset has 65 seats compared to Livni's 
potential bloc of 45 seats for center-left/left wing parties 
plus 11 seats for Arab parties.  Netanyahu said his desire 
would be to form a unity government with Kadima, but would 
not agree to a rotating prime ministership with Ms. Livni. 
He explained that the one time Israel had a rotation came as 
a result of an exact tie between the two political 
coalitions, but this time the right wing bloc was much 
larger. 
 
¶10.  (C) When asked about Avigdor Lieberman's Yisrael 
Beiteinu party, Netanyahu reminded the CODEL that Kadima had 
in fact included Lieberman in their government in its earlier 
stages.  Netanyahu stressed repeatedly that he preferred a 
unity government, and said the large security and economic 
problems facing Israel called for the strength that a unity 
government would offer.  Livni "collapsed" left- wing votes 
(from Labor and other parties) to score a one vote margin for 
Kadima over Likud in the elections, but took no votes away 
from the right, according to Netanyahu.  When asked what he 
might offer to Kadima, Netanyahu suggested Kadima would get a 
few key ministerial portfolios, but did not elaborate.  He 
said that he while he was convinced a rotating Prime 
Ministership would not happen, he was confident a unity 
government could.  Netanyahu said the government would not 
include the Arab parties. 
 
¶11.  (C)  Netanyahu promised that as Prime Minister his 
government would not "go back" to unilateral withdrawals, and 
would have a clear focus.  On the economy, he said Israel was 
not a huge economy such as the United States or China, and 
that he would be able to turn things around quickly, as "a 
small share of a declining market" was big for Israel. Asked 
about settlements, Netanyahu noted that he had not 
established any new settlements when he was Prime Minister. 
Half of the West Bank, the area east of the ridge line and 
the Jordan Valley, is virtually unpopulated and only contains 
a few settlements.  In the other half, Israeli and 
Palestinian populations are intertwined.  Once the 
Palestinian Authority develops into a real partner it will be 
possible to negotiate an agreement over territory, 
settlements and "refined" Palestinian sovereignty without an 
army or control over air space and borders.  Netanyahu said 
it would be too hard to negotiate agreements over Jerusalem 
and refugees until the other issues are resolved.  Claiming 
that many Palestinians accept this point, Netanyahu said he 
was not talking about a delaying tactic but rather a 
temporary freeze, adding that he hoped PA Prime Minister 
Fayyad would still be around since Fayyad also thinks along 
economic lines. 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  As an example of economic development, Netanyahu 
spoke about expanding faith tourism.  He said that it "defied 
imagination" that the well-known site on the Jordan River 
where John the Baptist baptized Jesus was "paralyzed" by a 
GOI/PA jurisdiction dispute.  With Jericho only a mile away, 
Netanyahu offered to give an "easy", secure "envelope" for 
transporting tourists from the Galilee to this part of the 
West Bank.  That would lead to "co-production" that would 
provide large revenue streams of tourist dollars to the 
Palestinians, from a population that was already coming to 
Israel.  He asked why Israelis would be  less disposed to 
make concessions to a viable Palestinian government and 
society.  Netanyahu agreed that West Bank checkpoints take 
too long, and offered to look into express lanes, increased 
staffing, and other possible solutions - as Prime Minister. 
 
 
¶13.  (U) CODEL Cardin has cleared this cable. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
********************************************* ******************** 
CUNNINGHAM

Visit to Israel

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 00:21:15 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/01/07TELAVIV64.html
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000064 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017 
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV IS KWBG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE SECRETARY'S JANUARY 13-15 
VISIT TO ISRAEL 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Richard H. Jones, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 
 
¶1.  (S) Madam Secretary, internal tensions among GOI leaders 
have intensified since your last visit and have reached the 
point that there appears to be little coordination or even 
dialogue among the key decision makers.  Therefore, we will 
need to be sensitive to perceptions that we are favoring one 
faction over another.  The divisions at the top here are part 
of an increasingly gloomy public mood, with a new corruption 
allegations making headlines virtually daily, and a growing 
sense of political failure despite Israel's strong economy 
and a sustained success rate in thwarting suicide attacks. 
Prime Minister Olmert's approval ratings were only 23 percent 
in the latest poll, and Israeli interlocutors across the 
political spectrum are speaking openly of a crisis of public 
confidence in the country's leadership at a time when 
Israelis feel an urgent need for strong leadership to face 
the threats from Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hizballah. 
 
OPTIMISM ERODING 
---------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) The year 2007 has started off badly for Israelis. 
The good feeling generated by PM Olmert's long-delayed 
December 23 summit meeting with Abu Mazen quickly dissipated 
under the weight of reports of a new settlement in the Jordan 
Valley (now suspended by Peretz), continued Qassam rocket 
attacks on Sderot and neighboring kibbutzim, foot-dragging on 
both sides in implementing the transfer of tax revenues, lack 
of progress on the release of Cpl. Gilad Shalit, and the 
unpleasant atmospherics of the January 4 Olmert-Mubarak 
summit, which was overshadowed by a botched IDF daylight raid 
in the center of Ramallah in which four Palestinians were 
killed. 
 
¶3.  (S) The Ramallah operation, which was authorized by the 
IDF's West Bank commander without informing the Minister of 
Defense, served as a stark reminder of the lack of 
coordination between Israel's military and its civilian 
leadership.  When it comes to Israel's strategy for dealing 
with Palestinians, it increasingly seems that military is 
military, civilian is civilian and never the twain shall 
meet!  Despite Olmert's belated embrace of Abu Mazen as a 
peace partner, there is growing concern that moderate Arab 
willingness to maintain the embargo on Hamas may be eroding, 
and that Fatah may fail to muster the popular support it will 
need to depose Hamas, whether at the ballot box or in the 
streets.  Meanwhile, the upcoming release of the results of 
the Winograd Commission's investigation of the Lebanon war 
hangs like a sword of Damocles over the heads of Olmert, 
Defense Minister Peretz, and IDF Chief of General Staff 
Halutz.  Peretz and Halutz have both publicly stated that 
they will resign if the Commission holds them responsible for 
serious errors in the conduct of the war, but Olmert has 
refrained from public comments.  Olmert is also awaiting the 
results of several separate investigations involving 
corruption allegations, any one of which could further damage 
him severely, if not force his resignation. 
 
¶4.  (S) While Israeli anxiety over a possible dramatic shift 
of U.S. policy as a result of the Iraq Study Group's report 
has been allayed by statements by you and the President, 
there continues to be deep uneasiness here that the 
Baker-Hamilton recommendations reflect the shape of things to 
come in U.S. policy.  Israelis recognize that U.S. public 
support for the Iraq war is eroding and are following with 
interest the President's upcoming articulation of the 
revamped policy, but they are deeply concerned that 
Israeli-Palestinian issues not become linked in American 
minds to creating a more propitious regional environment for 
whatever steps we decide to take to address the deteriorating 
situation in Iraq. 
 
¶5.  (S) Iran's nuclear program continues to cause great 
anxiety in Israel.  Given their history, Israelis across the 
political spectrum take very seriously Ahmadinejad's threats 
to wipe Israel off the map.  Olmert has been quite clear in 
his public comments that Israel cannot tolerate a 
nuclear-armed Iran, a position stated even more emphatically 
by opposition leader Netanyahu, who compares today's Iran to 
Nazi Germany in 1938.  Despite the worst-case assessments of 
Israeli intelligence, however, there is a range of views 
about what action Israel should take.  The MFA and some of 
the think tank Iran experts appear increasingly inclined to 
state that military action must be a last resort and are 
taking a new interests in other forms of pressure, including 
but not limited to sanctions, that could force Iran to 
abandon its military nuclear program.  The IDF, however, 
srikes us as more inclined than ever to look toward a 
military strike, whether launched by Israel or by us, as the 
only way to destroy or even delay Iran's plans.  Thoughtful 
 
TEL AVIV 00000064  002 OF 003 
 
 
Israeli analysts point out that even if a nuclear-armed Iran 
did not immediately launch a strike on the Israeli heartland, 
the very fact that Iran possesses nuclear weapons would 
completely transform the Middle East strategic environment in 
ways that would make Israel's long-term survival as a 
democratic Jewish state increasingly problematic.  That 
concern is most intensively reflected in open talk by those 
who say they do not want their children and grandchildren 
growing up in an Israel threatened by a nuclear-armed Iran. 
 
LIVNI RISING 
------------ 
 
¶6.  (C) FM Tzipi Livni is frustrated by Olmert's continued 
refusal to coordinate closely, and -- perhaps with an eye on 
polls showing her popularity at over double the level of the 
Prime Minister -- suggested to a Ha'aretz interviewer in late 
December that she would challenge Olmert for the prime 
ministership if he continued not to give her his full 
backing.  In the same interview, Livni provided an outline of 
her thinking, but not a detailed plan, on the way ahead with 
the Arabs, including negotiating an interim agreement with 
the Palestinians in which the separation barrier would serve 
as the border, and refusing to engage with Syria unless Asad 
takes steps to end support for terrorism and distances 
himself from Iran.  Livni's policy adviser has confirmed to 
us that she has engaged in her own discrete discussions with 
Palestinians, but very much in an exploratory mode.  Livni 
told Senators Kerry and Dodd that she doubted that a final 
status agreement could be reached with Abu Mazen, and 
therefore the emphasis should be on reforming Fatah so that 
it could beat Hamas at the polls.  MFA officials tell us that 
Livni is also focused on the need to keep Hamas isolated. 
She and her senior staff have repeatedly expressed concern 
that some EU member-states are wobbly on this point. 
Meanwhile, Livni is keenly aware that unlike Olmert, she has 
little to fear from the Winograd Commission report (nor is 
she tainted by the corruption allegations that dog Olmert). 
Her incipient bid to take Olmert's place could become more 
serious once the report's preliminary conclusions are 
released next month. 
 
SHIFTING VIEWS ON SYRIA 
----------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Olmert and Livni agree that negotiations with Syria 
would be a trap that Damascus would use to end the 
international pressure on it and to gain a freer hand in 
Lebanon.  While they see public relations downsides to 
dismissing Syrian peace overtures out of hand, they continue 
to insist that no negotiations will be possible until Syria 
reduces its support for terrorism and/or takes direct steps 
to secure the release of Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and 
Hizballah.  Olmert and Livni are supported in that view by 
Mossad chief Dagan, who takes a dim view of Syrian 
intentions.  A significant part of the security 
establishment, however, appears to be reaching the conclusion 
that it is in Israel's interest to test Asad's intentions -- 
possibly through the use of a back channel contact -- and to 
seek to wean him away from Tehran.  They are joined in that 
view by Defense Minister Peretz, much of the Labor Party and 
the Israeli left, who argue that Israel cannot afford to 
refuse to at least explore Asad's offer to negotiate, often 
comparing that stance to Golda Meir's much-criticized 
decision to spurn Sadat's offer to negotiate, which then led 
to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Press reports January 5 stated 
that the defense establishment had recommended to Olmert that 
he open an exploratory channel to Damascus in two months, a 
timeline reportedly linked to the completion of reviews of 
U.S. policy toward Iraq and the Middle East, as well as to 
clearer indications of Abu Mazen's intentions and 
capabilities vis a vis Hamas. 
 
PERETZ-OLMERT TENSIONS 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) According to leaks from a recent Labor Party 
leadership meeting, Amir Peretz said that he feels completely 
disconnected from Olmert.  Ever since Peretz' telephone 
conversation with Abu Mazen which infuriated Olmert, the two 
reportedly barely speak to each other.  Television news 
reports on January 4 trumpeted rumors that Olmert had decided 
to remove Peretz as Defense Minister and replace him with 
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who has already announced 
plans to challenge Peretz for the Labor Party's leadership in 
late May primaries.  Even though the Prime Minister's Office 
almost immediately denied the reports, there is little doubt 
here that someone in the PMO was behind them.  While much of 
the Labor Party feels that Peretz has been a failure, both as 
Defense Minister and as Party Secretary General, and Peretz' 
popularity with the general public has hit rock bottom, Labor 
 
TEL AVIV 00000064  003 OF 003 
 
 
members widely condemned the media trial balloon, which they 
saw as an unacceptable attempt by Olmert's advisers to 
intervene in their party's leadership contest.  In any event, 
the incident is yet another indication of the intense degree 
of personal rancor and dysfunction prevailing at the top of 
the GOI. 
 
PERETZ AND SNEH OUR AMA PARTNERS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) Notwithstanding the GOI's internal discord, there is 
some good news in our efforts to nudge the GOI toward 
improvements in Palestinian quality of life issues.  Despite 
his political woes, Peretz has proven himself a serious 
partner in our efforts to implement the Agreement on Movement 
and Access (AMA) and more generally in a slow but steady push 
by the MOD to force a reluctant IDF to accept steps to reduce 
barriers to Palestinian movement and to revive the 
Palestinian economy.  Deputy Defense Minister Efraim Sneh, 
who will likely accompany Peretz to your meeting, has emerged 
as the point man for these efforts.  Sneh shares Peretz' 
conviction that Israel's security stranglehold on the 
Palestinians is "winning the battle but losing the war," but 
Sneh, who in a decades-long career served as a military 
governor of the West Bank, commanded an elite combat unit, 
and took part in the famed Entebbe raid, also has both an 
intimate knowledge of the Palestinians and a combat 
commander's credibility with the IDF that Peretz sorely 
lacks.  Your meeting with Peretz provides an opportunity to 
express appreciation for his and Sneh's efforts and to 
encourage them in their struggle to bring recalcitrant 
elements in the IDF to heel.  The more progress we can 
achieve with them on AMA implementation now, the easier it 
will be to achieve meaningful results with both parties in 
the coming year. 
 
********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
 
You can also access this site through the State Department's 
Classified SIPRNET website. 
********************************************* ******************** 
JONES

Netanyahu and Iran

Thu, 16 Dec 2010 00:20:00 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/04/09TELAVIV936.html
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TEL AVIV 000936 



SIPDIS 



H PASS TO CODEL KYL 



E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KNNP KWBG IR IS

SUBJECT: CODEL KYL'S MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER NETANYAHU: 

 WHAT WILL THE U.S. DO ABOUT IRAN? 



Classified By: Ambassador James B. Cunningham, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 



¶1. (S) Summary. CODEL Kyl, accompanied by the Ambassador, 

called on Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu April 6 in the 

first official U.S. meeting with Netanyahu since he formed a 

government.  The main topics of discussion were stopping 

Iran's nuclear program and Netanyahu's approach to 

peace-making with the Palestinians.  On Iran, Senator Kyl 

raised ways to increase the effect of sanctions, including 

possible legislation targeting Iranian imports of refined 

petroleum.  Adopting a forceful stance, Netanyahu asked 

repeatedly what the U.S. plans to do if sanctions and 

engagement fail to stop Iran's program.  Calling Iran's 

development of a nuclear bomb a world-changing event, 

Netanyahu said all other issues become insignificant by 

comparison.  On the Palestinians, Netanyahu reviewed his 

intent to pursue a three-track approach with political, 

economic, and security aspects.  While noting that his 

government is conducting a review of Israeli policy toward 

the Palestinians, Netanyahu asserted that there is agreement 

within the government and among 80% of Israelis that the 

Palestinians should be able to rule themselves, but with 

limits imposed by Israel's security requirements.  Netanyahu 

said the only difference between his position and that of 

opposition leader Tzipi Livni is over the name of the goal, 

i.e. the two-state solution.  In response to comments by 

Senator Sessions that the Palestinian Authority needs 

functioning courts and jails as well as police, Netanyahu 

agreed but said he had not yet focused much on Palestinian 

governance issues.  Netanyahu said he wants to show the 

Palestinians the benefits of peace, but with the proviso that 

if Iran goes nuclear, peace will fail. Predicting that his 

government would pleasantly surprise many critics, Netanyahu 

concluded that he hopes to come up with a common approach 

with President Obama.  End Summary. 



¶2. (U) CODEL Kyl, consisting of Senator Jon Kyl (R, AZ); 

Senator Jeff Sessions (R, AL); Representative Jane Harman (D, 

CA); Representative John Kline (R, MN); and Representative 

Chris Carney (D, PA), called on Prime Minister Benyamin 

Netanyahu April 6.  The Ambassador, Congressional staff, and 

Pol Couns (notetaker) participated in the meeting.  Netanyahu 

was joined by National Security Adviser Uzi Arad, Spokesman 

Mark Regev, Policy Adviser Ron Dermer, former chairman of the 

Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Kadima MK 

Tzachi Hanegbi (Senator's Kyl's counterpart in the 

U.S.-Israel Joint Parliamentary Committee on National 

Security), and the Israeli Embassy in Washington's 

Congressional liaison officer.  The meeting was the first 

official U.S. face to face contact with Netanyahu since he 

formed his government. 



What Will the U.S. Do About Iran? 

--------------------------------- 



¶3. (S) After a brief discussion of the world economic crisis, 

Senator Kyl raised Iran, noting the "sobering" briefings the 

CODEL had received from senior Israeli defense and 

intelligence officials the previous day.  Kyl said the 

Congress is looking at legislation that would target Iran's 

imports of refined petroleum products, adding that there are 

only four or five companies that supply refined petroleum to 

Iran and the U.S. has considerable leverage over most of 

them.  Kyl added that Israeli experts had told the CODEL that 

they thought such legislation would be helpful.  Netanyahu 

said nothing is slowing the progress of Iran's nuclear 

program.  The Prime Minister asked what will happen to the 

Middle East if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon?  If such a 

prospect is unacceptable, what will the U.S. do as Iran 

reaches the nuclear threshold?  What will the U.S. do if 

Pakistan is taken over by Islamic radicals? 



¶4. (S) Representative Harman told Netanyahu that no one in 

the CODEL disagreed with his analysis, but the U.S. should 

give engagement an opportunity to see if it works.  If it 

does not, at least it would show the world that the U.S. had 

tried.  She added that Congress supports engagement on a 

bipartisan basis.  Senator Kyl added that the Europeans tried 

to engage Iran for five years but it did not work.  President 

Obama will pursue engagement, but Kyl said he doubted it 

would be successful.  We should consider what to do in the 

mean time.  Netanyahu responded that the U.S. should move 

quickly.  Engagement should have a short time limit and a 

specific goal, for example talk to the Iranians for four to 

twelve weeks and make clear that the U.S. goal is an end to 

their nuclear program.  Leaning forward, Netanyahu repeated 

his earlier question:  "What will you do if it does not work?" 





TEL AVIV 00000936  002 OF 003 





¶5. (S) Netanyahu said that learning to live with a nuclear 

Iran would be a big mistake which would lead to a different, 

more dangerous world.  While he noted that he could not say 

for certain that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against 

Israel, if Iran had a bomb Israelis would have to ask that 

question every day.  This is a historic moment, and leaders 

have a responsibility to make decisions.  All other issues 

are insignificant by comparison.  For a third time, Netanyahu 

asked, "What are you going to do?" 





Netanyahu's Approach to the Palestinians 

---------------------------------------- 



¶6. (C) Senator Kyl asked the Prime Minister about his view of 

the two-state solution.  Netanyahu said he plans to engage 

the Palestinian Authority quickly and will not tie political 

talks with the Palestinians to developments with Iran. 

Reviewing a now familiar formula, Netanyahu said he will 

approach the Palestinians on parallel political, economic and 

security tracks.  Political talks would aim at achieving an 

agreement within certain limits, the economic approach would 

promote foreign and Arab investment and joint projects with 

Israeli partners, while the security track would continue to 

build up the PA's security forces.  In order to do any of 

this, Netanyahu noted, he will need a Palestinian partner. 



¶7. (C) Representative Harman observed that the CODEL had 

visited units of the PA's National Security Forces and the 

Presidential Guard.  PA Prime Minister Fayyad said he was 

happy with the PA's security forces, and they want to take on 

increased responsibility for security in Jericho and Jenin. 

Netanyahu replied that Israel would be happy to let them do 

more, but it is not clear what Hamas will do next. If Hamas 

forces a confrontation, Israel will have to initiate further 

military action in Gaza. Israel did not want to go back into 

Gaza, but it will do what is necessary to protect its people. 



¶8. (C) Netanyahu said his government is reviewing Israel's 

policy toward the Palestinians.  There is a consensus in the 

government and among 80% of the Israeli public that the 

Palestinians should be able to govern themselves.  The only 

limits on Palestinian sovereignty would be elements that 

affect Israel's security.  A Palestinian state must be 

demilitarized, without control over its air space and 

electro-magnetic field, and without the power to enter into 

treaties or control its borders.  Netanyahu concluded that he 

and opposition leader Tzipi Livni "only disagree about the 

name," i.e. the two-state solution. 



¶9. (C) Senator Sessions noted that people everywhere want law 

and order.  Palestinians not only need to deal with 

terrorism, they also need a functioning legal system.  Moving 

from a lawless system, the Palestinian Authority is showing 

some pride, but police are not enough, they need courts and 

jails that work.  Economic development is impossible in a 

lawless society.  Netanyahu agreed this was a valid point and 

uncharacteristically admitted that he had not focused much on 

Palestinian governance.  He added that international 

assistance should provide funding for jails and courts.  It 

is possible to create crime-free zones and begin economic 

development "in bubbles" which would then be expanded. 

Senator Sessions noted that Lt. General Dayton is focused on 

this issue.  Representative Harman commented that "bubbles" 

in the West Bank would not be enough, Palestinians need law 

and order everywhere. 



¶10. (C) Netanyahu said the "classic rhetoric" of the peace 

process has been that if Israel withdraws, all will be well. 

Now, however, if Israel withdrew from the West Bank, Hamas 

would take over.  Economic development would not be a 

substitute for a political settlement, but it would change 

the environment and show Palestinians the benefits of peace. 

Israel has been trying to "build a roof without a foundation" 

and it has not worked.  Netanyahu said there was one proviso: 

 If Iran gets a nuke, peace efforts will fail. 



¶11. (C) Netanyahu pointed to the example of Jordanian King 

Hussein, whom he termed Israel's best Arab ally and a man 

deeply committed to peace.  Yet when Saddam Hussein took 

Kuwait, King Hussein got on board with the Iraqis.  In the 

event of a nuclear Iran, "all the Arabs will become Qatar." 

We should therefore move in parallel to work for peace with 

the Palestinians while acting to stop Iran.  Netanyahu said 

he thought his government would pleasantly surprise many of 

its critics.  He concluded the meeting by saying that he 

wants to coordinate Israel's positions with the U.S. and 

hopes to come to a common position with President Obama. 



TEL AVIV 00000936  003 OF 003 







¶12.  (U) CODEL Kyl has cleared this cable. 









********************************************* ******************** 

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********************************************* ******************** 

CUNNINGHAM

Qatar's HBJ on the Middle East

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 14:06:05 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/02/10DOHA71.html

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DOHA 000071 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2020 
TAGS: PREL KWBG KPAL IR QA
SUBJECT: SENATOR KERRY'S MEETING WITH QATAR'S PRIME MINISTER 

Classified By: Ambassador Joseph E. LeBaron, for reasons 1.4 (b, d). 

-------------- 
(C) KEY POINTS 
-------------- 

--  Prime Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani (HBJ) told 
Senator John Kerry February 13 that we will all lose us 4-6 
months of time in pursuing the recently announced "proximity 
talks" between the Israelis and Palestinians. 

--  HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to ignore Hamas in 
seeking a lasting agreement. 

--  From Qatar's perspective, there are differences in style 
and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in 
principle both are fundamentally aligned.  Hamas leaders in 
Damascus and Gaza can accept recognition of Israel, but must 
calibrate the timing very carefully because Hamas supporters 
are not ready for this change. 

--  According to HBJ, Egypt has a vested interest in dragging 
out Palestinian reconciliation talks for as long as possible. 
 Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is 
Egypt's only business interest with the U.S." 

--  The Prime Minister suggested that one or two GCC members, 
Morocco, and Syria form the core membership of an Arab League 
committee to address Palestinian-Israeli concerns.  Giving 
Syria a role would create jealousy among the Arabs, which HBJ 
said would help the U.S. move talks forward. 

--  HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran by targeting 
its oil revenues is the best way to get Tehran to rethink its 
quest for nuclear weapons.  For the sanctions to work, it 
would be vital that Russia and other countries bordering Iran 
implement them fully. 

End Key Points. 

¶1. (C)  The Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (SFRC), Senator John Kerry (D-MA), accompanied by 
Ambassador, P/E Chief and SFRC staff Frank Lowenstein and 
Fatema Sumar, met February 13 with Prime Minister (and 
Foreign Minister) of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani 
(HBJ).  HBJ opened the meeting by observing that President 
Obama's presidency had brought a lot of optimism to the 
region.  Senator Kerry agreed, adding that now we "need to 
deliver." 

--------------------------- 
PROXIMITY TALKS NOT HELPFUL 
--------------------------- 

¶2. (C) HBJ expressed dissatisfaction that "everyone in the 
region" seems to have a separate plan for moving ahead on the 
Israeli-Palestinian dispute when only one plan was needed -- 
a plan that both the Israelis and Palestinians would accept 
and finalize.  More disconcerting to Qatar, he said, was the 
announcement by Special Envoy Mitchell that both parties 
would now engage in "proximity talks."  Such talks "will lose 
us 4-6 months of time," stated HBJ. 

¶3. (C) Senator Kerry responded that we "are where we are." 
He assessed that the Goldstone Report and dissatisfaction in 
Fatah's ranks in the West Bank made it difficult for Abu 
Mazen to "give something to Israel" that would allow direct 
negotiations to begin between the parties.  Add in Abu 
Mazen's previous statements on the need for a full settlement 
freeze, and the ingredients for the Palestinian people to 
accept direct talks simply are not there. 

¶4. (C) Abu Mazen is out on a limb, responded HBJ.  "He 
climbed a tree (drawing a line in the sand on settlements) 
and can't get down."  HBJ suggested that President Obama's 
address to the UN General Assembly at the opening of its 
current session could serve as a "roadmap" forward:  two 
states (Israel and Palestine) remain the goal, and the 
establishment of settlements must stop while negotiations 
take place.  HBJ stressed again that the "proximity talks" 
will cause a "lot of problems." 

----------------------------------- 
NEED FOR PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION 
----------------------------------- 

¶5. (C) HBJ told Chairman Kerry he had met recently in Doha 
with an Israeli delegation and had encouraged them to work 
with Palestinians of all stripes in the pursuit of peace. 
HBJ underscored that it is a mistake to work with just one 
partner, Fatah, and ignore Hamas.  Saying this does not mean 

DOHA 00000071  002 OF 004 


that Qatar expresses a preference for Hamas.  HBJ pointed out 
that Abu Mazen had taught in Qatar for 30 years and remains a 
friend of Qatar.  Qatar has no differences with him or those 
around him, but the Palestinian Authority (PA) cannot sign 
off on an agreement on behalf of the Palestinians where open 
divisions exist. 

¶6. (C) HBJ noted that in conversations Qatar has held with 
Hamas' leadership, it is clear that Hamas is ready to accept 
Israel's right to exist.  But the acceptance must come about 
gradually, not in one day.  Senator Kerry said he had heard 
this elsewhere, but in his own conversations in Damascus -- 
where a many leaders of Hamas reside -- he did not get the 
sense that Hamas was ready to accept Israel's existence. 

¶7. (C) Qatar's PM observed that the biggest obstacle on the 
Palestinian side to an eventual agreement with Israel is the 
reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah.  HBJ maintained that it 
would have happened during the previous U.S. administration, 
but President Bush told Abu Mazen not to sign off on it. 
Now, said HBJ, progress is slow, and bringing the two parties 
together in the spirit of reconciliation is hampered by Arab 
politics.  Reconciliation can happen, HBJ asserted, but only 
"if bigger countries in the region allow it." 

8, (C) Senator Kerry, noting that he had seen Yasser Arafat 
make the transition from PLO fighter to signer of an 
agreement on the White House lawn, observed that people can 
come around and change their position.  But was that the case 
here?  The Senator asked HBJ if the differences at play 
between Hamas' leaders in Damascus and Gaza were too wide to 
bridge. 

¶9. (C) From HBJ's perspective, there are differences in style 
and approaches between the two wings of Hamas, but in 
principle both are fundamentally aligned.  They can accept 
recognition of Israel, but have to calibrate the timing very 
carefully because Hamas knows that its supporters in the 
Palestinian territories are not ready for this change.  HBJ 
said Hamas leaders in Damascus and Gaza are aligned on 
wanting to open the border crossing at Rafah, for example, 
but differ on tactics in reaching this goal.  The leaderships 
in Syria and Gaza consult each other, and no one leader in 
Hamas can take a decision alone, reported HBJ. 

-------------------------------------------- 
EGYPT INTERESTED IN THE PROCESS, NOT RESULTS 
-------------------------------------------- 

¶10. (C) Chairman Kerry asked HBJ if Hamas is feeling 
political pressure from Gazans over their current living 
conditions.  HBJ responded that anytime people do not have 
housing, schools or public utilities, their political leaders 
feel pressure.  Hamas, however, has a greater sense of 
urgency in reconciling with Fatah, observed HBJ, than does 
the broker of the talks between the Palestinian parties. 

¶11. (C) According to HBJ, Egypt -- the broker -- has a vested 
interest in dragging out the talks for as long as possible. 
Egypt "has no end game; serving as broker of the talks is 
Egypt's only business interest with the U.S."  HBJ likened 
the situation to a physician who has only one patient to 
treat in the hospital.  If that is your only business, "the 
physician is going to keep the patient alive but in the 
hospital for as long as possible."  HBJ emphasized that 
Qatar, on the other hand, is interested only in bringing 
about peace in the region -- and as quickly as possible. 

¶12. (C) Short term, HBJ said Hamas wants to form with Fatah a 
unity government and rebuild the Israeli-inflicted damage in 
Gaza.  Senator Kerry, steering the conversation toward Hamas' 
long-term aims, acknowledged that Qatar's leaders speak 
frequently with Hamas.  The Chairman asked HBJ to explain why 
Hamas does not seem "to move when we need Hamas to move." 

¶13. (C) Simply put, answered HBJ, "Hamas does not trust Egypt 
and the Quartet enterprise."  HBJ noted that since its 
inception the Quartet has been anti-Hamas and aligned with 
the interests of Abu Mazen, Egypt and Jordan.  These partners 
of the Quartet, observed HBJ, are the very partners who have 
not delivered a Palestinian-Israeli agreement. 

¶14. (C) Returning to his theme that "peace brokers" act in 
their own self-interest, HBJ observed that President Mubarak 
of Egypt is thinking about how his son can take his place and 
how to stave off the growing strength of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  The Egyptian government, said HBJ, has jailed 
10,000 Muslim Brotherhood members without bringing court 
cases against them.  The Egyptian "people blame America" now 
for their plight.  The shift in mood on the ground is "mostly 
because of Mubarak and his close ties" to the United States. 

DOHA 00000071  003 OF 004 


His only utility to the U.S. is brokering peace between 
Palestinians and Israelis, so he has no interest in taking 
himself out of the one game he has, underscored HBJ.  "Tell 
your friends (in Egypt) they must help themselves." 

¶15. (C) As for Qatar, "We want to help Abu Mazen and the 
Palestinians," declared HBJ.  The short-term needs of 
Palestinians in Gaza are acute, said HBJ.  We need to broker 
a quick reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah and move 
forward quickly on rebuilding Gaza.  Senator Kerry asserted 
that HBJ was preaching to the converted and told the PM he 
was "shocked by what I saw in Gaza." 

¶16. (C) Continuing to illustrate how Egypt had not delivered 
for the U.S. on Palestinian issues, HBJ said Qatar was told 
in late 2008 that Israel and the U.S. needed the Egyptians to 
deal with the crisis in Gaza.  Yet former Israeli PM Olmert 
later complained to Qatar that Egypt is a big country and not 
nimble; it could not move fast enough.  Senator Kerry pointed 
out he was in Cairo at the time Qatar was calling for an Arab 
League Summit in December 2008/January 2009 and asked HBJ for 
his perspective on the rift between Qatar and Egypt at that 
time. 

¶17. (C) HBJ told Senator Kerry that Mubarak refused to come 
to Doha for a meeting of Arab leaders, preferring that the 
meeting take place in Riyadh.  The request to move the 
meeting was relayed to Qatar by the Saudis, not the 
Egyptians.  Saudi Arabia, as a big country like Egypt, has a 
vested interest in keeping Egypt afloat, said HBJ.  The 
Saudis agreed to host the meeting in Riyadh not because they 
objected to traveling to Doha, but because the Egyptians did. 
 "So we argued over the meeting location" while the 
Palestinians suffered, and we in Qatar "called a meeting and 
said whoever comes, comes." 

¶18. (C) Qatar is worried, said HBJ, about Egypt and its 
people, who are increasingly impatient.  Mubarak, continued 
HBJ, says Al Jazeera is the source of Egypt's problems.  This 
is an excuse.  HBJ had told Mubarak "we would stop Al Jazeera 
for a year" if he agreed in that span of time to deliver a 
lasting settlement for the Palestinians. 
Mubarak said nothing in response, according to HBJ. 

¶19. (C) Asked his advice on bringing about an agreement 
between Israel and the Palestinians, HBJ said President 
Clinton recognized before leaving office that Egypt was a 
problem.  When President Clinton sought help at the end of 
his term in reaching a final deal, the Saudis and Egyptians 
did not encourage him, said HBJ.  "They told him to do what 
he thinks right."  Culturally, said HBJ, that is the way 
Arabs say "you are on your own."  And President Clinton was, 
said HBJ. 

¶20. (C) Now we are at a stage, said HBJ, where Egypt does not 
want Arab League involvement in brokering a reconciliation 
agreement among the Palestinians unless the talks bog down. 
HBJ said he had told Abbas that climbing down from his tree 
on no settlement activity so that talks can go forward will 
require Arab support.  But the Egyptians won't allow it. 

¶21. (C) Asked if tabling a more specific plan for peace 
between the Israelis and Palestinians would help, HBJ said it 
would be a mistake to table a plan that is too specific.  HBJ 
then reiterated that the problem is more with those carrying 
out the negotiations.  "The good cooks (Egypt) have not given 
good food to now." 

¶22. (C) Senator Kerry noted that Special Envoy Mitchell had 
made a lot of requests of Arabs but with little success. 
Leaving Qatar aside, the Chairman asked HBJ for proposed next 
steps.  HBJ said he trusts the Saudis, but because they talk 
openly to Egypt and do not want to create more problems for 
Egypt than the Egyptian government already has, it is 
essential to bring in the small countries and start there. 

¶23. (C) HBJ suggested one or two GCC members, Morocco 
(although the King there is hesitant) and Syria as the core 
membership of an Arab League committee to address 
Palestinian-Israeli concerns.  HBJ told Senator Kerry the 
inclusion of Syria might surprise him, but having Syria play 
a role would create jealousy among the Arabs.  Some jealously 
and rivalry is just what the U.S. needs, opined HBJ, to get 
the process moving. 

---------------- 
IRAN AND LEBANON 
---------------- 

¶24. (C) Turning to Iran, Senator Kerry said he understood 
Qatar's need to find the right balance in dealing with bigger 

DOHA 00000071  004 OF 004 


neighbors, especially Iran given the natural gas field both 
share.  Due to the working relationship Qatar maintains with 
Iran, the Chairman asked HBJ for his advice as the 
international community becomes more serious about economic 
sanctions against Iran. 

¶25. (C) HBJ said Iran's president views the U.S. as a country 
that is overstretched and in difficulty as a result of too 
many commitments.  Iraq, Afghanistan, and the U.S. economy 
are the three main problems President Ahmadinejad sees.  HBJ 
observed that a Western attack against Iran for Ahmadinejad 
would be good politics, because it would allow him to take 
out his opposition using the war as a pretext.  Senator Kerry 
asked clarification of whether Ahmadinejad had said these 
things, or if HBJ inferred them from conversation. 

¶26. (C) Qatar's PM said Ahmadinejad had told him, "We beat 
the Americans in Iraq; the final battle will be in Iran." 

¶27. (C) HBJ said putting economic pressure on Iran is the 
best way to get the leadership to rethink its quest for 
nuclear weapons.  To be successful, he told Senator Kerry, 
Russia would definitely have to be on board, as would the 
Central Asian countries bordering Iran that provide food and 
supplies. 

¶28. (C) Asked his perception of the state of play with the 
opposition, HBJ said the U.S. had done a good job of standing 
back and not becoming the symbol of the opposition.  Cracks 
in the regime are appearing.  It is highly significant that 
many demonstrators ignored Khamenei when he called on them to 
stop their protests.  The four key pillars of Iranian power 
-- the court, oil sector, imams, and Revolutionary Guards --- 
all must stick with him, stressed HBJ.  There are cracks in 
the system, but the downfall of the regime may not be in the 
cards. 

¶29. (C) Asked what the sanctions should target, HBJ said the 
money that Iran derives from oil.  Depriving Tehran of this 
revenue would force the regime to negotiate. 

¶30. (C) Senator Kerry observed that Ahmadinejad was making it 
easier by his actions.  There is wide consensus in the 
Executive and Legislative branches of Washington to press 
ahead.  Senator Kerry warned that Ahmadinejad "should not 
equate Afghanistan and Iraq with what he faces." 

¶31. (C) HBJ encouraged Chairman Kerry to bear in mind that 
Iran is clever and makes its opponents dizzy in the quest for 
deals.  They will keep you working on a deal and then start 
from scratch with a new interlocutor.  HBJ stressed that Iran 
will make no deal.  Iran wants nuclear weapons, and HBJ said 
he would not be surprised to see Iran test one to demonstrate 
to the world its achievement. 

¶32. (C) On Lebanon, Senator Kerry asked if Iran and Hizballah 
are ratcheting up their weapons stockpiles as part of Iran's 
war against Israel.  HBJ affirmed that is the case. 

---- 
IRAQ 
---- 

¶33. (C) On Iraq, HBJ told Senator Kerry that Prime Minister 
Al-Maliki wants a Shia state, even though the Sunnis (when 
you count Kurds and non-Kurds) have the majority. 

¶34. (U) CODEL Kerry has cleared this message. 

Lebaron

Discussing Iran with IDF

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 14:05:24 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/05/09TELAVIV1060.html 
S E C R E T TEL AVIV 001060 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2019 
TAGS: PREL MPOS KNNP IR IS
SUBJECT: REP. WEXLER DISCUSSES IRAN WITH IDF INTELLIGENCE 
CHIEF YADLIN 

Classified By: DCM Luis G, Moreno, Reason 1.4 (b) (d) 

¶1.  (S)  Representative Robert Wexler (D, Florida), 
accompanied by Deputy Chief of Staff Joshua Rogin and DCM 
Moreno, met with Israel Defense Forces Intelligence Chief, MG 
Amos Yadlin, on Sunday 10 May 2009.  MG Yadlin focused his 
discussion on the preparations for the upcoming visit of 
Prime Minister Netanyahu to the United States and the Iranian 
nuclear program.  MG Yadlin informed Rep. Wexler that the PM 
was preparing intensely for his upcoming visit to Washington. 
 In addition to hours of policy review, the PM had been 
provided significant amounts of intelligence from the IDI and 
Mossad on Iran's nuclear program.  The intelligence presented 
included assessments of the current status of the Iranian 
program; timelines, effects of sanctions; views of the 
international community; and outcomes of engagement.  The 
differences that exist between the intelligence community in 
interpretations of the Iranian nuclear program as well as the 
relationship between Iran and the Palestinians were also 
presented.  MG Yadlin indicated that the IDF had presented 
its information last week, leaving the cabinet on Friday 08 
May 2009 to consider policy options and how information will 
be presented during the upcoming visit to Washington. 
Although no direct feedback was provided, MG Yadlin opined 
that the PM appears determined on Iran. 

¶2.  (S)  Rep. Wexler asked MG Yadlin to expand on the 
differences in the interpretations of the intelligence.  MG 
Yadlin explained that until 2003, Iran had violated the 
Nuclear Proliferation Treaty by having a weaponization group 
and although Iran could show civilian uses for a missile 
program and a fissile program, there was no justification for 
a weaponization group.  He went on to say that Iran halted 
its program in 2003 after the invasion of Iraq, but 
reinvigorated the program in 2005.  He expressed that some in 
the US agree with this and others do not.  He went on to 
explain that Israel is not in a position to underestimate 
Iran and be surprised like the US was on 11 September 2001. 

¶3.  (S)  MG Yadlin explained that Israel tries to be more 
precise than the US in estimating Iran's intentions and 
timeline for obtaining a nuclear bomb.  Iran is in the 
position of wanting to pay only a minimum cost for its 
current program. It does not want to be North Korea or what 
Iraq was before 2003.  Iran intends to keep resolutions and 
sanctions at a certain manageable level and continue to 
produce low enriched uranium until there is enough for 
several bombs.  MG Yadlin stated that Iran could decide to 
produce a bomb by 2010, but Iran is waiting for the right 
time in the future and that there are some who will always 
doubt it despite the evidence. 

¶4.  (S)  Rep. Wexler then asked about the prospect of 
engagement.  MG Yadlin said he does not oppose engagement, 
and in fact gave a speech approximately six months ago 
expressing that Israel needed to find a way to find positives 
in engagement.   He feels there needs to be an agreed upon 
deadline; a measure for success or failure; and a plan B if 
engagement does not work in order for engagement to have any 
chance.  He also expressed strongly that engagement should 
have already started.  MG Yadlin outlined four possible 
outcomes of engagement.  Two good outcomes would be the 
Iranian nuclear program stopped or a failure of engagement 
that allows Russia and China to see the US made all efforts 
to prevent the program diplomatically and allows for greater 
cooperation in the future.  Two bad outcomes would be Iran 
playing for time with no claim of failure on the part of 
engagement or a bad bargain that still allows Iran to obtain 
a nuclear bomb even if in a longer timeline.  Rep. Wexler 
went on to discuss that there is a third good option in that 
the President may have better leverage with the American 
public to support action if engagement efforts are attempted 
and failed.  Rep Wexler recommended that the Israeli people 
need to consider the US perspective and public opinion.  MG 
Yadlin responded that he is not recommending the US enter a 
third front, but it has to be understood that Israel sees 
things differently and that Israel has to be ready and can 
not remove the military option from the table.  Rep Wexler 
stated that he expected Israel would be pleasantly surprised 
by the President's acceptance of all possible options in 
regards to Iran. 

********************************************* ******************** 
Visit Embassy Tel Aviv's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/telaviv 
********************************************* ******************** 
CUNNINGHAM

Turkey

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 14:04:00 -0500

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001594 
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/11/09ANKARA1594.html

SIPDIS 

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EUR/SE, EUR/PD, NEA/PD, DRL 
JCS PASS J-5/CDR S. WRIGHT 

E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OPRC KMDR TU PREL KPAO
SUBJECT: TURKISH MEDIA REACTION 
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2009 

Media Highlights:  Clinton's Global Partnerships; Commentary on 
Turkey-US-Iraq Relations; New Case Against Incirlik 
Base Extensions; Sabah on USNATO Tour to Afghanistan;  Another 'One 
Minute' Crisis in Rize; Erdogan Makes TGS Demands; Erdogan on 
Turkey's Foreign Policy;  Erdogan Rejects Swine Flu; New Turkish 
University for Kabul; 

Clinton's Global Partnerships to Strengthen Muslim Ties 
Turkish media outlets were lukewarm in initial reporting on 
Secretary Clinton's new initiative to boost development around the 
Muslim world.  National broadcaster TRT-TV Online in "Obama's New 
Beginning Plan," notes that "previously, in his June address in 
Cairo, President Obama promised to seek a new start to troubled US 
relations with the Islamic world."  In "Hillary Clinton Offers US 
Aid to Help Boost Muslim Ties," Islamic-oriented Today's Zaman notes 
that  "taken together the new package pales in comparison to the 
billions of dollars in aid that Washington  extends to governments 
in the region, including both Israel and Egypt."   In "New US 
Initiative for the Islamic World," liberal Radikal says, "Secretary 
Clinton, speaking at a development forum in Marrakesh, announced the 
new US initiative with the world's Muslims, to promote 
entrepreneurship, economic development and education."  Mainstream 
Aksam's online page headlines, "Clinton Holds Muslim Initiative in 
Morocco," and notes, "Clinton said the programs would aim to 
encourage scientific and technical collaboration, women's 
empowerment and cooperation between faiths." 

Pundits Take Note of Turkey-US and Turkey-Iraq Relations 
Cuneyt Ulsever in mainstream Hurriyet evaluates Turkey's foreign 
policy and says "I am sure Turkey will produce independent policies 
in certain areas, but after Obama was elected as the President and 
Davutoglu assigned as Turkish Foreign Minister, Turkey-US ties 
started settling on a new axis.  Within the framework of Obama's 
multi-centered politics -  which expects active participation from 
the other countries - Turkey is playing for the role of the US 
Representative in the Middle East.  US wants to test Turkey in four 
areas.  First of all the US wants to know whether Turkey will take 
over an active role in Northern Iraq or not.  Secondly, will Turkey 
be able to tame Iran under US' demands.  The US also wants to know 
whether Turkey will be able to take Syria to the US' side.  And 
finally, the US wants to test Turkey whether it will be able to save 
Hamas and Hezbollah from Iran's influence.  If Turkey passes all 
these tests without losing or isolating Israel in the Middle East 
completely, then Turkey will be considered successful, otherwise, 
we'll go back to Bush Administration's period." 

Sami Kohen in mainstream Milliyet compares current ties between 
Ankara-Irbil, as compared to last year, and says because of Ankara's 
rationalist and pragmatic strategies, Turkey has improved relations 
with the Northern Iraqi Administration. He comments: "The Kurdish 
Administration in Northern Iraq, with US pressure, supported Turkey 
in its fight against PKK terrorism.  And we came to today's point 
through a series of diplomatic and political initiatives, supported 
by the military.  Good ties with Northern Iraq is necessary for 
Turkey, especially after the US withdrawal from Iraq." 

Turkish NGO Goes to Court Against the Use of Incirlik Airbase by the 
US 
Papers report that following an application by the Global Peace and 
Justice Coalition, a Turkish NGO,  the Council of State (Danistay) 
prosecutor has demanded the annulment of a Council of Ministers 
decision made in 2007 to extend the agreement with the US allowing 
the use of Incirlik Airbase for another two years.  The prosecutor 
said the approval of the parliament was needed to extend the mandate 
for using Incirlik AB.  He noted that the parliament, and not the 
Council of Ministers, was to decide whether to authorize a foreign 
troop deployment in Turkey and to use Turkish facilities.  Danistay 
is expected to make a decision on the issue within a month, 
according to papers. 

Sabah Multipart Series on Afghanistan 

ANKARA 00001594  002 OF 004 


Mainstream-pro government Sabah's diplomatic correspondent Duygu 
Guvenc went on a USNATO tour in October in Afghanistan, reporting on 
the Turkish ISAF contributions and the challenges of civilian 
infrastructure projects in a three part series. She leds off the 
series with a frank assessment of  Turkey's" tough mission" in 
Afghanistan and how Turkey handles many projects there, including 
the police force, education and health services.   In addition to 
ISAF cooperation, she also emphasizes that the future of Afghanistan 
is in civilian hands, noting the need for teachers, engineers and 
doctors.  One part of the series takes a humorous look at life for 
the ISAF forces there, from rock concerts to the delights of Afghani 
bread.  "Now, ISAF is looking for a way out from Afghanistan," she 
observes and notes that  "civilians hold the key for the troop exit 
from Afghanistan." 

Turkey-Israel:  A Mini 'One Minute' Crisis in Rize and Calls for Gul 
to Visit Israel 
Hurriyet, Milliyet, Sabah, Aksam, Haberturk, Cumhuriyet, Yeni Safak 
and Zaman report the mayor of the Black Sea province of Rize, Halil 
Bakirci, had an "unpleasant" exchange of remarks during a meeting 
with visiting Israeli Ambassador, Gaby Levy.  Mayor Bakirci told the 
Israeli Ambassador that the attitude of Turkish people toward Israel 
would not change as long as Israel continues its "expansionist 
policies."  "The people of Rize will defend themselves in the face 
of such threats, but they will not kill babies," said Bakirci.  Levy 
responded by saying that Israelis did not have any other 
alternatives for survival.  He admitted that Turkish-Israeli 
relations had entered a difficult period, but added that 
Turkey-Israel bilateral relations had strong roots.  According to 
Turkish media, the mayor went on to express anxiety about the safety 
of the Israeli tourists visiting the Black Sea region, who he said 
were viewed with suspicion but constitute 70 percent of all foreign 
visitors to the area. 

Commentary Condemns:  In mainstream Hurriyet, Chief Editor Ertugrul 
Ozkok took aim at the Mayor, criticizing him for his warning that 
"Israeli tourists should not come to Rize" and for voicing concerns 
of Israel policies in Gaza.  According to Ozkok, "if Ankara's harsh 
language spreads internally and turns into warnings to an Ambassador 
from a Mayor, then, it will be difficult for the Turkish foreign 
policy to stretch when it is necessary." 

Gul Should Visit Israel:  In mainstream Aksam, columnist Utku 
Cakirozer voices concern that the continuing diplomatic crisis will 
damage Turkey and Israel's strategic interests.  "The heaviest 
portion of the bill will go to Israel, because Turkey is Israel's 
only trustworthy ally in the Islamic world," he opines.  "Foreign 
Ministry officials in both countries and the Ambassadors in two 
capitals, exert extreme efforts to ease the tensions, however, the 
remarks of the politicians in both countries, do not help at all. 
We believe that, at this point, President Gul can play the most 
constructive role to eliminate the tensions.  If President Gul pays 
a visit to Israel, the relationship between Ankara-Tel-Aviv will 
reach the much deserved strategic level again." 

Erdogan Calls on TGS to Turn In Anti-Government Conspirators 
Papers report Prime Minister Erdogan, on an alleged military plot 
against his government, called on the TGS Chief General Ilker Basbug 
to bring to justice the suspects who drafted the plan for fighting 
fundamentalism.  Erdogan wanted the army to hand over Colonel Dursun 
Cicek, the author of the plan, and five other military officers to 
the prosecutor.  TV and print media also carry reports of a new 
wrinkle in the Ergenekon crisis with the publication if a new 
"military memorandum" on fundamentalism.  Media report that last 
night an unidentified officer e-mailed a copy of another secret TGS 
memo dated April 2009, to the 'Ergenekon' prosecutor and media 
outlets.  The new memo indicates that 430 websites, including the 
NYT, the New York Post, The Independent, ANF, DIHA, Bianet, the AFP 
and the WP, were monitored.  Wire services reported that 292 of them 
were in Turkish and 138 in foreign languages.  They were categorized 
as "separatist," "fundamentalist," "nationalist," "extreme left," 

ANKARA 00001594  003 OF 004 


"pro-EU" and "unbiased."  The memo was signed by eight officers, 
including Colonel Cicek.  It was presented to then TGS Deputy Chief, 
General Hasan Igsiz.  The memo also listed the websites used by the 
TGS for psychological warfare, say papers. 

Erdogan: Turkey in Close Ties both with West and Islamic World 
All papers report Prime Minister Erdogan on Tuesday told his ruling 
AK Party group meeting that Turkey was "not shifting" its foreign 
policy, but was only getting "normalized."  Erdogan emphasized 
Turkey was in close relationship both with the West and the Islamic 
world.  "Defending the rights and humanity in the face of the 
Israeli atrocities in Gaza cannot be characterized as shifting 
politics," said Erdogan. 

Erdogan-Akdag Disagreement on Swine Flu Vaccines Lead to Confusion 
All papers report Erdogan's controversial rejection of the swine flu 
vaccination, just as swine flu vaccinations began in Turkey and the 
death toll hit eleven.  Health Minister Recep Akdag was vaccinated 
in front of TV cameras as part of the nationwide swine flu 
vaccination campaign.  Prime Minister Erdogan, however, said he will 
not get vaccinated, adding he did not agree with the health minister 
that it should be compulsory.  Akdag said the prime minister was not 
in the group at risk for contracting the virus, and that citizens 
would make their own choice about the vaccination. Erdogan's remarks 
also led to confusion over the effectiveness of the vaccine, say 
papers.  Eyup Can in Hurriyet  writes that the PM has more concerns 
regarding the vaccination campaign which the public doesn't know. 
"Otherwise," he says, " the PM would not be concerned that if 
anything goes wrong with the campaign, his government would get all 
the blame." 

Turkey to Establish University in Kabul (Zaman) 
Islamist-oriented Zaman reports Turkey would establish Mevlana 
University in Kabul, upon demands coming from President Karzai that 
Afghanistan's education needs be met.  In the first phase, an 
Education Faculty will be set up.  Afghanistan will need 100,000 
more teachers by the beginning of 2010, says Zaman.  There is 
currently eight Turkish schools in Afghanistan, including two high 
schools for girls. 

Upcoming events: 

Q November 4: President Abdullah Gul will hold meetings with Prime 
Minister Erdogan and army chief General Ilker Basbug. 
Q November 4: British Foreign Secretary David Miliband will meet in 
Ankara with the chief EU negotiator Egemen Bagis. 
Q November 5-9: The 25th session of the Standing Committee for 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation of OIC (COMCEC) will be held in 
Istanbul. 
Q November 8: Iranian President Ahmadinejad will come to Istanbul 
for the OIC meeting. 
Q November 6: Foreign Minister Davutoglu will go to Paris for an 
official visit. 
Q November 10: The AKP government plans to bring the "democratic 
initiative" to the parliament for debates. 


TV News (NTV) 

Domestic 

Q The government plans to debate the government's Kurdish 
"democratic initiative" in the parliament on November 10, but 
opposition CHP says the debates should not be held on the day when 
Turkey commemorates the death of the founder of modern Turkey, 
Ataturk. 
Q DTP leader Ahmet Turk says his party will file a legal complaint 
against an alleged military plot envisaging steps against the Kurds. 

Q Farming Minister Mehdi Eker has briefed the parliament on a new 
regulation related to genetically modified food. 

ANKARA 00001594  004 OF 004 



World 

Q Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei says his country will not 
be deceived into reconciliation with its arch foe, the United 
States. 
Q France and Germany urge Iran to accept a UN-brokered proposal to 
enrich its nuclear fuel abroad rather than lose time by asking for a 
further round of talks. 
Q Four months after unrest in China's Xinjiang region, security 
officials have launched a fresh campaign to track down accused 
rioters. 
Q The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled against the 
use of crucifixes in classrooms in Italy, saying he practice ran 
counter to the child's right to freedom of religion. 

JEFFREY

Ethiopian views on Africa

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 14:03:42 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2009/06/09ADDISABABA1318.html

Monday, 08 June 2009, 12:33
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 001318
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 06/07/2019
TAGS PGOV, PINR, PREL, KPAO, ET
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE ETHIOPIAN HARDLINERS
Classified By: Ambassador Donald Yamamoto for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).
SUMMARY
-------
¶1. (S) In a rare meeting with the elusive head of the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and main hardliner within the powerful executive committee of the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) party, Ambassador and NISS chief Getachew Assefa discussed a wide range of regional and bilateral issues. Getachew made clear during the four hour private meeting that Ethiopia sought greater understanding from the U.S. on national security issues vital to Ethiopia, especially Ethiopia’s concerns over domestic insurgent groups like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). He spoke at length about former Addis Ababa Mayor-elect Berhanu Nega XXXXXXXXXXXX; VOA’s biased reporting; the dangers of former defense minister Seeye Abraha’s growing authority within the opposition; Ethiopia’s views on democracy and human rights; Eritrea’s role as a rogue state in the region; and regional issues including the importance of supporting the Transitional Federal Government and a rapprochement with Alhu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) as the only option for Somalia’s survival; and the need for U.S. reconciliation with Sudan. End Summary.
TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
-----------------------------
¶2. (S) Through the arrangements of former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia, Irv Hicks, Ambassador met with Ethiopia’s national intelligence chief, Getachew Assefa, for a four hour private meeting on June 4. Getachew, noted for his eccentric behavior and elusiveness, explained to the Ambassador that he welcomes greater dialogue with the U.S. Embassy, but underscored the importance of deeper U.S. understanding of Ethiopia’s security concerns. Characterizing the U.S. relationship as sound and expressing appreciation for the cooperation with the U.S. on special projects on counterterrorism, Getachew emphasized that Ethiopia shares U.S. views on high value targets (HVT) like Robow and al-Turki as threats to regional stability. But domestic insurgent groups, like the OLF and ONLF, should also be treated as terrorists because they have safe haven camps in extremist-held areas in Somalia and receive support and assistance from the very same HVTs that the U.S. and Ethiopia are trying to neutralize. Such support makes the ONLF and OLF accomplices with international terrorist groups, Getachew argued. Just as Ethiopia would not meet with domestic U.S. insurgent groups, referring to individuals and groups who would conduct bombings of U.S. government offices, abortion clinics and advocates of racial and gender hate, Ethiopia would not want U.S. officials to meet with Ethiopia’s domestic insurgents who bomb and kill Ethiopian officials and citizens.
¶3. (S) Getachew added that the GOE does conduct talks with the ONLF and OLF and there are groups, like the Ethiopian elders, who reach out to the membership in an effort to end the violence. Getachew stressed that this is an Ethiopian process by Ethiopians and should remain an Ethiopian-led, Ethiopian-directed and Ethiopian-coordinated process. Ambassador made clear that the U.S. Administration does not meet with the ONLF and that the U.S. is in close consultations with Ethiopian authorities on their views on the ONLF and OLF, and that the U.S. supports the work of the Ethiopian Elders to end the violence. Getachew noted the visit to European Capitals and Washington of ONLF senior leaders and said they met with staffers in the U.S. Vice President’s office. The Ambassador said that we had no evidence that a meeting took place with the Vice President’s staff and stressed that the State Department did not meet with the ONLF group. Further, the U.S. military no longer meets with alleged ONLF supporters in the volatile Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia because of security concerns. The Ambassador stressed that such meetings in the past was for force protection of U.S. military civil affairs team working in the dangerous Ogaden region near Somalia, but in the last few years there has been no contact. The Ambassador added that there should be closer discussion between he U.S. and Ethiopia on this issue.
U.S. GIVES EXTREMISTS A VOICE AND LEGITIMACY
--------------------------------------------
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 002 OF 004
¶4. (S) Getachew complained pointedly that Voice of America (VOA) is biased and gives a platform for extremist elements. XXXXXXXXXXXX
¶5. (S) Getachew also discussed the VOA reports covering former State Department official Greg Stanton of Genocide Watch, who charged Prime Minister Meles of crimes against humanity as a result of Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia in 2006. Getachew complained that VOA Amharic reporting was biased and not even handed. He did note that VOA English was fine. VOA Amharic service does not interview Ethiopian officials who can refute “false assertions” espoused in the VOA interviews. Getachew praised Germany’s Deutsche Wella service for its balanced and yet hard hitting reporting. Getachew underscored that if the GOE is doing something wrong or does not have the support of the people, news services have an obligation to highlight such problems. Getachew said VOA, however, seeks to report only what is anti-government or lend support for the opposition. Getachew concluded that the U.S.G., because of VOA Amharic service is an official arm of the U.S.G., lacks neutrality in its support for the opposition and this undercuts relations between the two countries. The Ambassador replied that VOA is a very independent media and the U.S.G. does not have oversight and control over the content of the reporting.
¶6. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
THE OPPOSITION
--------------
¶7. (S) Getachew commented on Ethiopia’s opposition leadership underscoring that he wishes to see a vibrant opposition movement, but currently, the NGO community and foreign missions support the opposition blindly without critical analysis. XXXXXXXXXXXX
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 003 OF 004
¶8. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
--------------------------
¶9. (S) Getachew echoed common themes advocated by the ruling EPRDF party stalwarts from the Prime Minister to the party faithful. He stressed that the EPRDF supports democracy and that it is the goal for the ruling party to eventually give way to other parties of common vision in fighting poverty and a commitment to support the process of democratization. Getachew said he would support opposition parties if they have a better message to help Ethiopia overcome poverty, improve health care and education, and raise the standard of living of the Ethiopian people. He added that the U.S. and others should look at Ethiopia’s democracy efforts and human rights record as a work in progress. It will take time but Ethiopia is moving in the right direction that will make Ethiopia a democratic state.
FOREIGN POLICY: ERITREA, SOMALIA, AND SUDAN
-------------------------------------------
¶10. (S) Getachew described Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki as “no martyr,” who sought to survive and establish himself as the predominate leader in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia stands in the way of Isaias’ grand design and it is his goal to divide Ethiopia and weaken it through terrorism. Getachew remarked that one of Isaias’ bodyguards was in Dubai and then defected to Ethiopia. The bodyguard remarked that Isaias was a recluse who spent his days painting and tinkering with gadgets and carpentry work. Isaias appeared to make decisions in isolation with no discussion with his advisors. It was difficult to tell how Isaias would react each day and his moods changed constantly. Getachew added that Eritrea trains over 30 rebel groups at Camp Sawa near the Sudan border and graduates are infiltrated into Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia to enhance instability and target Ethiopian interests. Getachew expressed dismay with Kenya in allowing Eritrean intel officers and military trainers who support al-Shabaab in Somalia, to bribe their way out of Kenya and return to Eritrea. He explained the activities of Abraha Kassa, Eritrea’s elusive intel chief who directs Eritrea’s Somalia operations.
¶11. (S) On Somalia, Getachew said the only way to support stability was through support for the ASWJ which attracts a wide range of support from all the clans, especially those groups in conflict with each other. The ASWJ has been effective in countering al-Shabaab and is ideologically committed to Sufism and the defense of Islam against the extremist salafists which form al-Shabaab. Getachew said the U.S. can best help by supporting the ASWJ and TFG to cooperate, to pay salaries of TFG troops and support the IGAD and African Union which are seeking to sanction Eritrea, implement a no fly zone, and close ports used by extremist elements.
¶12. (S) On Sudan, Getachew urged the U.S. to engage Bashir and the Sudanese leadership. Sudan, more than Somalia, poses the greatest threat to regional security and stability, Getachew argued. The prospects for a civil war which destabilizes the region would be devastating. The only country that would benefit would be Eritrea.
COMMENT
-------
¶13. (S) It is interesting that Getachew’s description of President Isaias mirrors Getachew’s own character, as well.
ADDIS ABAB 00001318 004 OF 004
Getachew avoids speaking with foreigners and few foreigners really know him. He is not well liked within his own agency for decisions he makes in isolation which, at times, make little sense and are not discussed in consensus with his staff. His apparent hot temper and reclusive habits have made it difficult for his staff to gauge his moods and understand his thought process. The Prime Minister himself and other EPRDF leaders have remarked to the Ambassador that it is difficult to talk with Getachew and to meet with him, but that his loyalty to the EPRDF is never in question. Despite his poor reputation, Getachew is regarded as a strong EPRDF hardliner and commands considerable authority and influence within the powerful EPRDF executive committee which lays down the policy for the ruling party and the government. While relations with NISS officials below Getachew’s rank are extremely cordial and, depending on the unit, very close, the Ambassador has met with Getachew only twice in the past three years, and other Embassy staff have also met with little success in engaging him. Even visiting senior U.S. intel officers have not been successful in meeting Getachew. Ambassador will pursue future meetings with Getachew but he will never be a close contact. End Comment. YAMAMOTO

Vatican support Saddam

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 14:01:00 -0500

The Vatican supported Saddam Hussein. The US anticipated interference from the Vatican prior to going into Iraq. Has a network of underground contacts in China which the US utilises for intelligence.

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2001/07/01VATICAN3507.html

Tuesday, 03 July 2001, 12:03

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 VATICAN 003507

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH

HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO

NSC FOR AMB. FREID

EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01

EO 12958 DECL: 07/02/11

TAGS PREL, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, PHUM, IS, EG, CH, ID, VT, VTPREL, VTPREL, VTPREL

SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER

REF: 00 ROME 0988

¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA JOSEPH MERANTE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D). CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z

BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION

---------------------------

¶2. (U) THIS CABLE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE PLANNED PRESIDENTIAL MEETING WITH THE POPE. IT UPDATES REFTEL, OUTLINING ASPECTS OF THE USG- HOLY SEE RELATIONSHIP THAT WE BELIEVE WILL REQUIRE U.S. ATTENTION IN THE NEAR AND MIDTERM. THE MIDDLE EAST WILL FEATURE PROMINENTLY. IN ASIA, VATICAN PRIORITIES WILL REMAIN FOCUSED ON CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM AND INDONESIA/EAST TIMOR. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN MEDIATING AFRICA’S GREAT LAKES CONFLICT, WHILE CUBA LOOMS LARGE AMONG VATICAN INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS CABLE IDENTIFIES AREAS IN WHICH THE U.S. AND THE VATICAN SHARE INTERESTS, AND AREAS IN WHICH THERE ARE POLICY DIFFERENCES.

¶3. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE IS A SUPRANATIONAL ENTITY THAT HAS ITS CAPITAL AND TERRITORIAL MANIFESTATION IN THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE UNITED STATES BASED ITS 1984 RECOGNITION OF THE HOLY SEE IN PART ON THE FACT THAT THE HOLY SEE EXERCISES SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE 109 ACRES OF THE VATICAN CITY STATE. HOWEER ALL AMBASSADORS TO THE HOLY SEE, INCLUDING THE U.S. AMBASSADOR, ARE ACCREDITED TO THE HOLY SEE AN NOT/NOT TO THE STATE OF VATICAN CITY. THE VATIAN INSISTS ON THIS POINT TO REMIND THAT ITS REAC AND INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY IS GLOBAL. FOR PRPOSES OF THIS CABLE, THE TERMS HOLY SEE AND VATICAN WILL BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z

¶4. (U) BACKGOUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE HOLY SEE ISONE OF THE OLDEST CONTINUALLY EXISTING INTERNATINAL ENTITIES. IT EXERCISED TEMPORAL CONTROL OF TE ITAIAN PENINSULA DURING THE MIDDLE AGES, BUT WAS COMPLETELY BEREFT OF TERRITORY BETWEEN 1870 AND 1929. NEVERTHELESS, EVEN DURING THIS PERIOD, MOST NATIONS CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE IT AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENTITY AND MAINTAINED FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

¶5. (U) BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION (CONT’D): THE VATICAN IS ONE OF VERY FEW SOVEREIGN ENTITIES THAT HAVE PRESENCE AND REACH IN VIRTUALLY EVERY COUNTRY OF THE WORLD. ALTHOUGH ITS SOVEREIGNTY IS OVER LIMITED TERRITORY, VATICAN TEACHING AND POLICIES CAN INFLUENCE THE OVER ONE BILLION ADHERENTS OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH. END BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION.

DEVELOPING POLICY TOWARD THE HOLY SEE

-------------------------------------

¶6. (C) IN DEVELOPING U.S. POLICY VIS-A-VIS THIS UNIQUE ENTITY, POLICYMAKERS SHOULD THINK OF THE HOLY SEE AS SIMILAR TO A TRADITIONAL NATION-STATE, WITH A VARIETY OF FACTORS INFORMING ITS FOREIGN POLICY. THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING INCLUDE:

-- RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES/HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS: THE VATICAN STRIVES TO TRANSLATE ITS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND ITS HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS INTO CONCRETE POLICIES. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 01 OF 04 031719Z FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES BASED ON THESE PRINCIPLES INCLUDE: SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT AND DEBT RELIEF FOR POORER COUNTRIES, OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, OPPOSITION TO ABORTION AND CONTRACEPTION, AND OPPOSITION (ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS) TO EMBARGOES;

-- “NATIONAL” SELF-INTEREST: THE HOLY SEE SEEKS TO PROTECT CATHOLICS AROUND THE WORLD, ITS OWN POSITION OF INFLUENCE, AND ITS VAST WEALTH. THE VATICAN’S SUPPORT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN RESULTS FROM ITS DESIRE TO PROTECT 600,000 IRAQI CATHOLICS FROM ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM; ITS REFUSAL TO PUBLICLY CRITICIZE CROAT NATIONALIST CLERGY IN BOSNIA STEMS IN PART FROM THE CROAT CHURCH’S STAUNCH DEFENSE OF THE FAITH DURING THE COLD WAR;

-- HISTORY/TRADITION: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE HOLY SEE AND SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND OTHER LATIN COUNTRIES GO BACK OVER 500 YEARS. THE VATICAN’S HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THESE COUNTRIES FREQUENTLY DEMANDS AN ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY ROLE;

-- PROSELYTISM: THE VATICAN KNOWS THAT IT MUST

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8384

PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ACTION ECA-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 VCE-00 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /002W ------------------00B3A7 031716Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 VATICAN 003507

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID

EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11

TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL

SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER

CONTINUALLY REFRESH ITS MESSAGE FOR CHANGING TIMES. VATICAN II IN THE 1960S WAS AN EXAMPLE. INTERFAITH AND ECUMENICAL OUTREACH IS AN IMPORTANT FOCUS OF THE CURRENT PAPACY, AND PROSELYTISM/POPULATION GROWTH IN THE THIRD CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z WORLD ACCOUNTS FOR MUCH OF THE GROWTH OF THE CHURCH IN RECENT YEARS.

¶7. (C) PAPAL HEALTH/SUCCESSION AND WHAT IT MIGHT MEAN FOR U.S. POLICY: POPE JOHN PAUL II IS SURELY THE MOST WIDELY RECOGNIZED WORLD LEADER. ALONG WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, HE ENJOYS THE HIGHEST STATURE AND PROFILE AMONG WORLD LEADERS. IN EARLY 2000, PRESS MISREPRESENTATION OF A GERMAN BISHOP’S REMARKS IN THE POPE JOHN PAUL II’S ABILITY TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE, SPARKED A SERIES OF SPECULATIONS AROUND THE WORLD ABOUT SUCCESSION. THE POPE AND THE VATICAN STRONGLY DENIED THAT HIS CONDITION WAS SERIOUS ENOUGH TO WARRANT ABDICATION. THERE IS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA THAT THE POPE WOULD IN FACT RESIGN EVEN IF HIS HEALTH WERE TO DECLINE PRECIPITOUSLY. THE LIST OF CARDINALS WIDELY PERCEIVED AS POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS DOES NOT INCLUDE ANY AMERICANS, AND ONLY ONE ANGLOPHONE. AN ELECTION OF A EUROPEAN CARDINAL (MOST LIKELY AN ITALIAN) WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN ONLY MINOR CHANGES IN VATICAN POLICY AND ITS CURRENT STANCE ON ISSUES VIS A VIS THE UNITED STATES. IF THE NEXT POPE IS FROM LATIN AMERICA, ASIA, OR AFRICA, WE SHOULD EXPECT THE VATICAN TO TAKE POSITIONS FURTHER TO THE “LEFT OF CURRENT U.S. POSITIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT FURTHER “RIGHT” ON SOCIAL ISSUES.

MIDDLE EAST

-----------

¶8. (C) MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS (MEPP): THE HOLY SEE DENIES WANTING TO BECOME INVOLVED IN THE POLITICAL CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z ASPECTS OF THE MEPP, ALTHOUGH IT REMAINS KEENLY INTERESTED IN WHAT IT TERMS THE “CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS” ASPECTS OF THE HOLY SITES IN THE REGION (SPECIFICALLY JERUSALEM). THE VATICAN MAINTAINS THAT ITS CONCERNS HAVE BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY THE USG AND THE ISRAELIS, AND IN 1999 WORKED WITH THE FRENCH AND SEVERAL OTHER EU COUNTRIES IN THE “JERUSALEM WORKING GROUP” (JWG -- SINCE INACTIVE).

¶9. (C) THE VATICAN WAS CLEARLY DISAPPOINTED WHEN THE USG AND GOI DECLINED TO ASSOCIATE WITH THE JWG INITIATIVE. THE GOI’S DECISION TO ALLOW CONSTRUCTION OF THE NAZARETH MOSQUE CREATED ALARM (AND IN SOME CASES, RESENTMENT) AT THE VATICAN. THE GOI FOR ITS PART WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POPE LEFT UNANSWERED BASHIR ASSAD’S ANTI-SEMITIC INVECTIVE DURING THE POPE’S MAY 2001 SYRIA VISIT. WE CAN EXPECT CONTINUED TENSION IN THESE AREAS. THE HOLY SEE WILL CONTINUE TO SEEK TO PLAY A ROLE IN THE MEPP, WHILE DENYING THIS INTENTION. EMBASSY VATICAN CONTINUES TO RECOMMEND A HIGH LEVEL VISIT TO ENCOURAGE THE VATICAN TO PLAY A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE, OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFUL, ROLE IN THE PROCESS.

ASIA

----

¶10. (C) THE VATICAN AND THE U.S. SHARE INTERESTS IN MANY OF THE SAME COUNTRIES (E.G. INDONESIA, CHINA, TAIWAN, VIETNAM), BUT NOT ALWAYS FOR THE SAME REASONS. IN ADDITION TO THE FORMAL CHURCH NETWORK NUMEROUS, OFTEN SEMI-AUTONOMOUS, CATHOLIC MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 02 OF 04 031715Z OPERATING THROUGHOUT ASIA HAVE A SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THEIR AREA. CONTACT WITH THESE MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS PROVIDES UNIQUE INSIGHTS INTO CONDITIONS IN THESE COUNTRIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH IN ASIA IS AN EXPRESS GOAL OF THE CHURCH. THE VATICAN AND ITS CONSTITUENT EPISCOPATES ARE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN DIALOGUES WITH POLITICALLY POWERFUL MUSLIM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX FAITHS. THE RESULTS OF THESE DIALOGUES WILL IMPACT PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY, STABILITY, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND A RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES.

¶11. (C) CHINA: WITH ITS OWN NETWORK OF CONTACTS AMONG CHINA’S UNDERGROUND AND PATRIOTIC CHURCHES, THE HOLY SEE HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION REGARDING DISSIDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION. THERE IS A CONSTANT CONTROVERSY AROUND THE EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS ISSUE INVOLVES THE VATICAN’S RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND CHINESE GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE. BEIJING’S REGULATION AND OFTEN OPPRESSION OF THE CATHOLIC

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8394

PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z ACTION ECA-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B442 031721Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 VATICAN 003507

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID

EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11

TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL

SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER

CHURCH IS PARALLEL TO AND THEREFORE A WINDOW ON PROBLEMS IN CHINA WITH U.S.-BASED PROTESTANT CHURCHES AS WELL AS ISLAM AND BUDDHISM. THE CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF THE CHURCH AND THE REPORTING SYSTEM WITH THE NUNCIOS AND CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z BISHOPS, NOT TO MENTION INDEPENDENT MISSIONARY GROUPS, GIVES EMBASSY VATICAN A UNIQUE VIEW OF EVENTS INSIDE CHINA.

¶12. (C) VIETNAM: UNOFFICIAL DISCUSSIONS CONTINUE BETWEEN VIETNAM AND THE VATICAN ON ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THE GOV’S ATTEMPT TO CONTROL RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IS ONE OF THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCKS FROM A VATICAN PERSPECTIVE. THE VATICAN’S ATTEMPTS TO APPOINT BISHOPS WITH MINIMAL GOVERNMENT INTERFERENCE AND THE REPORTING PROVIDED BY ITS NUNCIO ON THESE EFFORTS CAN BE USED AS A GAUGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ISSUES IN VIETNAM.

¶13. (C) INDIA: INDIA HAS SEEN SIGNIFICANT SECTARIAN VIOLENCE OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, AS MUCH AGAINST MUSLIMS AS CHRISTIANS. RESOLUTION OF THIS VIOLENCE IS A KEY TO DEMOCRACY, STABILITY AND THE GUARANTEE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THE VATICAN, LOCAL BISHOPS WHO REPORT TO THE VATICAN, AND VARIOUS MISSIONARY ORGANIZATIONS WILL ALL CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE OBSERVERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND DEVELOPMENTS.

¶14. (C) INDONESIA: EAST TIMOR IS POISED TO BECOME THE SECOND CATHOLIC COUNTRY IN ASIA (THE OTHER IS THE PHILIPPINES). THE VATICAN, THROUGH ITS BISHOPS, HAS BEEN DEEPLY INVOLVED IN RECONCILIATION EFFORTS FOR YEARS. THE VATICAN IS INVOLVED IN RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS IN EAST TIMOR. IN OTHER PARTS OF INDONESIA WRACKED BY SECTARIAN VIOLENCE, THE CATHOLIC PRESENCE IS LESS PRONOUNCED, BUT CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION. CATHOLIC PRELATES HAVE ALSO ACTED AS CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z MEDIATORS BETWEEN OTHER CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES AND MUSLIM GROUPS. VISITS OF THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND PRESIDENT TO THE VATICAN UNDERSCORE THE INFLUENCE THE VATICAN HAS ON A COUNTRY OF SIGNIFICANT POLICY INTEREST TO THE USG.

¶15. (C) NORTH KOREA: VATICAN OFFICIALS, AND CATHOLIC RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS PERIODICALLY VISIT NORTH KOREA. WE LEARN FROM THEIR VISITS AND WE CAN GIVE SUGGESTIONS TO OUR CONTACTS FOR POINTS TO RAISE WITH NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS.

AFRICA

------

¶16. (C) GREAT LAKES: VATICAN CONTACTS ADMIT PRIVATELY THAT CHURCH RELATIONS WITH LATE DROC PRESIDENT LAURENT KABILA BEGAN ON THE WRONG FOOT BECAUSE OF KABILA’S MINDSET AND THE CHURCH’S PREVIOUS ASSOCIATION WITH THE MOBUTU REGIME. REAL HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS AND RELIGIOUS (EVANGELIZATION) CONSIDERATIONS PUT AFRICA ON THE SCREEN AT THE VATICAN. THE VATICAN AFFILIATED SANT’EGIDIO COMMUNITY PLAYS AN IMPORTANT SUPPORTING ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO MEDIATE THE CRISIS, KEEPING THE VATICAN INFORMED OF THEIR EFFORTS.

LATIN AMERICA

-------------

¶17. (C) CUBA: THE POPE’S 1998 VISIT TO CUBA HAS NOT BROUGHT THE KIND OF PROGRESS ON CHURCH FREEDOM SOUGHT BY CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 VATICA 03507 03 OF 04 031721Z THE POPE. THAT SAID, VATICAN-GOC DIALOGUE HAS CONTINUED WITH FOLLOW-UP VISITS TO CUBA BY SENIOR VATICAN OFFICIALS -- AND TO THE VATICAN BY CUBAN COUNTERPARTS. AMONG THE TOPICS OF DISCUSSION: THE GOC’S TREATMENT OF THE CUBAN CHURCH, THE STATUS OF DISSIDENTS, AND THE EFFECTS OF THE U.S. EMBARGO, ABOUT WHICH THE HOLY SEE SHARES CASTRO’S CRITICISM. THE VATICAN IS QUIETLY LOOKING AHEAD TO THE DAY WHEN FIDEL CASTRO DEPARTS THE SCENE. IT IS CONCERNED HOWEVER, THAT HIS REPLACEMENT CAN ACTUALLY BE WORSE.

EUROPE

------

¶18. (C) THE VATICAN WOULD LIKE TO SEE A UNIFIED, CHRISTIAN (IE. CATHOLIC) EUROPE. AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO INTENSIFY ITS DIALOG WITH THE LEADING PROTESTANT GROUPS IN GERMANY AND SCANDINAVIA. THE VATICAN WILL ALSO CONTINUE ATTEMPTS TO ENGAGE THE RUSSIAN CHURCH AND THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH IN ISTANBUL IN AN ATTEMPT TO HEAL THE LATIN/ORTHODOX RIFT. VATICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS CAN BE USEFUL TO U.S. POLICY IF IT IS DIRECTED AT PROMOTING CATHOLIC/ORTHODOX

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL PTQ8397

PAGE 01 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z ACTION ECA-00

INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AMAD-00 ACQ-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 DODE-00 DS-00 EUR-00 FBIE-00 VC-00 TEDE-00 INR-00 IO-00 VCE-00 DCP-01 NSAE-00 SSO-00 SS-00 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 DRL-02 SAS-00 /003W ------------------00B486 031723Z /38 O 031203Z JUL 01 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0000 WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 VATICAN 003507

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR EUR/WE, PD/ECA (SEXTON), WHITE HOUSE FOR JOSEPH HAGIN, BRADLEY BLAKEMAN AND MARY HAINES, PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMB. FREID

EMBASSY VATICAN MESSAGE NO. 107/01

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/11

TAGS: PREL PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID PHUM IS EG CH ID VT VTPREL VTPREL VTPREL

SUBJECT: THE VATICAN-- THE SUPRANATIONAL POWER

COEXISTENCE. CONTINUED VATICAN CRITICISM OF “U.S. MATERIALISM AND COMMERCIALISM” COULD BE USED BY MANY IN EUROPE TO SUPPORT ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF LIMITING U.S. INFLUENCE AND ACTIVITY ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z

¶19. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE CAN WORK CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE VATICAN DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:

-- ETHNIC RECONCILIATION AND CIVIL CULTURE - IN JUNE, PD/ECA DAS BRIAN SEXTON MET WITH VATICAN AND SANT’EGIDIO OFFICIALS DURING A PD/ECA SPONSORED INTER-RELIGIOUS CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. EMBASSY VATICAN, WITH DEPARTMENT GUIDANCE, IS SEEKING TO DEVELOP FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS;

-- ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS -- POST HAS DEVELOPED TWO PROJECTS IN CONJUNCTION WITH CARITAS (THE VATICAN RELIEF NGO) AND WITH THE ARCHBISHOP OF PESCARA. THESE PROJECTS WILL OFFER EDUCATION, RESCUE, REHABILITATION, AND REPATRIATION TO VICTIMS AND POTENTIAL VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKERS. WORKING WITH THE CURIA AND CARITAS THERE IS MUCH MORE GROUND TO BE COVERED IN THIS AREA IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- BIOTECHNOLOGY AND AGRICULTURAL TRADE -- EMBASSY VATICAN HAS SPONSORED TWO DISCUSSIONS OF THIS THEME INVOLVING SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS ATTACHED TO THE VATICAN. PROMOTING A MORE POSITIVE VATICAN APPROACH TO APPROPRIATE USE OF GMOS IN THIRD WORLD AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT COULD HELP MAKE GMOS MORE WIDELY ACCEPTED EVEN IN THE DEVELOPED WORLD.

¶20. (C) AREAS IN WHICH WE SHOULD EXPECT CONTINUED DIFFICULTIES DURING THE NEXT 12 MONTHS:

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 VATICA 03507 04 OF 04 031723Z -- THE MIDDLE EAST - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE U.S. EFFORTS TO ISOLATE SADDAM HUSSEIN. WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE THAT THE VATICAN WILL NOT SUPPORT OUR EFFORTS IN IRAQ, AND INVESTIGATE WAYS TO LIMIT VATICAN INTERFERENCE WITH OUR OBJECTIVES. IN ISRAEL, THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE EFFORTS TO INSERT ITSELF ON THE QUESTION OF THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM;

-- DEATH PENALTY - THE VATICAN WILL CONTINUE ITS CONDEMNATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY. STATEMENTS BY THE POPE ARE LIKELY TO BE USED BY MANY AROUND THE WORLD TO CONDEMN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES. THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD CONSIDER IF IT WANTS TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE, AND IF SO, WHAT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AVENUES TO USE. MMERANTE

CONFIDENTIAL

2001VATICA03507 - Classification: CONFIDENTIAL

Baseline Perceptions of the Afghan People(mod)

Sat, 11 Dec 2010 18:13:45 -0500

Baseline Perceptions of the Afghan People(mod)

2007-02-19 18:00:00 Expand acronyms: Take care; definitions may be wrong.
<h2>Javascript required for full view</h2> <h3>Limited script-free view:</h3> EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (S//REL) Baseline Perceptions of the Afghan People, FEB 2007, POTF-AF S2: This document combines the results of four surveys, Altai Consulting (2006) ANDP and PME surveys, Asia Foundation (2006) A Survey of the Afghan People, and U.S. Department of State, Office of Research (2007) Afghanistan: Closer to One Nation Than a House Divided to establish baseline perceptions of the target audience (Afghan Populace). The intent was not to provide demographic data but to provide a baseline in the populaces perceptions in specific areas. This information is important for psychological operations in developing programs to change negative perceptions or to maintain positive perceptions that support the CJTF-76 mission and stated objectives. POTF-AF will continually update the perceptions through monthly perception/trends analysis utilizing information gathered from PSYOP elements, SITREPs, SIGACTs, and contracted surveys. (S//REL) SECURITY: Afghans cite security as Afghanistans biggest problem (22%), while unemployment, poor economy, and the presence of Taliban all come in second at 12%. Nearly 30% of Afghans believe that the Taliban are the greatest threat to Afghanistan. Afghans identify insurgents as bringing insecurity rather than foreign forces but blame unemployment for driving insecurity, not the insurgents. Altai Consulting concludes that jobs and more ANP will improve security at the local level while at the national level jobs, collecting weapons, and more ANA provide more security. The majority of Afghans trust the ANA (84%) and ANP (86%). Most Afghans are proud of their ANA (84%) and ANP (76%) but only a third believe they are very capable of protecting their area. (S//REL) GOVERNANCE: Most Afghans (85%) believe Afghanistan should be a unified nation. Nearly 9 out of 10 people say they have confidence in the national government in 2006. This has remained unchanged since 2004. 90% of Afghans back President Karzai and this has remained the same since 2004. Most people perceive democracy as meaning freedom while others said democracy means peace, and a smaller number said rights and laws. Over half of those asked strongly agreed and 29% somewhat agreed that religious authorities should lead people in obeying their faith while political leaders should make decisions about running the government. Two thirds believe that Islamic countries can be a democracy without becoming westernized. Close to half of both Sunni and Shia and all ethnicities believe religious laws should dictate all aspects of life including economics, politics, culture, and family. (S//REL) DEVELOPMENT: When asked what the main reason for the countrys progress was nearly a third cites security, followed by peace/end of war (29%) and then disarmament (26%). Just over half of the Afghans feel that their economic prosperity has increased since the fall of the Taliban. When asked what is the biggest problem at the local level unemployment ranks as the top concern (18%) followed fairly closely with basic needs such as electricity, food, water, and health care. Perceptions of foreign forces reconstruction efforts vary widely from region to region. Kabul has the highest perception rate of foreign forces helping a lot. Radio is the most popular means for people to receive information of national importance followed by television and family and friends. Men rely on radio and women rely on word of mouth for information. Only 20% of Afghans said they would completely trust information from foreign forces and 44% would trust the information a little bit. (S//REL) STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: Afghans, on average believe that the motives of foreign forces are to bring peace and security. Three out of four Afghans believe foreign forces are necessary in Afghanistan and 74% believe they should stay until Afghanistan is fully at peace. 75% say the U.S. treats Afghanistan with respect. Three-quarters still support U.S. military presence which is down from 81% in 2005. When asked which country is providing the most aid, nearly half of the Afghans responded with USA, Japan, Germany, and India. (S//REL) PROPAGANDA: In 2006, there were over 1000 reports of insurgent propaganda throughout Afghanistan. In most areas intimidation is the primary means for propaganda. There has been an increase in resentment and resistance towards the Taliban as a result. This reliance on intimidation is their greatest weakness as it is unlikely that it will gather long-term support. Another line of persuasion contained in most insurgent propaganda is that the coalition forces are here to weaken/destroy Islam. This line of persuasion appears to be ineffective since only 12% of the 21% of the Afghan populace felt the country was going in the wrong direction believed Islam is in danger due to the presence of coalition forces/foreign fighters. (U) POC: LTC Jeffrey L. Scott, POTF-AF Commander, CJTF-76, Jeffrey.l.scott@cjtf76.centcom.smil.mil , DSN 231-3003 or SGT Joseph Atneosen, POTF-AF S2, joseph.o.atneosen@cjtf76.centcom.smil.mil , DSN 321-3062. See Attachment EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(S//REL) Baseline Perceptions of the Afghan People, FEB 2007, POTF-AF S2: This document combines the results of four surveys, Altai Consulting (2006) ANDP and PME surveys, Asia Foundation (2006) A Survey of the Afghan People, and U.S. Department of State, Office of Research (2007) Afghanistan: Closer to One Nation Than a House Divided to establish baseline perceptions of the target audience (Afghan Populace). The intent was not to provide demographic data but to provide a baseline in the populaces perceptions in specific areas. This information is important for psychological operations in developing programs to change negative perceptions or to maintain positive perceptions that support the CJTF-76 mission and stated objectives. POTF-AF will continually update the perceptions through monthly perception/trends analysis utilizing information gathered from PSYOP elements, SITREPs, SIGACTs, and contracted surveys.
(S//REL) SECURITY: Afghans cite security as Afghanistans biggest problem (22%), while unemployment, poor economy, and the presence of Taliban all come in second at 12%. Nearly 30% of Afghans believe that the Taliban are the greatest threat to Afghanistan. Afghans identify insurgents as bringing insecurity rather than foreign forces but blame unemployment for driving insecurity, not the insurgents. Altai Consulting concludes that jobs and more ANP will improve security at the local level while at the national level jobs, collecting weapons, and more ANA provide more security. The majority of Afghans trust the ANA (84%) and ANP (86%). Most Afghans are proud of their ANA (84%) and ANP (76%) but only a third believe they are very capable of protecting their area.
(S//REL) GOVERNANCE: Most Afghans (85%) believe Afghanistan should be a unified nation. Nearly 9 out of 10 people say they have confidence in the national government in 2006. This has remained unchanged since 2004. 90% of Afghans back President Karzai and this has remained the same since 2004. Most people perceive democracy as meaning freedom while others said democracy means peace, and a smaller number said rights and laws. Over half of those asked strongly agreed and 29% somewhat agreed that religious authorities should lead people in obeying their faith while political leaders should make decisions about running the government. Two thirds believe that Islamic countries can be a democracy without becoming westernized. Close to half of both Sunni and Shia and all ethnicities believe religious laws should dictate all aspects of life including economics, politics, culture, and family.
(S//REL) DEVELOPMENT: When asked what the main reason for the countrys progress was nearly a third cites security, followed by peace/end of war (29%) and then disarmament (26%). Just over half of the Afghans feel that their economic prosperity has increased since the fall of the Taliban. When asked what is the biggest problem at the local level unemployment ranks as the top concern (18%) followed fairly closely with basic needs such as electricity, food, water, and health care. Perceptions of foreign forces reconstruction efforts vary widely from region to region. Kabul has the highest perception rate of foreign forces helping a lot. Radio is the most popular means for people to receive information of national importance followed by television and family and friends. Men rely on radio and women rely on word of mouth for information. Only 20% of Afghans said they would completely trust information from foreign forces and 44% would trust the information a little bit.
(S//REL) STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS: Afghans, on average believe that the motives of foreign forces are to bring peace and security. Three out of four Afghans believe foreign forces are necessary in Afghanistan and 74% believe they should stay until Afghanistan is fully at peace. 75% say the U.S. treats Afghanistan with respect. Three-quarters still support U.S. military presence which is down from 81% in 2005. When asked which country is providing the most aid, nearly half of the Afghans responded with USA, Japan, Germany, and India.
(S//REL) PROPAGANDA: In 2006, there were over 1000 reports of insurgent propaganda throughout Afghanistan. In most areas intimidation is the primary means for propaganda. There has been an increase in resentment and resistance towards the Taliban as a result. This reliance on intimidation is their greatest weakness as it is unlikely that it will gather long-term support. Another line of persuasion contained in most insurgent propaganda is that the coalition forces are here to weaken/destroy Islam. This line of persuasion appears to be ineffective since only 12% of the 21% of the Afghan populace felt the country was going in the wrong direction believed Islam is in danger due to the presence of coalition forces/foreign fighters.
(U) POC: LTC Jeffrey L. Scott, POTF-AF Commander, CJTF-76, Jeffrey.l.scott@cjtf76.centcom.smil.mil , DSN 231-3003 or SGT Joseph Atneosen, POTF-AF S2, joseph.o.atneosen@cjtf76.centcom.smil.mil , DSN 321-3062.

See Attachment

Iranian State-sponsored Prostitution

Sat, 11 Dec 2010 18:13:21 -0500

http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10BAGHDAD167.html
S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000167

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV KISL KCOR
SUBJECT: PRT MUTHANNA: RENTAL SHEIKS AND LOST IRANIAN
WEEKENDS

REF: A. 08 BAGHDAD 3492
¶B. 08 BAGHDAD 3654

Classified By: xxxxx for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d
)

¶1. (U) This is a xxxxx reporting cable.

¶2. (S) SUMMARY: xxxxx met with local leader Sheikh xxxxx. During our lengthy discussions the
Sheikh shared his belief that the USG has poorly utilized its
influence in Iraq, leaving the way open for Iran to advance
its agenda at USG expense. He went on to describe Iranian
government attempts to buy his influence on a recent trip he
made to Iran. End Summary.

A new twist on &what happens in vegas, stays in vegas8
--------------------------------------------- ---------
¶3. (S) Sheikh xxxxx on January 13 to
discuss his recent trip to Iran. He told the xxxxx that he has
been courted by Iranian officials in an effort to garner more
support and influence among well-placed Iraqis in the middle
Euphrates area. He noted that the &handler8 for the tribal
leaders in this area is xxxxx, who has long
family ties locally.

¶4. (S) The public reason for xxxxx trip to Tehran
was for a medical check-up. He privately told xxxxx that his trip was more for pleasure
than medical treatment and included one or more short-term
&marriages8 (i.e. with state-sanctioned prostitutes) and
other entertainment. xxxxx shared that other (unnamed)
tribal leaders had enjoyed similar privileges while guests of
the Iranian regime recently.

Dashed expectations
-------------------
¶5. (S) The Sheikh suggested that some Iraqi figures are more
susceptible to Iranian influence because of disillusionment
with the United States. During the meeting with xxxxx asked repeatedly, &Why have the Americans let us
down?8 After he and other tribal sheikhs visited the White
House and met then-President Bush in 2008, he expected to
benefit financially from the Americans. Instead, he
suggested that the Americans did nothing for him, even after
he reported on Iranian activities in Muthanna (Ref A). &The
United States did not secure their friends, the sheikhs,
financially, and has left them vulnerable to Iranian
temptations.8

¶6. (S) xxxxx also complained that while tribal leaders
in fairly stable areas used their influence to help minimize
insurgent activities over the past several years, they have
received nothing for their efforts. Cooperative sheikhs in
insurgent hotbeds like Anbar, in contrast, received benefits
from the Americans. xxxxx cited Abu Risha as an
example, noting he received money, projects, and other
perquisites for his cooperation. He finished by noting that
several of the White House-invited tribal leaders have been
quietly grumbling. He states that he has had conversations
on this perceived inequity with parliamentarian xxxxx from Diwaniyah.

¶7. (S) Additionally, xxxxx was frustrated with
the current regime in Baghdad. He stated that the United
States' support of the Maliki government has only increased
Iran's influence in Iraq, enabling operatives to influence
political decisions and diminish national sovereignty. The
Iraqi government has not made progress in fighting poverty,
it has failed to provide essential services, and it is full
of corruption. He asked if the United States is supporting
Iran. &Why? Because you have American troops on the
ground, but you are advancing Iranian interests without
costing them anything.8

Comment
-------
¶8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known
Q8. (S) PRT COMMENT: Southern Iraqi sheikhs are well known
for shifting their loyalties based on financial
considerations. PM Maliki's Isnad/Tribal Support Councils
are particularly noteworthy in this regard. Susceptible
sheikhs will trade their influence for financial support
especially if the sheikh is not independently wealthy.
(Note: xxxxx and
does not independently enjoy a large bankroll. End note.)
In turn, the sheikh can mobilize supporters, when needed
(e.g. Ref B). The influence, however, is rented and not
bought. If the financial contributions suddenly stop, much
of the support may also cease. xxxxx considers this true
for Iranian influence in the region as well. If Iran
continues to pay for support among influential sheikhs, the

Islamic Republic will likely increase its influence. If and
when the money dries up, so will the cooperation among these
rented sheikhs. End Comment.
Hill